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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines stock price bubbles in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) from its 
establishment in April 1975 until December 2012 using regime-switching bubble models, 
on the main aggregated market index, called the “SET Index,” and several disaggregated 
stock indices by industrial sector. The results suggest some evidence of bubble-like 
behaviour in these indices, most especially when a structural break is included at July 1997, 
the date when Thailand switched to adopting a managed floating exchange rate system. 
Given the limitations of published stock price indices in Thailand – a new, consistent index 
was computed – the K-NI. The econometric test results using this new index indicate strong 
evidence of stock price bubbles in several industrial sectors and at least some evidence of 
bubbles in all industry groups in the SET. Finally, the standard model is extended to study 
the transmission of bubbles between industry groups.  The results indicate some levels of 
contagion in the Technology sector, as well as, in several other industry groups, while the 
Resources sector seems to be relatively isolated. 
 
Key words: asset pricing, stock market bubble, bubble test, regime-switching model, bubble 
contagion, Thai stock market 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
According to IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database: October 2014 Edition, the 2014 
Thai nominal gross domestic product (GDP) was estimated to be around US$380 billion, 
ranking 32nd in the world, or ranking 22nd based on the purchasing-power-parity valuation 
of approximately US$990 billion. Thailand’s principal stock market is the Stock Exchange 
of Thailand (SET), the domestic market capitalisation of which was about US$430 billion 
at the end of December 2014, ranking it 22th out of the 64 exchanges, according to the World 
Federation of Exchange (WFE) statistics. These figures illustrate the significance of the Thai 
economy and the Thai stock market in both the South East Asian region and the global 
economy in 2015. This position, however, has been achieved over a relatively short time 
period, given the stock market was not opened until 1975. 
 
There have been several periods of rapid expansion in the Thai stock market. For example, 
the market index more than doubled from 400 points to about 900 points during 1988-1989. 
It slowed down during 1990 until mid-1992 and then soared to above 1700 points in 1993. 
Market capitalisation rose about 25 times during these six years from 138 billion baht to 
3,325 trillion baht. During the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997-1998, the Thai market was 
heavily hit. The Stock Exchange of Thailand’s SET Index plummeted from 850 points to 
370 points, and the market capitalisation shrank to just a third of the previous year’s 
valuation. More recently the global crash of 2007-08 also impacted the Thai stock market 
which saw the index plunged by more than 50% from the October 2007 high at around 900 
points to the November 2008 low at roughly 400 points. However, the index had rebounded 
strongly to about 1400 points at the end of 2012.   
 
It is this record of growth and volatility in the Thai stock market that provides the motivation 
for this thesis. Since the long-term growth of the Thai economy depends in part on the ability 
of local and international firms to grow by raising capital, it is important to examine the 
extent to which the true fundamental value of the assets governs the level of the stock price 
index or if there exist periods of dramatic price rises followed by remarkable sharp price 
corrections - a phenomenon known as bubbles. In these bubble phases, market transactions 
are motivated by expectations of future price increases, with little regard to the 
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fundamentals. This study, therefore, aims to investigate in presence and importance of stock 
price bubbles in the Thai stock market. 
 
This study of bubbles is a topical issue and has motivated asset-pricing research to 
understand its developments to produce sensible forecasts for future decisions. Although 
some authors, such as Garber (1990), may have doubted the validity of claims for the widely 
cited events as bubbles, it is clear that asset mispricing is typically associated with crashes 
and crises, which pose serious challenges to the financial stability of the economy. At least, 
the resulting loss of investor confidence would hurt the economy through the rise in the cost 
of capital for businesses. Given these implications, it begs the question whether policy 
makers should actively try to break the bubbles. At first glance, it seems desirable for the 
central banks or the government to restrain the bubbles or burst them when preventions 
failed. In the real world, however, the issue is much more complicated.  First of all, the true 
models for explaining asset price behaviour are far from settled, and it is almost impossible 
to conclusive identify bubbles as the economy is going through different periods. 
Furthermore, large asset price drops are not necessarily coincided with economic recessions. 
Expansive economic measures can help alleviate the severity of any potential downturn, 
although the use of such policies is questioned to have contributed to form the next bubble 
(Jones, 2014; Meltzer, 2002). On the other hand, speculations in stock markets could 
provide potential economic benefits as well. Consider a case where financing is limited to 
borrowing from banks. Companies with innovative but risky projects may never obtain the 
funding required. However, with its capability of risk-sharing and diversifications, stock 
markets could help enable the implementation of new technology, which consequently lead 
to better long-run economic growth (Komaromi, 2006).  Nevertheless, the asset prices 
would deteriorate if investors’ expectations of future profits do not materialise, due to mal- 
or over-investments, for example.  In addition, an economy could realise long-run benefits 
from institutional or regulatory change, triggered by the collapse of bubbles. 
 
Apart from winners and losers in the stock market, bubbles are also in the interests of 
financial intermediaries, such as brokerage firms, mutual funds, and investment banks. A 
boom in the stock market means more trading activities and potential fees to be collected 
by these parties. Money managers, in particularly, would gain from understanding the 
behaviour of asset price for their portfolio optimisation and hedging decisions. Specifically, 
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they could profit from trading rules that allow them to successfully ride the bubbles and exit 
just before the burst, for instance.  
 
Finally, the issue of financial bubbles has also attracted a great deal of consideration from 
the academics. Similar to the investors, researchers seek to formulate models suitable for 
pricing assets as well. They aim to improve the knowledge of investor behaviour and 
resulting bubbles – in particular, the dynamics of bubbles in different asset classes, and in 
different groups or sectors, and whether they are contagion between them. Most importantly, 
the analysis of bubbles help improve the understanding of determinants of asset prices and 
whether they are driven by fundamentals, as well as, other non-fundamental factors. 
 
The thesis makes four identifiable contributions to the literature. First, this study focuses on 
bubble behaviour in the Thai stock market from its establishment in April 1975 until 
December 2012. Even though it stands as one of the largest stock markets in the South-east 
Asian region with strong linkages to other more advanced markets, the amount of research 
on bubbles in the Thai market is very limited. Only a few frequently cited papers exist: for 
example, Jirasakuldech et al. (2008), who examined whether Thai stock price deviated from 
fundamental values, and Watanapalachaikul and Islam (2007) who considered rational 
speculative bubbles in the Thai stock market using the Weibull Hazard model, but with data 
spanning only from 1992 to 2001. Other work on the Thai market usually appears as a part 
of broader studies of Asian markets, such as that by Chan et al. (1998). 
 
A second contribution of the thesis is that in addition to the main market-wide index, 
disaggregated indices were also examined. They provide a more detailed insight as to which 
industry or sector contains bubbles and may be regarded as an informal test of the claim by 
Jung and Shiller (2005) that results based on the aggregated market index would be more 
obscure than any derived from the disaggregated sectors. The idea is that in aggregate 
bubbles in different sectors might offset each other, or a bubble in one sector of the market 
may drive a bubble in another sector. Although disaggregated sector data is available from 
the SET’s industry group and sectoral indices and Thomson Reuters’ Datastream, both of 
these sets of data have limitations. For example, there were many sectoral indices which 
make estimation and interpretation less manageable, while the official industry group 
indices were only available for a limited sample period. At the same time, the bubble 
calculations based on Datastream-calculated indices were not completely reliable. 
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Consequently, a new index – referred to as the K-NI – was computed; it overcomes these 
limitations by replicating the SET’s industry group indices and extending them to start as 
far as 1988. 
 
The third contribution of this thesis is to apply a regime-switching model approach to the 
Thai market. This model is intuitively very appealing and has been applied in other contexts, 
such as van Norden and Schaller (1993) who analysed the Toronto Stock Exchange, and 
Anderson et al. (2010) who studied the S&P500. For studies on Thai market, only 
Pongsutinart (2000) used this particular technique with the SET Index. Nonetheless, his 
sample size, covering only the data during 1989-1999, was far too short – especially when 
compared to a more extended coverage in this research. Moreover, Pongsutinart (2000) 
adopted the basic Van Norden-Schaller model, while this thesis considered the volume-
augmented model which also includes abnormal trading volume as an indicator to help 
identify the possible timing of bubble collapse.  
 
Additionally, one of the specific features of the Thai market over the period of study is the 
switch in exchange rate regime during 1997, which is one example of a potential structural 
break. Other examples may be the financial liberalisation policies by the Thai government 
in the early 1990s or the recent global financial crises. Experimentation with endogenous 
breakpoints and multiple structure breaks are therefore a feature of the modelling approach 
employed in this thesis. As the inclusion of structural breaks improves the results from 
estimations, this method suggests that significant changes in the behaviour of Thai market 
returns took place. Particularly, the model allowing for two structural breaks picked up the 
breakpoints at September 1996 and August 1998, consistent with splitting the period up to 
pre-crisis, the Asian Financial Crisis, and post-crisis sub-periods.    
 
Finally, the baseline bubble model was also extended to capture potential bubble 
transmission between industry groups within the Thai stock market. Three models were 
investigated, namely the model for contagion with all other industry groups (Model A), the 
model for contagion with the market-wide index as a proxy (Model M), and the model for 
contagion between two industry groups (Model J). The comparison of results between 
models shows that the technology stocks were the most contagious, while stocks in 
resources industry were rather isolated. Several other industry groups were found to be 
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heavily interlinked as well. The findings of the Granger Causality tests partly reinforced 
these results. 
 
This thesis is organised as followed. Chapter 2 critically reviews the theoretical and relevant 
empirical literature on stock market bubbles and contagion. The institutional structure of the 
Thai stock market is elaborated in Chapter 3, together with documentation of its historical 
development and performance. Chapter 4 describes the econometric methodology used in 
the thesis to test the bubble hypothesis, the results of which are reported in the following 
three chapters. Chapter 5 presents the results from the aggregate market index, Chapter 6 
the results from the disaggregated (industry group and sectoral) indices and Chapter 7 the 
results from the inter-sector contagion models. Overall conclusions from the empirical 
analysis and potential implications for policy are noted in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 2: Review of the Literature on Asset Bubbles 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Historically, episodes of extreme movements of asset prices, such as the Tulipmania in the 
early 1960s in the Netherlands, Japan during 1980s, or the dot-com bubble in the late 1990s 
in the US, were observed every once in a while. Prices significantly rose which sometimes 
continued for an extended period, and then followed by sharp corrections. Such phenomena 
motivated much research. The fact that the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences 
in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2013 – commonly referred to as the Nobel Prize in Economics 
– were awarded to three laureates who have contributed to the understanding of asset pricing 
only helps show the significance of the field. 
 
Still, economists diverge in their opinions as to what actually determine prices. Many 
believe that prices are driven by fundamental factors, such as expected future dividends 
streams, however, there exists plenty of evidence that suggests otherwise. That led 
researchers to search for other factors, one of which is the possibility of bubbles. The 
question whether a bubble exists in the financial market in a particular period has significant 
implications for the economy and market participants. Specifically, asset prices serve to 
allocate economy’s limited resources to the best use. A bubble could potentially distort 
decisions to consume, save, and invest. Damages caused by the collapse of a bubble were 
substantial and demanded a large amount of attention by regulators and policy makers. 
Investment managers would also monitor the development of asset prices and try to form 
optimal trading rules to obtain highest returns. Finally, as mentioned earlier, the issue draws 
massive attention from the academic community as well. 
 
There have been many theoretical models, empirical tests, experiments proposed by 
countless of authors. From the early works in the 1960s, researchers were focusing on the 
fundamental factor as a key determinant of prices with discount rates which include the risk 
premium assumed to be constant, as well as, whether bubbles will be prohibited or broken 
if occurred by market forces. When that appeared to be unconvincing, economists also 
investigated the possibility of time-varying discount rates. Lately, many assumptions were 
further relaxed, and concepts brought over from the field of psychology were introduced. In 
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short, the bubble literature has experienced considerable advancements. There are still many 
unresolved issues. While the role of behavioural biases of traders seems to help further 
complement the understanding of bubbles, they are still relatively underexplored.  The 
review of the earlier literature includes, for example, Camerer (1989) and Stiglitz, (1990), 
while a survey of more recent approaches is offered by Scherbina (2013). 
 
Several economists have offered their descriptions of a bubble, but there is no universally 
agreed definition (see, for example, Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005; Brunnermeier, 2008). 
Most of them emphasised on a situation where prices deviate from the fundamental value, 
or that they move independently of the fundamental value or cannot be explained by any 
reasonable future changes in fundamental factors. This definition allows for a simple 
mathematical representation of bubbles as a difference between actual price and 
fundamentals. The sharp rise of price and the divergence from fundamentals typically 
believed to be caused by the expectations of continued price increase or the possibility of 
reselling at higher prices. This resale optionality stresses the importance of anticipations and 
self-fulfilling nature of future price movements. Kindleberger and Aliber (2005) also 
mentioned that the price surge from the bubble is a continuous process whose initial rise 
leads to an expectation of further advances and drawing in new buyers. The new players 
represent excess demand and result in demand-side inflation or bubble. Many economists, 
as early as Keynes (1936), recognised the impacts of emotions and psychological biases of 
investors. Keynes made a distinction between the more legitimate enterprise investment and 
the speculation under the influence of mass psychology. He also further described 
speculation as the activity of predicting market’s psychology. More precisely, investment 
decisions are not made based on the intrinsic value but rather the prediction of what average 
opinion expects average opinion to be.  Episodes of trade frenzy or volatile price were 
thought to be caused by over-confidence and panic – or change in animal spirits which Alan 
Greenspan referred to as irrational exuberance – in the market. Shiller (2014) also pointed 
out the epidemic nature of bubble where investing ideas based on exaggerated beliefs of one 
investor can be contagious to others, as well as, the important role of news media in 
spreading and suppressing the information. Finally, some authors focused on the social 
dimensions of bubbles, regarding members of the general public who has little interest or 
understanding in the financial markets being drawn into participating the bubble and suffer 
the eventual burst. However, this aspect is less practical for formal testing.  
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Bubbles in the different context could mean slightly different things, and their properties 
are also inconclusive. In general, it usually begins with prices deviate from fundamental 
value explosively and persistently then reversals follow. Most papers concentrated on 
overvaluation or positive bubbles because it is more common, due to relatively more limit 
on short selling activity. The expectation for higher sale price in the future was typically 
assumed to initiate a bubble. Alternatively, others suggested they can be artificially made 
by the incorrect model of fundamental values, or violations of assumptions included in the 
fundamental model such as information asymmetry, or created by exogenous factors 
uncorrelated with fundamental factors like psychology or behaviour of investors. For 
instance, the models that include the role of feedback traders interacting with rational 
investors, or behaviour of institutional investors under different limitations were proposed. 
On the other hand, the collapse of bubble often regarded by theories as caused by a change 
in investors’ beliefs about the future or by exogenous events. Moreover, although the term 
seems to suggest a drama of sudden burst, like the US market in 1929 or 2000, it is not 
required, and a bubble could gradually deflate and even reflate again or not instead, for 
example, the periods between  2003-2007 and 2009 until recently (Shiller, 2014). In 
addition, it is frequently observed that the run-up time and the crashes tend to be at different 
speeds, where collapses are shorter than the build-up, and when a bubble episode involved 
speculative attacks or regulatory change, its reversal is quicker than a sentiment change.  
Finally, there was evidence of different recovery time in different markets. Scherbina (2013) 
discussed that the real estate market took longer to bounce back than equity.  
 
There are three main methodologies for analysing bubbles. The first is the mathematical 
approach, which involves specifying mathematical models to explain various market 
characteristics. It includes conventional rational bubble models, the new generation of 
rational models where the assumption of perfect rationality is relaxed, and behavioural 
models. Proposed models are, for instance, models with asymmetrical information, or 
models with heterogeneous beliefs. However, with exact modelling, the approach is 
criticised regarding its generality, as it is only valid in certain specific contexts. Necessary 
and sufficient conditions are sometimes left unelaborated. An alternative approach is to 
conduct laboratory-based experiments to examine different factors, referred to as 
experimental approach. Finally, the literary approach qualitatively discussed properties, 
causes and effects, of different historical bubble incidents. It is interesting to note that 
although the terms bubble and asset price bubble are used interchangeably, Komaromi 
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(2006) discussed a fine distinction between them. Specifically, the former refers to an 
unqualified form of the bubble in the overall market, while the latter analyses a bubble 
formed in each specific asset which can be generalised into the entire market. In this sense, 
the mathematical and experimental approaches are more suitable for investigating asset 
price bubble, whereas with the literary approach can analyse a bubble phenomenon better.  
 
Analysing bubble phenomena face a number of challenges. Firstly, not all explosive price 
movements are bubbles, and an eventual price correction does not necessarily mean a 
breaking of bubbles if they reflect a systemic response by market participants which is 
entirely rational. For instance, if oil price surged due to scarcity, and when the petroleum 
substitute was discovered, the price could drop markedly (Stiglitz, 1990). In contrast, 
bubbles could arise but not detected. Jones (2014) discussed an example of when prices do 
not change or decrease just marginally, but expectations of future dividends become more 
pessimistic which results in lower fundamental values. Furthermore, even when it can be 
established that bubble exists, there are many competing theories attempting to explain the 
causes and developments of the bubbles. It is hard to determine unambiguously whether a 
bubble was caused by informational issues forbidding agents to act with perfect rationality, 
by institutional settings that limit the ability of rational investors to break the bubbles 
through arbitrage, or by irrational behavioural errors of market participants. To put it 
differently, the split between those holding the rational expectations assumptions and those 
who believe in behavioural finance is somewhat unreal (Shiller, 2014). It could only be 
known with a reasonable level of certainty ex-post, which also implies real-time monitoring 
as the bubble is in progress would be exceptionally tricky if not impossible. This problem 
of inference, together with the unsettled definition of a bubble result in many empirical tests 
ignoring to elaborate on theoretical existence problem and treating bubbles as empirical 
issues (Gürkaynak, 2008). Finally, given that the perfect arbitrage does not really exist, 
prices would almost never be equal to the fundamental value. In other words, with a strict 
definition of a bubble, there is asset price bubble all the time. Thus, some researcher doubts 
whether bubble investigation is still relevant (Komaromi, 2006).   
 
The following sections elaborate on the theoretical arguments of rational bubble models, 
behavioural models, and related discussions. After that, the results drawn from the 
experimental approach are discussed. Next, the insights from the literary approach are 
explored. Finally, the last section focuses on empirical evidence from bubble detection tests.  
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2.2. Rational Bubble Models 
 
The standard asset pricing models assuming rational expectations normally start at what the 
fair price is. In principles, the fair price should reflect the intrinsic value of the asset. For a 
stock, it represents the present value of all the future dividends and the future price when 
the stock is to be sold or a terminal price. In a way, the future price will also be dependent 
future dividends further forward, thus, it implies expected dividend streams are the only 
systematic force driving the price movements. The implication is that there cannot be any 
bubbles. This is because investors are rational, and when they observe price deviates from 
the fundamental value, they will intervene such that the mispricing will be eliminated.    
 
However, this conclusion is based on such a simple model which relies on several 
assumptions. For example, there has to be no informational asymmetry, such that there are 
no uninformed momentum traders who infer information from others’ trades and amplify 
price movements away from the equilibrium. The representative consumer is assumed to be 
risk neutral or that there is no risk premium, implying that the discount rate is constant over 
time. Finally, to have the unique equilibrium price, dividends must grow at the rate lower 
than the discount rate so that the present value of future dividends in distant future are 
approaching zero and are negligible.   
 
The last assumption is also known as the transversality condition. If it is relaxed, there are 
an infinite number of possible relationships between price and fundamentals, or that price 
could have multiple equilibria. That could even include a path where actual price diverges 
from the fundamental value due to the existence of a bubble. In other words, actual price 
could have two components, which are the systematic fundamental part, and a bubble. That 
means the case where price is equal to fundamental value is only a special case, where a 
bubble is zero, out of many more general settings. The bubble can derive from different 
generating mechanisms, and there is no generally accepted view. The only condition for it 
to be consistent with rational expectations behaviour is that the bubble must be expected to 
grow at the rate equal to the discount rate.  The intuition is that if the bubble grows at a rate 
lower than the discount rate, it would also be insignificant in the distant future, and the 
transversality condition applies so that price would converge to the fundamental value. On 
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the other hand, if the growth rate is higher than the discount rate, the bubble would explode 
infinitely, and asset price would exceed the aggregate wealth of the economy.  
 
Another condition for the possibility of a bubble depends on the arbitrage opportunity. A 
bubble could exist if there are short-sale constraints in place, or the market is not complete 
such that not all instruments are available, or the asset does not have a close substitute. 
Maturity or investment period also matters. Bubbles could only exist with an asset with 
infinite periods. This is because if the asset has a fixed maturity, say, at time t, investors 
would know it cannot grow after a specific time and would, therefore, try to offload the 
assets in the period before. That means the price will not contain bubbles in the period t-1. 
It is only rational for investors to foresee this and decide to sell the assets before that. This 
backward induction repeatedly occurs until a conclusion is reached that there must never be 
a bubble in the first place. A similar result can be obtained if non-infinitely-lived decision 
makers replace the finite asset or that there are only limited number of players in the market. 
Rational investors are thought to prohibit the existence of a bubble. However, if they do not 
live forever or have overlapping generations to continue, there is no guarantee that there 
will be someone to break the bubbles. However, these results are based on the backward 
induction which implicitly implies complete information that the timing of the collapse is 
known. Allen et al. (1993), for example, showed that a bubble could exist for a finitely-lived 
asset when there is no common knowledge, and short-sale constraints are imposed. Lastly, 
Tirole (1982) discussed another type of common knowledge. If all agents regard the initial 
allocation as Pareto efficient, they will not trade the assets, and thus, rational bubbles cannot 
be present.  
 
There are many tests for rational bubble detection in the literature, and they will be discussed 
in the following sections. However, the results are not compelling (see, for example, Flood 
and Hodrick, 1990). Meltzer (2002) explained that part of the reasons was the inability for 
a researcher to observe expectations, and the models are, consequently, prone to 
misspecification. More critically, the broader issue is the joint hypothesis problem where 
the bubble hypothesis is tested against a maintained hypothesis of fundamental price 
valuation. Investors are assuming to have rational expectations and thus exploit all available 
information, but it is limited to what included in the maintain model. Bubbles would account 
for whatever remain explained or act as a catch-all. The fundamental value models had been 
under extreme scrutiny. The literature documented failures of the standard present value 
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model to capture certain characteristics. They include, for instance, non-linearity, long-
memory in dividends series – which refers to persistent deviations from the equilibrium 
condition (Caporale and Gil-Alana, 2004; Cuñado et al., 2005; Koustas and Serletis, 2005), 
and the impact of low probability but high impact event of a policy change such as currency 
regime or tax law – especially when they were expected but did not materialise (Flood and 
Hodrick, 1986; Flood et al., 1994). In these cases, the behaviour of prices would look like a 
bubble, though they are arguably not one, and thus complicate the identification of bubbles.  
 
Moreover, the standard model viewed the investors as practising buy-and-hold strategy and 
having an infinite investment period. However, in reality, data of terminal price extended 
into infinity are not available which means the fundamental value cannot be determined in 
advance (Stiglitz, 1990). Plus, there are several other trading motives which could lead to 
current price to include some interim returns as well. The assumption of perfect information 
is also crucial. There are several instances of financial markets that are incomplete, such 
that precise payoffs cannot be assigned or that investors have different information or 
interpretations. For example, Brunnermeier (2001) showed that asset price increase could 
happen because of the ability for investors with different prior opinions to trade as compared 
to the case where they cannot. Finally, although some authors argued that it would require 
extreme beliefs for the standard models to produce estimates of fundamental values that 
justify movements observed in the data, Jones (2014) proved that a small change in 
fundamental assumption could lead to significant impact on the assessed price as well.  
 
In addition, some authors also questioned the validity of fundamental models when applied 
to assets that do not typically pay dividends like technology stocks. Anderson et al. (2010) 
and Anderson and Brooks (2014) argued that the use of alternatives measures such as 
earnings, or soft variables like human resources, patents, or web traffic were not proved to 
represent fundamental values better by previous studies. In addition, their tests detected 
bubble in several sectors and not just the technology sectors, which led them to conclude 
that the fundamental model based on dividends are equally applicable, and the approach 
allowed for direct comparisons between sectors as well. Furthermore, Damodaran (2002) 
also showed that the conventional fundamental valuation is still valid with growth stocks 
although it tends to be quite noisy. All these issues illustrate how complicated the problem 
of fundamental price estimation could be and the impact it has on the identification of 
bubbles. 
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The rational bubble model implied that price would explode to be infinitely large. However, 
this is not observed in the data. Froot and Obstfeld (1991) proposed an alternative type of 
bubble, which is determined by evaluation of dividends instead of being stochastic, and 
referred to it as an intrinsic bubble. The approach yielded some promising results that are 
more closely aligned with empirical observations and could help explains several puzzles, 
such as why prices are more volatile than dividends or overreact to dividend changes 
(Scherbina, 2013). Furthermore, it could replicate a bubble burst, as a bubble would 
disappear when the fundamentals are zero.  
 
The next issue regarding rational bubbles is about the conditions on initiating and 
terminating bubbles. Several authors had pointed out that the models are providing very 
little clues on these matters. Brunnermeier (2008), for example, concluded that rational 
bubbles must already exist when the trading of the asset started, as they can never emerge 
within the asset-pricing model. Moreover, it is quite inconclusive with regards to negative 
bubbles. Some papers allowed for the existence of such bubble, while others argued against 
such possibility. For instance, Brunnermeier (2008) explained that it is not possible as it 
suggests that, at some point in time, the expected asset price has to become negative.  
 
Lastly, it is also difficult to separate between rational and non-rational or behavioural 
bubbles. The main difference between the two explanations is the rational bubbles are 
related to rational response based on some structural hypothesis, while the collapse of a 
bubble based on irrational exuberance works independently from such kind of hypothesis. 
However, this issue is complicated by uncertainties in determining the fundamental value. 
For example, a change to fundamentals could happen, but investors cannot distinguish with 
certainty the type of the shocks whether it is temporary, permanent in level, or permanent 
in growth rate (Meltzer, 2002). Investors could form different views regarding price 
prospect, and the correctness of their predictions would only be confirmed ex-post. This 
could be applied in the case of new technology innovations or liberalisation of monetary 
policy of central banks (Zeira, 1999).  
 
In conclusion, the initial focus on rational bubbles did not produce convincing explanations 
due to both the failure of the standard models, as well as, the questionable assumptions of 
perfect rationality. The new generation of rational models introduces more realistic features, 
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such as non-standard preference, incentive structure, and market frictions. It allows the 
researcher to explain movements of price without having to resort to irrational behaviour. 
Scherbina (2013), for instance, discussed three examples: herding, limited liability, and 
perverse incentives.  
 
The first aspect is herding, which is when investors follow the actions of others. Herding is 
deemed to be an important mechanism for starting and spreading bubbles. Theories of 
herding suggested that investors have incomplete information and thus try to improve their 
trading strategies by looking for hints from other investors (Shiller, 2001). Alternatively, it 
could be the outcome from other settings with non-standard preferences or different 
incentive structures as well. They are, for example, relative wealth model (DeMarzo et al., 
2008), interaction between ‘smart’ and ‘dumb’ money managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 
1990), the cost of going against the herd by investment managers in terms of fund outflows, 
and the role played by popular media in attracting investors to a particular asset.  
 
Secondly, a situation where investors only faced limited downside risk but enjoy the full 
benefits of rising price is referred to as limited liability. It could contribute to the existence 
of bubble as it increases willingness for money managers to ‘ride the bubble’ instead of 
breaking it. The means, for instance, unskilled managers would participate in a bubble and 
hope they can sell it in time before the burst. They would not mind taking this risk since 
they could earn high profits if it works out well, while the losses are limited if they do not 
manage to. This is particularly notable for risky assets. The higher the risk, the more money 
is drawn into the bubble, thus the larger the size.   
 
Lastly, many important market players who are supposed to provide correct information and 
could help prevent bubbles have perverse incentives. Equity analysts, rating agencies, 
accounting auditors have the role of disseminating information to other market participants. 
However, they are sometimes motivated by badly-structured incentives to not tell the truths. 
For example, equity analysts issuing sell recommendations would risk hurting their 
connections with the companies and be cut off from future communications, or auditors and 
rating agencies faced conflicts of interests as they are paid by the firm and would be 
concerned about losing future businesses.  
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2.3. Behavioural Explanations 
 
Since the 1990s, there have been several hundred papers presenting empirical evidence of 
inconsistencies with investors’ rationality (Shiller, 2014). Instead of assuming rational 
expectations, the alternative approach of behavioural finance also incorporated 
psychological patterns of investor behaviour to explain asset price movements. The 
behavioural models assume that at least one group of investors is irrational. These non-
rational investors follow typical behavioural patterns with assumptions based on 
psychological evidence or make decisions based on rules of thumb instead of being perfectly 
rational. Some authors argued that they are not entirely wrong but rather quasi-rational 
(Komaromi, 2006). As opposed to rational models which concentrate on possibility and 
conditions for bubble formation under perfect rationality, behavioural approach attempt to 
model the observed price dynamics by taking into account certain behavioural specifics. 
Behavioural approach can explain some anomalies in asset returns and also finds support 
from experimental studies (Scherbina, 2013). Moreover, in the original rational bubble 
models, investors would hold the assets as they grow in expectations ad infinitum, while 
more recent models would include an option to resell to others, sometimes referred to as 
‘greater fools’. Lastly, the rational bubble models cannot really explain how bubbles are 
initiated or assume that they must already be present, while the behavioural models suggest 
some possible causes, for example, bubbles arise when investors overreact to information 
or money illusion (Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008).  
 
In any case, there are also issues in analysing bubbles with the behavioural models. Firstly, 
this approach still has the fundamental value as a benchmark for the existence of bubbles. 
However, as argued in the case of rational models, the validity of fundamental value is 
disputed. It is still not possible to test and exclude all possible explanations to conclude the 
existence of bubbles irrefutably. There are always alternative explanations for bubble-like 
episodes. For example, the rational story of 1929 bubble in the US is along the line of the 
new economy and new era beliefs, together with the monetary policy by the Federal 
Reserves, or that technological innovations are bringing significant changes in productivity 
but do not result in substantial changes in profits of companies (Meltzer, 2002). Reinhart 
and Rogoff  (2009) also described many cases of bubbles in emerging markets led by the 
expansion of credit resulting from financial liberalisation. It is difficult to identify as the 
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economy is experiencing a bubble whether which explanation is correct and it could 
potentially take years before conclusive evidence is available. In addition, Meltzer (2002) 
and Komaromi (2006) pointed out that the behavioural approach only explores the issues in 
general terms. This means, for example, it does not precisely analyse the dynamics of 
investor behaviour over different time periods, or does not explain the behaviour of sellers 
thoroughly. If it is assumed that there will be someone predicting the collapse of bubble and 
would have sold the assets out earlier, the volume of short sales is too small, or if it is 
assumed that the holders of assets turn into sellers who increasingly offload the assets at 
different price levels, more concentrated holdings are not always observed.   
 
In terms of an example of specific models, Scherbina (2013) discussed behavioural bubbles 
in four settings. 
 
2.3.1. Model 1: Differences in opinions and short sale constraints 
 
This first setting is based on a combination of disagreement among investors and short sale 
constraints. The model incorporates some uncertainty such that there are investors who 
interpret information positively, and others who are more pessimistic. Alternatively, the 
model could start from investors started with different prior belief distribution but would 
not try to infer from each other due to psychological biases like overconfident, such that 
they agree to disagree even when they share all information (Brunnermeier, 2008).  The 
pessimistic investors are limited by short sale constraints and consequently are not able to 
sell their assets, while the optimistic investors are very rigid in their view such that they 
ignore the possibility of others who may think differently but cannot offload the asset. With 
the optimistic investors pushing up the price and pessimistic investors not being able to 
counterbalance, the result is that price would be higher than the fair price. Harrison and 
Kreps (1978) developed a model with this foundation in a dynamic setting. They concluded 
that differences in opinion and short sale constraints could cause a bubble. A bubble of this 
type would usually coincide with high price volatility and trading volume. Scheinkman and 
Xiong (2003) showed that it should be accompanied by active trading and that the bubble 
size increases with the degree of overconfidence but decrease with trading costs. The 
validity of this model is also confirmed by several empirical studies based on analyst 
earnings forecasts or mutual fund ownership as a proxy for different opinions of investors 
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(Chen et al., 2002; Diether et al., 2002). Finally, under this setting, a bubble will collapse 
when the uncertain is resolved or that short sale constraints become less binding. This 
prediction is supported by evidence based on price declines observed around the time of 
earnings announcements, and the expiration of the lock-up provisions imposed by many 
technology companies’ initial public offerings (Ofek and Richardson, 2003; Scherbina, 
2008). 
 
2.3.2. Model 2: Feedback trading 
 
Feedback traders refer to a group of investors whose trade demand is exclusively determined 
by past movements of price. They can lead to bubbles by the following process. Suppose 
there is a positive news regarding the asset’s future cash flow which would result in price 
increase. This initial return attracts feedback traders who expect the return to continue and 
push prices up further beyond justified by the initial news. The extra return would draw in 
subsequent investors who buy the asset and result in price rising even further and so on. 
Although it is difficult to forecast the exact point of sentiment reversal, it usually 
corresponds to the decelerating of bubble growth after new inflows start to slow down, 
which is sometimes indicated by the participation of poor households or those who do not 
generally take part in financial markets, or caused by credit tightening such as capital control 
or tax policy (Scherbina, 2013). Investment funds would begin to flow out and thus leading 
to bubble deflation or collapse. Instead of exhaustion of new capital, an alternative 
mechanism that could potentially cause a bubble to deflate is the introduction of a new 
supply of the assets, for example, seasonal equity offerings in the case of stocks. This would 
also reduce pressure on price to keep on rising. Shiller (2001) also discussed the role of new 
media in attractive new investors into the bubble, which keeps the bubble growing for some 
time before the eventual burst. In some way, this setting is comparable to a Ponzi scheme 
where it is sustained by new inflows and those who are in early hope to get out just before 
it deflates. Another interesting feature of this model is the action of rational investors if 
introduced. Recall that rational investors are expected to break the bubbles. However, in this 
case, because they predict the action of feedback traders which will result in an even higher 
price, they would, in fact, participate in the bubble, rather than trading against it. Moreover, 
the interaction between returns and trading volume could signal different stages of bubbles 
in this model. Trading volume is a natural outcome from investors contributing to the 
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bubble. Finally, Scherbina (2013) also discussed the possibility of frauds to prevent returns 
from falling which will lead to outflows of investments at the later stage of the bubble.  
 
2.3.3. Model 3: Biased self-attribution  
 
Biased self-attribution is one of the heavily examined behavioural phenomena in 
psychology. In the context of the stock market, it is related to the situation where investors 
become selective in interpreting the signals they received by only paying attention to those 
supporting the views they hold and ignoring those that contradict. Daniel et al. (1998) 
constructed a model with this setting. In their model, investors first obtained a noisy private 
signal by, for instance, conducting their own research, and formed their initial prediction of 
the asset price. Then, they also received a noisy public signal. Because they suffer this biased 
self-attribution, they are dogmatic to the view they established earlier. If the public signal 
support what was interpreted from their private signal, they would become ever more 
confident and, consequently, revise their expectations further in the direction of their initial 
valuation. However, if they are conflicting, the investors will dismiss the public information 
and price will be unaffected. A bubble is registered when the price is revised further beyond 
what is justified by fundamentals in the first case.  Eventually, when sufficient amount of 
public signal convinced the investors to become less confident in their interpretation of the 
private signal, the bubble would begin to deflate.  
 
2.3.4. Model 4: Representativeness heuristic and conservatism bias 
 
The last model is based on two behavioural biases from psychology concerning how 
information is processed. Representativeness heuristic is when investors make decisions on 
the rule of thumb based on information that stands out more than others, for example, 
overreacting to an attention-grabbing news. On the other hand, conservatism bias is a 
mistake in information process where investors value the initial information used to form 
an opinion but deem new information received after the opinion is formed that may be 
conflicting as not important. In other words, investors put too little weight on relevant 
information and underreact as they look as if they are just regular evidence. An example of 
a model in this setting is by Barberis et al. (1998). In their model, investors mistakenly 
assume a wrong asset pricing model based on a few realisation of earnings data that occur 
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by chance. They detected a pattern and assumed it to continue into the future. That means 
they suffer representativeness heuristic. Alternatively, if investors hold a certain incorrect 
model to be true and fail to revise their model based on recent realisations of earnings, they 
would have suffered conservatism bias. When investors conduct their trades based on a false 
model, their price predictions could be incorrect. This mispricing is a bubble, and it will 
continue until the investors revise their pricing model once they have accumulated sufficient 
evidence that they have made a mistake. In other words, the bubble would collapse when 
the sentiment is reversed. Besides, a strong negative signal could also lead to a burst of the 
bubble. For instance, stock market crash in 1929 may have acted as a negative signal for 
real estate market (Nicholas and Scherbina, 2013). 
 
Regarding a comparison between these four behavioural models, there are several 
similarities as well as difference among them. For instance, Model 1 with heterogeneous 
beliefs among investors and short sale constraints could only result in positive bubbles, 
while both positive and negative bubbles are possible for the other three models. Secondly, 
Model 1, Model 3 and Model 4 are more appropriate for assets that are difficult for valuation 
and judgement is critical, but Model 2 could also work with more basic assets. Thirdly, the 
accompanied trading volume can be conjectured for Model 1 and Model 2. However, the 
same is not possible for Model 3 and Model 4 as the investors could be aggregated into 
representative agent settings. Finally, Model 3 would only produce a result in the form of 
overreaction, while Model 4 could yield a resulting bubble with initial underreact and then 
overreaction. 
 
2.4. Limit to Arbitrage 
 
Based on efficient market hypothesis, rational investors should take advantage of arbitrage 
opportunity when prices deviate from fundamentals and bubble cannot survive. Even with 
the existence of behavioural investors, when sufficient amount of short sales by arbitrageurs 
attacks the bubble, it would be undone. However, there are plenty of evidence against this 
prediction. Sophisticated investors like hedge funds were found to be participating in the 
bubbles, instead of correcting the mispricing, during the 1990s (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 
2004). Xiong and Yu (2011) also discussed a bubble in Chinese warrants in the late 2000s. 
Assuming a case of bubble existence has been established, the literature on limits to 
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arbitrage offers explanations on what might prohibit arbitrageurs from breaking the bubbles, 
apart from constraints from regulations on short selling. 
 
The first channel is the fundamental risk. Fundamentals may have changed positively such 
that the asset is no longer overvalued. Availability of close substitutes or other assets that 
are not overvalued but closely correlated to the bubbly asset is also an issue. The lack of 
such instrument would complicate the hedging strategy.  
 
Secondly, rational investors also interact with other behavioural investors who suffered 
psychological biases or noise traders. These irrational traders may keep pushing the price 
up further and cause the price to deviate from fundamental value even further. In other 
words, bubbles may continue to grow instead of collapsing. In that case, arbitrageurs would 
incur losses and may even have to cut back on their investments to meet margin calls. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) discussed how money managers are affected by these short-run 
price movements in terms of possible fund outflows. Consequently, they might trade less 
aggressively against the bubbles.  
 
Thirdly, as each investor represents only a small fraction of the total investment in the 
market, breaking the bubble requires coordinated efforts. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) 
considered a bubble model without a synchronisation mechanism for arbitrage attack. The 
model assumed sequential awareness of bubble existence by investors. This means each 
investor does not know what others know or how many of them have already recognised of 
the bubble. This lack of common knowledge dismisses the argument against the existence 
of bubble using backward induction process. Also, there is a trade-off faced by each player. 
If they attempt to bring the price down too early, they miss out on a further potential upside. 
However, if they are too late, they would suffer from the crash. The result is that rational 
investors could decide not to trade against the bubble since it is to their advantage to 
participate in the bubble for some time before breaking it in the end. The time it takes before 
the arbitrage is exercised depends on the level of disagreement among investors, and the 
size of investors required to attack the bubble successfully.  
 
Finally, arbitrage against bubble could be costly. When new information about the asset was 
difficult to interpret, it can lead to a mispricing. Investors have different skills and 
knowledge, and they might evaluate the effect of the new information on the fair price 
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differently. This information asymmetry means individual investors who correctly observed 
that price are overvalued and decided to attack the bubble may encounter liquidity issues, 
and trading costs could be high. Moreover, as arbitrageurs typically trade with large volume, 
they risk eliminating or reducing potential profits. Therefore, they may decide to defer their 
actions under bubbles burst by other exogenous factors, especially when the growth rate of 
the bubble is high and they can still enjoy the price surge.  
 
2.5. Policy Implications 
 
One of the most important aspects of bubble analysis is about policy implications. The issue 
is whether government inventions are required. Many authors supported the role of the 
government or the central bank in deflating or, failing that, breaking the bubbles. However, 
bubble identification cannot be with sufficient accuracy. For example, some economists 
argued that asset prices are consistent with distributions with fat tails. Moreover, policy 
makers do not have superior information and face the same uncertainty encountered by 
market participants in terms of detecting and predicting the future of bubbles. Moreover, 
any errors in interpretation will only be confirmed ex-post. In any case, Meltzer (2002) 
pointed out that a collapse of a bubble does not need to be followed by a recession. 
Economic policies could still be useful. Specifically, expansionary policies after the decline 
of the Nasdaq index in 2000 helped offset the resulting economic downturn in the US. 
Nonetheless, there are doubts whether the extended use of such policy could be provoking 
the next bubble in asset price (Jones, 2014).  Meanwhile, Scherbina (2013) suggested several 
initiatives, such as removal of short sale constraints and limited liability incentive structure 
by exposing investors to downside risks as well, or providing better financial education to 
reduce irrationality. 
 
2.6. Experimental Approach 
 
An alternative approach to the mathematical modelling of a bubble is the experimental 
approach. It directly investigates different factors affecting investor behaviour in artificial 
market settings. Several simulations were conducted with the different focus on various 
conditions based on the pioneering work of Smith et al. (1988). Researchers attempt to 
assess the size of the bubble and the probability of bubble initiation based on a particular 
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aspect of the setting while keeping other conditions constant. The main weakness of this 
methodology is the issue of how the findings obtained can be related to real world asset 
markets since the participants might be influenced by the specific circumstances set in the 
simulation (Komaromi, 2006). That is, they might act differently in their real life outside of 
the laboratory. Given the possible distortions, the evidence still reaffirms some of the factors 
for bubble formation discussed in the literature. For instance, bubble in assets with fixed 
maturity is possible. Moreover, investors are prone to mistakes, for example, in their 
discounting calculation, and may not make every decision rationally. Besides, the fact that 
bubbles do not disappear quickly implies participants might assume that not everyone is 
acting rationally. Lastly, bubbles were also found to be accompanied by high trading volume 
and high volatility of price relative to fundamentals, which is consistent with the existence 
of feedback traders. 
 
In general, the findings from several experiments revealed that there are two groups of 
factors determining the bubble formation. The first type is the uncertainty factors. The lack 
of common knowledge of rationality causes players to ride with the bubble, instead of 
breaking it (Lei et al., 2001). This is consistent with the investors assuming the existence of 
other noise traders which may allow them to resell the asset at a higher price in the future. 
The inclusion of experience players helped eliminate or reduce the number of bubble 
incidents as well (Dufwenberg et al., 2005). The uncertainty caused by the lack of 
information regarding the number of rounds the experiment is to be conducted was also 
found to lead to higher price deviations from the fundamental value (Stanley, 1997). Finally, 
if transaction information, such as the bid-ask details, are not provided, that also coincided 
with a larger bubble (Caginalp et al., 2001). The second set of factors involves liquidity. 
Caginalp et al. (2001) also documented the impacts of initial cash relative to price, and the 
liquidity caused by whether dividends are paid immediately or deferred on the size of the 
bubble. However, the evidence on the effect of short sale constraints was mixed. Ackert et 
al., (2002) concluded that permitting short selling resulted in price closer to fundamentals, 
while Haruvy and Noussair (2006) found that relaxing short sale constraints did not make 
the market more efficient.   
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2.7. Literary Approach 
 
The previous sections reviewed the mathematical approach including rational and 
behavioural bubble models and the experimental approached. They examined deviations of 
actual price from the fundamental value and how a bubble of an individual asset could occur. 
On the other than, the literary economics is the third approach that considers the same 
phenomena but with a broader perspective of why a bubble in the whole market emerge and 
what its impacts on the economy are. Rather than analysing quantitatively, this approach 
discusses bubbles in more qualitative terms. The main tools employed in the literary 
approach include historical examples and comparisons of their similarities.  
 
The typical development of a bubble process starts with the assets, or the economy 
experiences a positive shock which leads to a distinct price rise for an extended period. 
Uninformed investors, troubled with deducing the causes of the price change, interpret the 
initial price increase as a positive sign and expect it to continue with a further rise. The 
particular stocks or sectors then attract more and more of buyers to participate in the market. 
Most of the investors do not aim to receive dividend payments but rather speculate on the 
capital gains. The increase in activity of these new players is accompanied by a surge in 
trading volume. The existence of feedback traders, together with information asymmetry, 
magnify the influence from noise trading before the eventual collapse. In addition, 
economists generally only refer to a period of a stock market bubble when the probability 
of a sudden reversal in price pattern grows and that real macroeconomic impacts or 
regulatory changes are observed after the crash. 
 
The literature chronicled many incidents of bubble episodes. Detailed discussions can be 
found in, for instance, Galbraith (1994), Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), Komaromi (2006), 
and Scherbina (2013). The famous examples include the Dutch tulip bulb bubble in 1634-
1637, the South Sea bubble in the UK and the French Mississippi bubble – which are often 
considered as the first stock market bubbles – in 1720, the Latin American debt boom in 
1820s, the railway manias in the UK during 1840s and the US during 1870s, the so-called 
Roaring Twenties in the US ending with a big crash in 1929, the rise in bank loans to Mexico 
and other developing countries in the 1970s, the bubbles in equity and real estate markets 
in Japan, Finland, Norway, and Sweden during 1980s, the collapse of the US equity price 
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in 1987, the rise in foreign investment in Mexico during 1990-1993, real estate and stock 
market bubbles in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and many other Asian countries in 1990s, 
the bubble in real estate and the dot-com bubble ending in 2000, and the recent subprime 
mortgage crisis in the US starting from 2008. It suffices to say the main feature of the stock 
market bubbles is arguably the crash, which is normally caused by a change in investor 
behaviour. However, the review of these notable examples did not show a causal 
relationship between a bubble and a crisis, although they tend to coincide. There were cases 
where the economic crisis overlaps or precedes a bubble collapse, while a burst of a bubble 
could worsen the crisis, in other occasions. Moreover, the market participants generally 
regarded a period of excessive speculation as a bubble. However, the literary approach to 
bubble does not offer a definite conclusion on conditions for qualifying such episode, which 
led to the difficulty in identifying a stock market bubble and separating it from other 
phenomena.    
 
Still, there are certain traits commonly found before the eventual stock market bubble crash. 
A collapse of the stock market bubble is typically not caused by the arrival of new shock, 
or that price has reached a certain level. Rather, it mostly happens due to a radical change 
in investor behaviour which is usually when noise traders dominate the market. Komaromi 
(2006) listed several signals that could point to the intensification of noise trading. The 
indicators include the use of leverage, an increase in policymakers’ activity, the incidents 
of corporate scandals, frauds and corruptions, and unjustifiable co-movement of prices.  
 
Finally, as mentioned earlier, stock market bubbles typically refer to the boom with the 
eventual collapse which have lasting impacts on the economy. The obvious consequences 
of a crash are a possible economic recession, and consumption and investment decline in 
the short run. In the longer run, however, there could be positive impacts in terms of 
institutional or regulatory advancements or developments of better financing systems, which 
could lead to better resource allocation and economic growth.   
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2.8. Empirical Evidence 
 
2.8.1. Test of Bubble: Overview 
 
Economists have been fascinated by the notion of bubbles for a long time. Several strands 
of models were developed since the 1980s and early 1990s (Daoud and Antolin-Diaz, 2014).  
The majority of the studies focus on the detection of the rational bubbles. That is when 
investors expect asset price to go up even higher and, consequently, are willing to pay above 
the value warranted by discounted future dividends. This pricing will still be considered as 
rational if there are no arbitrage opportunities. Examples of influential survey papers include 
West (1988) and Camerer (1989). 
 
Essentially, most bubble tests examine whether the standard asset pricing model is valid. In 
cases where the assumption is refuted, they investigate whether it can be reconciled with the 
existence of bubbles. Since the seminal paper by Shiller (1981), numerous methodologies 
have been proposed to infer bubble-like behaviour in equity, commodities, and currency 
markets and in other macroeconomic time-series. There is no standard convention on how 
to categorise them. As a start, they can be separated roughly into indirect and direct tests.    
 
Asset prices are assumed to behave in certain ways in the absence of a bubble. They can be 
used to test for the presence of bubbles indirectly. More specifically, indirect tests identify 
bubbles by assessing distributions of fundamental values, actual prices, or returns 
(Blanchard and Watson, 1983; LeRoy and Porter, 1981; Shiller, 1981), conducting 
cointegration test of fundamental values and actual prices (Campbell and Shiller, 1987; Diba 
and Grossman, 1988), or evaluating hypothesised and actual relationship between dividends 
and prices (Dezhbakhsh and Demirguc-Kunt, 1990; West, 1987). As these tests rely on 
having the correct present value model in the first place, they are occasionally regarded as 
providing only clues, rather than solid evidence of bubbles. In contrast, direct tests specify 
a particular form of a bubble and assess how it fits with the actual data.  The specifications 
are, for instance, deterministic bubbles (Flood and Garber, 1980) or periodically collapsing 
speculative bubbles (Bohl, 2003; van Norden and Schaller, 1993). 
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Regarding the empirical evidence, the literature offers mixed conclusions, although there 
tend to be more papers supporting the existence of bubble than against it (Anderson and 
Brooks, 2014). However, none of the tests can convincingly prove or refuse the presence of 
bubbles (Flood and Hodrick, 1990; Jones, 2014). This is because they cannot satisfactorily 
differentiate between bubbles and misspecified fundamental values.  That is, as pointed out 
by Evans (1991), the tests only have power against certain bubble types. While some of 
them might be able to illustrate that the data do not support the notion of a bubble in some 
aspects, but those that reject the null hypothesis of the present value model cannot do so in 
a manner that bubble explanation is the only alternative. Gürkaynak (2008) concluded that, 
for every proposed test, there is always a paper that challenges it, and this is not just a 
theoretical issue.  
 
Many tests reach their conclusions by ruling out possible explanations of asset price 
movements, before inferring whether a bubble exists.  However, this approach may not be 
valid. The issue is referred to as the joint hypothesis problem.  It means the test combines 
both the hypothesis of having a correctly specified present value model and the bubble 
hypothesis. The fundamental value models are subject to misspecification, as they are often 
based on unobserved estimates. When a test rejects a particular model, it does not 
automatically imply the presence of a bubble, as there might be other alternative models. In 
other words, it could be mistaken to presume a bubble exists, as it may well be just a catch-
all or a residual of what not captured by the reference model. Moreover, many models were 
built on concepts of equilibrium prices in an efficient market, which is a very controversial 
topic on its own.   
 
Other issues for the bubble detection tests include the fact that bubble crash is taken to be 
exogenous. For example, many models assume it could be caused by the change of 
investors’ beliefs that the bubble will no longer survive (Anderson et al., 2010). Most tests 
impose very little structure on the bubble process and do not produce a time series of the 
bubble term, which prohibit assessment of its properties (Gürkaynak, 2008).  
 
Furthermore, the tests may have to overcome many estimation and measurement issues, 
such as small sample size distortion, estimated coefficients’ stability, quantifying irrational 
behaviour (Jones, 2014). Thus, the development of tests – especially, for real-time 
monitoring purpose – was also limited by the advancements in econometrics techniques. 
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Moreover, as pointed out by Meltzer (2002), the rational bubble tests did not generate 
convincing results because there may be other unobserved variables. They include, for 
example, investors’ rational expectations – such as anticipated inflation, the possibility of 
joining an integrated market like the European Monetary Union, or a change in economic 
structure (Daoud and Antolin-Diaz, 2014).  
 
Apart from the difficulties dealing with measurement and inference problems, one last issue 
of bubble test for policy purpose is about the threshold.  There are still ongoing debates with 
regards to how large the deviations of prices must be for an intervention to be required. 
Jones (2014) discussed the trade-off between the probability of not foreseeing the coming 
bubble collapse (Type I error) and the likelihood of observing too many false warnings of 
bubbles (Type II error). However, a price correction can still take place even if the bubble 
is not detected. For instance, when investors form overly optimistic expectations of future 
growth, and it later appears to be no longer viable, the share price could return to the 
previous level. In other words, failing to detect a bubble does not guarantee no risk of a 
large price drop (Daoud and Antolin-Diaz, 2014).  
 
It may seem that bubble tests are not very informative about whether the bubble definitely 
exists. Many stylised facts about asset pricing have been discovered in the process.  For 
example, the variance bounds tests show that there is something more volatile what is 
already included in the standard present value model. Non-linearity and possible regime-
switching nature of fundamental values were detected with papers investigating intrinsic 
bubble and collapsing bubble (Gürkaynak, 2008).  
 
Finally, it is important to note that the methodologies surveyed in this review are tests of 
rational bubbles. More recently, the behavioural approach offers an alternative set of models 
that allow for irrational bubbles. Vissing-Jorgensen (2004), for example, discussed such 
models. 
 
The following sections will elaborate and critically review the different types of bubble tests 
applied in the literature. They include variance bounds or excess volatility test, West’s two-
step approach, cointegration-based tests, intrinsic bubble test, regime-switching models, 
bubble premium test, the test based on the change of persistence, and quantity-based test. 
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The final section discusses the importance of analysing data on the different level of 
aggregation, namely, market index, and sectoral or firm-level data.  
 
2.8.2. Bubble Premium Test 
 
In general, asset returns comprise of the risk-free return, the risk premium which rewards 
investors for the asset-specific risks they assume, and a random disturbance. With the 
presence of bubbles, the asset return will be even higher to compensate for the additional 
risk of bubble exploding. The excess return is referred to as bubble premium. 
 
Hardouvelis (1988) split sample period 1977-87 into two samples at 1985 and used the first 
sample as a base to calculate bubble premium in the second sample. His analysis picked up 
excess return before the crash in 1987. However, with this methodology, he implicitly 
assumed that absence of a bubble in first sample and stability of parameters across two 
samples, which were unproven (Brooks and Katsaris, 2003a). Rappoport and White (1993) 
indirectly tested for bubble premium by investigating the interest rate and deduced that there 
was an increase in market risk in 1928 and 1929. However, the conclusion was challenged 
by Liu et al. (1995) as the similar phenomenon was observed in 1919-20 and the market did 
not experience a bubble collapse. They also indicated that the premium detected was 
influenced by the change in monetary policy, and there was no bubble in 1929 when that 
was controlled for. Wu (1997) used a model with the bubble as an unobserved variable and 
found that it influences stock prices, but Gürkaynak (2008) argued that it was a catch-all for 
model misspecification. More recently, Anderson and Brooks (2014) developed a cross-
sectional regression model based on Fama and French (1996) to include bubble risk and 
found supports for the presence of a bubble in the UK stock market.  
 
2.8.3. Variance Bounds Test 
 
Tests of bubble premium had encountered some critical issues and could not offer 
conclusive evidence whether bubbles exist. One of the alternative methods is to assess the 
assets’ return variances and check for excess volatility. Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter 
(1981) initiated this approach. The test compares the variance of actual prices with the 
variance of fundament prices which were typically computed using ex-post data and 
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observed whether the observed prices were too volatile to be justified by dividend flows. As 
the actual prices are only determined by expected dividends and not their forecast errors, 
the ex-post rational price should be at least variable as the actual prices. The violation of 
this theorised relationship suggests rejection of the standard present value model, and, thus, 
could also be interpreted as a sign of a bubble, although the tests were not initially intended 
to be used for bubble detection.  
In terms of empirical results, Shiller wrote a seminal paper rejecting efficient markets model 
based on U.S. stock data. Shiller (1981) showed that volatility of actual prices exceeds the 
bound imposed by the variance of the fundamental prices. LeRoy and Porter (1981) also 
arrived at the same conclusion that the standard present value models do not hold. The main 
difference between the two papers was that the former only produced a point estimate while, 
the latter views prices and dividends as a bivariate process which allows for construction of 
standard errors as well (Gürkaynak, 2008). In contrast, Dezhbakhsh and Demirguc-Kunt 
(1990) analysed volatility of fundamental values based on dividends series forecasted with 
an ARMA model and found that both sets of price had the same volatility. Thus, the no-
bubble hypothesis cannot be rejected.   
 
Overall, the test type offered additional indirect evidence, which was generally in support 
of the existence of bubbles (Brooks and Katsaris, 2003a). However, its actual 
implementation is problematic, and its validity was not without disagreements. Gilles and 
LeRoy (1991) surveyed the literature and discussed several concerns. The first issue is about 
the terminal price. As dividends are not realised out to infinity, the ex-post rational price is 
never observed. Shiller (1981) approximated a terminal price by sample average of de-
trended real price. However, that proxy is unreliable since the cut-off period is chosen 
arbitrarily. Also, it implies some strong assumptions, such as the market is efficiently 
pricing the future dividend flows when it might actually contain bubble and will not be 
detected, or the dividend process would remain unchanged throughout, which could 
potentially lead to wrong inference about the presence of bubble (Marsh and Merton, 1986). 
Flavin (1983) showed that it would be biased towards rejection in small samples and 
proposed the use of last observed price instead. However, that approach is also not suitable 
as a test of a bubble, because the bounds will not be violated when there is a rational bubble, 
and thus, not detected (Mankiw et al., 1985). 
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Secondly, the original test was based on a constant discount rate, which means it 
unrealistically assumed investors’ risk preference and market risk to stay the same through 
time. When this assumption is relaxed, the results are more ambiguous. For instance, 
Cochrane (1992) explored whether there is a discount rate that would justify the dividend 
and price volatility. The finding showed that there exists a time-varying process that would 
fit the data without having to resort to bubble explanations. 
 
Next, Flood and Garber (1980) asserted that excess volatility tests are unreliable on the basis 
that the fundamental prices are misspecified, as they were based on information set different 
from one used by investors, and relevant variables were not included. Moreover, the 
variance estimates are biased because dividend and price are not stationary (Marsh and 
Merton, 1986).  
 
Lastly, the violation of variance bounds can be caused by, not only misspecification of the 
fundamental price but also by the irrationality of investors (Kleidon, 1986). Moreover, the 
same paper also pointed out that the cross-sectional variances, not time-series estimates, 
should be tested and the non-stationary time-series could lead to observed results of excess 
volatility. 
 
2.8.4. West’s Two-step Test 
 
Although they are related, the test of a bubble and the test of the present value model validity 
are slightly different undertakings. As discussed earlier, the joint hypothesis problem means 
it cannot be automatically inferred that there is a bubble when the present value model fails. 
A good bubble detection test should at least have a bubble explanation explicitly included 
in the alternative hypothesis. The first of such test was West (1987).   
 
West proposed a test derived from the fact that parameters required for the calculation of 
price from expected dividends can be obtained from two different ways. His insight was 
that the Euler equation based on consumers’ optimisation problem could be estimated on its 
own to produce an implied discount rate, which can, in turn, describe the theoretical 
relationship between prices and dividends. This analysis is independent of the existence of 
a bubble. On the other hand, the relationship between actual prices and dividends, which 
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could be affected by a bubble, can also be estimated. In the absence of bubbles, the actual 
and the constructed relationships should be the same and, hence, the two estimates are 
expected to coincide. West used the Hausman specification test to determine whether they 
are different. If the discrepancy between the two estimates is found, specification tests can 
also be applied directly to the Euler equation and the dividend process assumed. If 
misspecification of the models is dismissed, evidence of bubble will be supported. West 
found that no-bubble hypothesis is rejected with the US stock data.  
 
Although it is very appealing conceptually, there were some concerns with this 
methodology. Firstly, Gürkaynak (2008) showed that this test will only identify a particular 
type of bubble which is correlated with dividends. He also pointed out that the set of 
information included in the expectation of future dividends by investors may be different 
from what is assumed in the dividend process. Moreover, it is not feasible to test for all 
possible specification to give a definite evidence of a bubble. Flood et al. (1994) indicated 
that the test could have picked up the influence of other factors, such as how investors assign 
a probability of large impact event like a tax law change (Flood and Hodrick, 1986) or other 
expected regime change that did not occur. They also questioned the validity of the Euler 
equation with risk neutrality and constant discount rate assumed. Indeed, when the time-
varying discount rate is allowed, evidence of bubbles is less clear-cut (Gürkaynak, 2008). 
The next issue is stationarity. As non-stationarity would affect the test and it is difficult to 
detect with reasonable certainty, the test should be conducted with data both in levels and 
differences. Finally, Dezhbakhsh and Demirguc-Kunt (1990) challenged the test on the basis 
of small sample distortion and developed an alternative test which considered small sample 
properties and found no evidence of bubbles.  
 
2.8.5. Non-stationarity and Cointegration Tests 
 
Even though bubble theories suggest that bubbles have explosive nature, the earlier tests did 
not exploit this knowledge. Specifically, West’s test eliminates other alternative explanation 
in order to identify a bubble, while the variance bounds tests simply showed that there is 
something other than the fundamental factors. There were other authors who developed tests 
based on concepts of stationarity and cointegration.   
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Diba and Grossman (1988) examined the present value model with unobserved 
fundamentals and analysed whether the deviations from fundamentals can be attributed to a 
bubble. Precisely, as the stock price is determined by future dividends, when there is no 
bubble, both should have the same level of stationarity. That is, if dividends are stationary 
in levels, then price should also be stationary in levels, or, if dividends are stationary after 
differencing n times, the price should be stationary after differencing n times as well. 
However, the relationship will not hold, when there is a bubble. This suggests a natural way 
to identify a bubble, which is by testing whether the price is more explosive than dividend 
process. On the other hand, the present value model also suggests an equilibrium 
relationship between price and dividend. That means, even if they are non-stationary, they 
will be cointegrated. Then, if they are cointegrated, the bubble hypothesis is not supported. 
So, testing for cointegration between price and dividend flows is another way to detect a 
bubble.  
 
Diba and Grossman applied the Dickey-Fuller unit-root tests to both prices and dividends 
as their first test of a bubble. The result was that they are difference stationary, which implies 
that bubble was not present in the data. They reaffirmed the result by conducting the 
cointegration tests which found evidence of cointegrating relationship between the two 
series and concluded that the bubble hypothesis can be rejected. Donaldson and Kamstra 
(1996) constructed fundamental prices based on nonstationary, non-linear discount rates and 
dividends and expected dividends forecasted with ARMA-GARCH, Artificial Neural 
Network model, and showed that they seemed to replicate to actual price observed in the 
U.S. stock market in 1929; thus there was no bubble. They also checked the series for 
cointegration and the result showed that they are cointegrated. Therefore, the no bubble 
hypothesis was not rejected. In contrast, Campbell and Shiller (1987) presented evidence 
that the linear combination of prices and discounted dividends is not stationary and that 
there may be bubbles, although they warned that the methodology is very sensitive to the 
discount rate. However, Campbell and Shiller (1988) discovered weak cointegration 
between prices and dividends. This shows how unreliable the evidence of a bubble is. 
Moreover, Fama and French (1988) argued that price is stationary in the short run, but it 
could change in the longer time frame. This was partly because asset price is more 
predictable in the long run, but also that there could exist collapsing and regenerating 
bubbles that were not detected. Finally, Brooks and Katsaris (2003a) investigated explosive 
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bubble in the London Stock Exchange with the cointegration test, and reported that prices 
were driven, but other factors did not have an equilibrium relationship with dividends in the 
late 1990s. They suggested it could potentially be a speculative bubble. 
 
There are certain issues when interpreting results from this approach. Firstly, its validity is 
greatly questioned, due to difficulties testing stationarity and detecting cointegration 
between variables. The econometrics literature offers many competing methodologies with 
differing properties and power, and they do not always give unambiguous results.  Worse, 
there is also an issue of small sample distortion. The study of Diba and Grossman included 
less than 100 observations, which the Dickey-Fuller tests would not give reliable results 
(Evans and Savin, 1984).  
 
A very influential criticism of this test was presented by Evans (1991). Although the paper 
did not prove the presence of a bubble, it illustrated that the standard unit-root tests are not 
sufficient to reject the bubble hypothesis. In a simulation study, Evans showed that the tests 
would not detect prices containing periodically collapsing bubbles. Because the collapsing 
feature makes it mean-reverting over time, and, hence, does not appear explosive, but rather 
like stationary process. Moreover, cointegration tests have low power against intrinsic 
bubbles whose development is tied to dividend process. Therefore, when the test fails to 
reject the no-bubble hypothesis, it does not mean that the data is free from a bubble. 
However, it would rule out any monotonically increasing bubbles (Gürkaynak, 2008).    
 
On the other hand, lack of cointegration does not prove the presence of bubbles as the model 
could be misspecified in some aspects by excluding other factors or making unrealistic 
assumptions. For example, Craine (1993) showed that discount rate for the S&P500 has 
unit-root. So, even if dividends are stationary, actual prices will not be stationary. Therefore, 
when the test suggests the existence of a bubble, it actually indicates there is something else 
non-stationary, which may or may not be a bubble.   
 
After the critique by Evans (1991), there were many subsequent attempts to improve the 
usefulness of the test. However, there was no agreement regarding methods or results. 
Taylor and Peel (1998) proposed a cointegration test that would be robust for a collapsing 
bubble and found that bubble did not exist in their data. Wu and Xiao (2008) developed a 
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test based on an insight that although residuals from periodically collapsing bubbles would 
be stationary, they would still be large. They also did not find evidence of a bubble.  
 
One of the most popular techniques to model for periodically collapsing bubbles was to 
allow for regime switches. Some examples of papers include van Norden and Schaller 
(1993), Driffill and Sola (1998), Hall et al. (1999), Bohl (2003), and McMillan (2007). This 
type of studies will be discussed in the following section.  
 
2.8.6. Regime-switching Test 
 
Motivated by the Evans critique regarding collapsing bubbles, many regime-switching 
models were built to explain the relationship between prices and dividends, and possibility 
of bubbles. Several papers adopted the Markov switching process, for instance, Hall et al. 
(1999) considered Evans’ collapsing bubble as a separate regime with constant probabilities 
of switching, while others analysed bubbles with other functional forms, for example, van 
Norden and Schaller  (2002) (hereafter VNS).  
 
The origin of the VNS model started from Blanchard (1979) and Blanchard and Watson 
(1982). They constructed a speculative bubble model such that in each period, the bubble 
may survive and continue to grow into the next period with a constant probability 𝑞 or 
completely burst with probability 1 − 𝑞. With the Blanchard and Watson model, a couple 
of very restrictive assumptions were imposed, and VNS attempted to fix them. Firstly, the 
bubble was assumed to disappear abruptly when it crashes. VNS allowed for partial 
collapses, which means a bubble may deflate over a period of time, and that bubble could 
regenerate or there could be more than one bubble in the series.  And, secondly, the 
probability of bubble surviving was assumed to be constant. VNS formulated that it would 
depend on the absolute size of the bubble, which suggests a time-varying probability and a 
possibility of a negative bubble was also permissible. Using the U.S. stock market data, they 
found support for their regime-switching model and evidence of bubbles.  
 
Still, the probability of collapse was assumed to be dependent only on the bubble size. 
However, bubble deviation could be prolonged before it crashes. Brooks and Katsaris 
(2003b) and Brooks and Katsaris (2005a) extended the VNS model by including the 
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abnormal volume term as an indicator of a collapse, in order to form trading rules. Anderson 
et al. (2010) applied the volume-augmented model with S&P500 series and presented 
evidence of bubble-like dynamics in the S&P500 as a whole, as well as, several sectoral 
indices. In addition, Brooks and Katsaris (2005b) further relaxed the assumption that a 
bubble had to always be explosive and extended the model by allowing for a third regime 
where the bubble only grows steadily in the dormant state.   
 
Another modelling technique adopted by McMillan (2010) was the asymmetric logistic 
smooth-transition (LSTR) model. He claimed that the approach offers improvements in 
three ways.  Firstly, McMillan argued that rational bubble model could not explain how a 
bubble initially forms, while his research allows for either rational or non-rational grounds. 
Secondly, the LSTR model permits more than two regimes. More specifically, it includes 
two extreme regimes and one transitional phase. Lastly, unlike VNS sudden change between 
regimes, the transition in the LSTR approach is smooth and observable. Investigating UK 
sectoral indices, he concluded that there was evidence in support of bubbles in the majority 
of sectors.  
 
Moreover, under the two regimes, the bubbles behave very differently. That is, when the 
bubble is small, the price is close the fundamental value. Changes in dividends affect the 
asset return, as predicted by the present value model. Also, when this small bubble increases, 
the next-period return will be higher too. This market sentiment shows the confidence of 
investors, which could potentially be an over-confidence as well. In this regime, it is 
interpreted as the fundamental traders dominate.  
 
A different behaviour was observed when the bubble is large. The estimated coefficients for 
dividend yield were small and largely statistically insignificant, suggesting no relationship 
with fundamentals. That is, prices were disconnected from dividends. By then, the market 
was dominated by noise traders. In fact, the fundamental traders would foresee and take 
advantage of this situation. More specifically, when there is a positive news regarding 
dividend development, it would warrant a price rise. However, as fundamental traders are 
aware that the noise traders would chase the trend, they push price up beyond what can be 
justified by the initial news, and start selling when noise traders began to be active. In other 
words, the fundamental investors would, in fact, ride the bubble and destabilise the market. 
Furthermore, in some case like the Technology and Telecoms sector, the estimates of 
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dividend yields on returns were unexpectedly negative. This suggests that investor might be 
concerned about the possible collapse of the bubble and start offloading the asset which 
pushes the price down.  
 
On the whole, the regime-switching tests also face problems. van Norden and Vigfusson 
(1998) compared the performance in detecting tests periodically collapsing speculative 
bubbles of the models proposed by Hall et al. (1999) and van Norden and Schaller (2002) 
and concluded that size distortion was occasionally found even with hundreds of 
observations. Furthermore, they also pointed out the issue of the exact switching process, 
since they observed that both models have significant power, even though the former 
assumed a constant probability and the latter assumed it was determined by the bubble size. 
 
2.8.7. Intrinsic Bubble Test 
 
Generally, bubbles do not have to be correlated with fundamentals. They are only required 
to grow at the rate (1 + 𝑟) to be consistent with the no-arbitrage condition. If they do not, 
the deviations from fundamentals will have explosive nature. In contrast, there is a large 
category of bubbles that are assumed to have the same evolution with the expected 
dividends. As the process of this bubble depends completely on dividends, it will not just 
rise independently, and, consequently, will not be detected by many tests. These bubbles are 
referred to as intrinsic bubbles. 
 
Froot and Obstfeld (1991) proposed one such setup. To tie bubble to fundamentals, they 
explicitly modelled the dividend process as a random walk with drift. Given the standard 
present value model, prices are a linear combination of expected future dividends. 
Alternatively, when there is an intrinsic bubble, prices would be extra responsive to any 
change in dividends. That is, intrinsic bubbles cause the relationship between prices and 
dividends to be non-linear. The behaviour of the price/dividend ratio will be different as 
well. Specifically, it would be a constant in the absence of a bubble, and it will be a function 
of dividends when there is a bubble. Froot and Obstfeld used this understanding to develop 
a test for intrinsic bubbles. It was done by estimating a regression of price/dividend ratio on 
a constant and dividends. If the estimated parameter of dividends is found to be statistically 
significant, that will suggest a non-linear relationship between prices and dividends. In other 
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words, it would point to the existence of a bubble. However, if only the constant term is 
found to be statistically significant, it would imply there was no bubble.  
 
Froot and Obstfeld reported a statistically significant and positive value for the estimated 
coefficient of dividends, which indicates that the data may contain a bubble. However, they 
cautioned that the evidence was not conclusive as other explanations were possible as well.  
Gürkaynak (2008) explained that the result only showed that there is non-linearity in the 
relationship between prices and dividends. It could be interpreted as a bubble because the 
model was assumed to be linear. However, it is possible the true relationship between them 
is non-linear. In fact, a remarkable example is Driffill and Sola (1998) who incorporated 
both regime-switching fundamental and intrinsic bubbles into their analysis. They found 
that the explanatory power of the combined model was low, but the model with just either 
the regime-switching feature or the intrinsic bubbles worked equally well.  
 
On a separate note, Gürkaynak (2008) also pointed out that West’s test actually investigated 
bubble that is correlated with dividends as well, but Froot and Obstfeld imposed more 
structure on the bubble process. 
 
2.8.8. Test based on Change in Persistence 
 
Bubbles represent deviations from the fundamental price. When they exist, prices would 
contain an explosive component in them. Some researchers have exploited this intuition and 
attempted to identify episodes of a bubble by detecting the change in characteristics of 
price/dividend ratio from a random walk to an explosive phase, which is a higher degree of 
non-stationarity. This type of bubble detection procedure derived from the literature on 
change-in-persistence tests developed by, for example, Kim (2000) and Busetti and Taylor 
(2004). The change-in-persistence test assessed between the hypotheses of time series being 
stationary the entire period or that it change between being stationary and non-stationary. 
Examples of papers with this approach are Phillips et al. (2011) who employed sequential 
unit-root test to timestamp the start date of bubble formation and reported a bubble in the 
Nasdaq index at the end of the 1990s, and Homm and Breitung (2012) who compared 
different bubble detection tests based on classic break date tests and presented evidence of 
bubbles in several markets.   
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The tests based on a change in persistence have some advantages over the other conventional 
tests. Firstly, the most obvious benefit is that the old approach could only tell whether there 
was any trace of a bubble in the data series, while the change-in-persistence bubble tests 
would be able to estimate the time when the bubbles start and burst. In other words, it offers 
live monitoring capability as well. Secondly, although the other tests may fail to detect the 
periodically collapsing noted by Evans (1991), these new bubble detection test with the sub-
sampling or break-test procedures, will be able to do so.  Finally, the classic tests would 
require approximation of the price/dividend ratio by converting into logarithms. In contrast, 
the bubble test based on change-in-persistence can be formulated to test data in levels and 
do not have to face uncertainty whether the relationship of the logarithm of the 
price/dividend ratio is a good approximation, for example, a version of the test by Phillips 
et al. (2013). 
 
However, there are also points of concern, such as, even when the test shows no evidence 
of a bubble in a certain time, a bubble can always start in a relatively short period. More 
importantly, Homm and Breitung (2012) showed that the number of breaks caused by 
episodes of a bubble is also a critical issue. Tests have different power based on assumption. 
Specifically, a sequential Chow test and a modified version of Busetti and Taylor (2004) 
had the highest power when only a single switch is assumed, while the Phillips et al. (2011) 
procedure was the most robust when multiple phases of bubbles were allowed.   
 
2.8.9. Quantity-based Framework 
 
All the test discussed so far have been based on price or return of assets. However, as noted 
by Jones (2014), not only the volatility of risk premium or the require rate of return, but also 
changes in other non-price information were observed during some of the largest booms and 
busts in the history of asset markets. Therefore, he argued that the quantity data should also 
be considered to enhance understanding asset price behaviour and detect for signs of 
bubbles, particularly in four aspects: quantity and quality of issuance, trading volumes, fund 
flows, and investor surveys.  
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Firstly, Myers and Majluf (1984) put forward the pecking order theory which suggests the 
management of the firm have and will exploit their information advantage as an insider. 
That is, they would choose to issue new securities to raise capital over other alternative 
methods of financing when they consider the cost of capital to be low or that prices are high 
relative to fundamental value. Thus, quantity and quality of issuance could be a sign for 
overvaluation. Secondly, abnormal trading activity should also be watched as trading frenzy 
was seen in practically every episode of asset price bubble from the Tulipmania in 1620 to 
the dot-com bubble in the late 1990s and the recent housing bubble in the U.S. market. 
Thirdly, Jones presented evidence of trend chasing in the asset market, where the positive 
correlation between asset returns and fund flows were witnessed. More specifically, debt 
and equity returns in emerging market appeared to lead fund flow by one quarter. Therefore, 
the pattern of investor fund flows is another tool to monitoring bubble evaluation as well. 
Finally, surveys of return expectations show how investors estimate future returns and 
measure market sentiment. It must be included in the surveillance framework too. 
 
2.8.10. Test based on Co-movement of Price 
 
When investors herd after each other and trade with positive feedback, meaning buying an 
asset with a high previous return in hopes for the price to continue even higher, their 
opinions are converging and so do prices of different assets. Komaromi (2006) proposed 
monitoring any unjustified co-movements of asset prices, for example, when prices of assets 
not affected by a common factor begin to move in the same direction, as it implies noise 
traders are dominating and, thus, a sign of a bubble. This is consistent with, for instance, 
investors becoming very optimistic about the future during the boom, not able to tell apart 
good and bad investments, and causing excitements over all assets in a particular market.  
(Kindleberger and Aliber, 2005). He used the average coefficient of determination (𝑅2) 
between returns of a particular asset and the market return as a measure of co-movement. 
The changes of such time-series show the strength of the level of convergence and periods 
of high variability would indicate a possible shift towards more non-information trading.  
 
Moreover, Komaromi also explained that co-movement is mainly determined by the level 
of market maturity.  Markets that are less-developed, not so integrated, and have weak 
corporate governance, tend to not attract many institutional investors like investment funds 
 40 
 
or hedge funds and the information content in prices will be limited. Investors would 
consequently have to trade with more noises. Thus, in such a market, using co-movement 
index as an indicator of possible bubble collapse is probably appropriate. However, a more 
complexed index might be required for more advanced markets.  
 
2.8.11. Results on Data with Different Level of Aggregation 
 
As discussed previously, the empirical evidence of bubble detection tests is extensive. 
However, a majority of them assessed the market-wide index. Recently, an increasing 
number of papers has looked into more disaggregated data. Examples of studies based on 
sectoral or industry level include McMillan (2010) and Anderson et al. (2010), while 
investigations on firm-level were conducted by Nasseh and Strauss (2004), Goddard et al. 
(2008), and Anderson and Brooks (2014). 
 
Utilising disaggregated data not only let researchers compare results based on different level 
of aggregation, but it could help them gain a deeper understanding of how bubbles may be 
formed, which sectors contain bubbles, and whether it only concentrates on particular 
grouping, like technology-related stocks. Moreover, it also allows for contagion or 
transmission of bubbles between different sectors to be investigated.   
 
In general, the results based on index-level data tend to find limited support for the standard 
present value model, while they are more likely to hold at firm-level. This is because 
aggregation averages out information from dividends from its constituents (Jung and Shiller, 
2005). In other words, it disguises information context of dividends, which makes impacts 
of any change in individual asset less pronounced and harder to predict. At the same time, 
that also leads to effects of factors other than fundamentals becoming more significant in 
determining price movements. Evidence from sectoral-level appears to lie in between 
(McMillan, 2010). 
 
Anderson et al. (2010) studied the evolution of S&P500 indices and showed that the 
augmented model that includes effects of the bubble from other sectors is preferred to the 
standard model. Their test detected bubble-like behaviour in many sectors and not just from 
the Information Technology (IT) as put forward by popular opinion or as concluded by 
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Cochrane (2002) that the bubble was concentrated on tech and internet stock. Similarly, 
McMillan (2010) worked with UK sectoral indices and found that evidence of a bubble, in 
the form of large and persistent deviations from fundamental values, appeared in most of 
the sectors, although there exists a long-run relationship between dividends and prices, 
which means the present value model is also justified. 
 
More specifically, Anderson et al. (2010) concluded that there were strong evidence in 
favour of periodically collapsing speculative bubbles in Financials, General Industrials, 
Information Technology and Non-Cyclical Services. They also detected some evidence in 
the Cyclical Services, Basic Industries and Utilities sectors. Working on data with 
Datastream’s classification system, McMillan (2010) found supports for bubbles in 
Technology, and Telecoms, as well as, other consumer product sectors like Financials, 
Health Care, Oil and Gas, and Utilities. Sectors that revealed limited evidence of bubble 
included Cyclical Consumer Goods, Non-Cyclical Consumer Goods, and Resources 
(Anderson et al., 2010), or the Basic Materials and Industrials sectors (McMillan, 2010). In 
other words, the traditional or old-economy sectors seem to be more immune to bubbles.  
 
For evidence of transmission of bubbles across sectors, Anderson et al. (2010) indicated that 
the Basic Industries, Cyclical Services, Financials, and General Industries are highly 
responsive, while the highly contagious sectors include the Basic Industries, Cyclical 
Consumer Goods, Information Technology and Resources. It thus led them to conclude that 
the linkages were multi-directional. They considered Non-cyclical Consumer Goods and 
Utilities as relatively isolated. Based on the graphical analysis, McMillan (2010) also 
discussed the linkages of technology bubbles to other sectors and inferred that it spread to 
many but not all other sectors. In addition, there was also evidence of the increase of 
deviation from the fundamental price in sectors with relatively low level of a bubble before 
the bursting of a so-called dot-com bubble around March 2000. This implies that investors 
may have recognised that the bubble was collapsing and shifting their investments to 
relatively safer sectors. A comparable pattern was also observed by McMillan (2010). The 
Basic Materials and Industrials sectors were regarded as immune from bubbles. However, 
they led the recovery after the crash in 2000, which suggested fund-shifting activities by 
investors. These two sectors appeared to contain bubble-like behaviour starting from 2006 
and later collapse in 2008.  
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Lastly, there are also results showing impacts of the market as a whole on the disaggregated 
data. For instance, the bubble in the market-wide index was found to increase the 
probabilities of the collapse of the bubble in certain individual sectors. They are the Cyclical 
Services, Information Technology, Non-Cyclical Services, Resources and Utilities 
(Anderson et al., 2010). Also, the covariance between bubbles at the individual firm and the 
market level was found to influence stock returns (Anderson and Brooks, 2014).    
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Chapter 3: The Thai Stock Market 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
In the early days of stock trading in Thailand, the activities were initiated by foreign players.  
Bird Co. Ltd was the first securities brokerage who began operating in 1953. Other 
companies with similar business were, for example, Houseman & Co., Ltd, Siamerican 
Securities Ltd., and Z&R Investment and Consultants. However, securities trading in a 
public market was not very popular at the time. Most activities were done in private 
dealings. Later in 1962, the Bangkok Stock Exchange was founded by a group of Thai and 
foreign investors as the first organised stock exchange in Thailand. Nonetheless, it was also 
with limited success and finally ceased operations in the early 1970s (Stock Exchange of 
Thailand, 2015a). 
 
Since 1961, Thailand’s economic growth objectives and directions have been defined in the 
National Economic and Social Development Plans. The Second Plan for 1967-1971 
included a plan for a new market for securities trading. The Third Plan for 1972-1976 
introduced the Stock Exchange of Thailand Act in May 1974. The bill gave rise to the 
Securities Exchange of Thailand, which started the trading operations on 30th April 1975. 
The exchange’s official name was changed to the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) in 
1991. Later in 1992, the Securities and Exchange Act (SEA) was enacted to replace the early 
Stock Exchange of Thailand Acts. The SEA is a comprehensive legal framework for 
regulating the capital market, including issues of disclosure, investor protection, fund 
management, takeover procedures, and securities company regulations. It also established 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the sole supervisor of the securities 
business.  
 
The SET is a secondary market. It attracts business to be listed on the bourse with the benefit 
of having an expanded investor base. Once the firm is registered with the exchange, the SET 
facilitates trading, settlement, and delivery of the securities, as well as, regulates trading, 
listed companies, and member brokerage firms. It is a self-regulatory organisation which 
operates under the supervision of the SEC, who is, in turn, overseen by the Ministry of 
Finance. Moreover, the SET has also expanded operations and included many subsidiary 
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companies over the years. For example, it introduced a computerised trading system and set 
up the Thailand Securities Depository who offers post-trade services in 1995, and 
Settrade.com who provides the internet trading platform from 2001. The Market for 
Alternative Investment (mai) which is the exchange for small and medium enterprises with 
registered capital more than 20 million baht (approximately US$0.55 million) but less than 
the required 300 million baht (approximately US$8.3 million) in the SET’s main board, the 
Bond Electronic Exchange (BEX) and the Thailand Futures Exchange (TFEX) are also part 
of the SET group. They began operations from 1999, 2003 and 2006, respectively.  
 
The SET’s primary objectives include operation efficiency regarding facilitating liquidity, 
risk-sharing opportunities and reducing volatility, and information efficiency by ensuring 
timely and accurate disclosure of information which leads to low costs of capital and 
transaction costs. It serves several duties in the economy, for instance, promoting savings 
and fund raising activities, creating liquidity, enabling businesses to restructure and obtain 
the optimal balance between debt and equity financing, serving as an organised exchange 
with appropriate supervisions, supporting participations of investors as part of the 
ownership, protecting the benefits of all related parties, disseminating relevant information, 
helping expand tax base for the government, and offering a leading indicator for the 
economic performance of the country.  
 
An alternative channel for savings and fund raising to the securities market would be 
through financial institutions, especially banks. The differences are that spread between the 
interest rate paid to depositors and charges to borrowers is earned by banks, while the cost 
of capital can be reflected more clearly via equity financing. Business risks would also be 
pooled to financial institutions, instead of being shared among investors. Furthermore, 
expected returns for investors are higher in the stock investment than savings at banks. 
Finally, the government by means of taxpayers’ money has to offer implicitly guarantee for 
the solvency of financial institutions in case of defaults.  In other words, the SET plays a 
major role in the development of the Thai economy. 
 
The main market-wide index of the Stock Exchange of Thailand is called the “SET Index”. 
Moreover, the SET also provided two blue chip indices: the “SET50 Index” and the 
“SET100 Index”. Besides, two disaggregated indices – the industry group indices and the 
sectoral indices – are also published by the bourse.   
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Information about the SET can be found via the official website at www.set.or.th, while 
further information regarding trading and investing in the SET, including investor 
knowledge resources, are available at www.settrade.com. Other public relations and 
education activities are done via the Thailand Securities Institutes (TSI), various 
publications, and a television programme on economics and investment news called 
“Money Channel”.  Lastly, the SET also offers historical data in a database called 
“SETSMART” as well.   
 
3.2. Trading Systems 
 
The financial products registered with the SET include equity instruments, such as ordinary 
shares, preferred share, warrants, unit trusts, and non-voting depository receipt (NVDR), 
and other instruments, such as debenture, and convertible bonds, as well. In May 1991, the 
SET introduced a fully computerised system called the “Automated Trading System for the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand” (ASSET). It was then upgraded to the “Advance Resilience 
Matching System” (ARMS) in August 2008. The latest system, called “SET Connect” was 
implemented to cope with new financial innovations and international standard protocol. 
Normally, the trading unit or board lot contains 100 units of the security or 50 units of 
security priced at 500 baht (approximately US$14) or more for six consecutive months.  
 
The market is open on all bank business days, typically Monday to Friday. The morning 
session pre-opens at 9:30 and the random opening time is between 9:55 to 10:00. The 
intermission is between 12:30 to 14:00 when it pre-opens again for the afternoon session. 
The second random opening time is between 14:25 to 14:30. The market pre-closes at 16:30 
and the random closing time is between 16:35 to 16:40. Off-hour trading is still allowed 
until 17:00 when the market is closed. The closing price is calculated based on the random 
auction method to prevent manipulation. Table 1 summarised the possible movement of 
prices stipulated by the SET’s regulations. Floor and ceiling limits on the price of typical 
instruments are also set to be at 30 percent of the previous closing price of local shares or a 
not more than one price spread. Foreign shares can move up to 60 percent of the previous 
closing price of domestic shares. Share price on the first trading day can move up to three 
times the Initial Public Offering (IPO) price but not below 0.01 baht. Warrants can have up 
 46 
 
to 100 percent movement in price from the previous close. There are also circuit breakers 
for unusual trading volatility. Transactions are halted for 30 minutes if the aggregated 
market index or the SET Index falls by 10 percent from the previous close. If it falls further 
to 20 percent from the previous close, trading would be stopped again for one hour.  
 
Table 1: Price Spread in the Stock Exchange of Thailand 
Market Price (Baht) Spread 
Less than 2 0.01 
2 up to less than 5 0.02 
5 up to less than 10 0.05 
10 up to less than 25 0.10 
25 up to less than 100 0.25 
100 up to less than 200 0.50 
200 up to less than 400 1.00 
400 up 2.00 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand, effective from 30th March 2009 
 
The only clearinghouse, securities depository, and registrar in the Thai stock market is the 
Thailand Securities Depository Co., Ltd (TSD), which is a subsidiary of the SET. It was 
established in November 1994 and began operations in January 1995 to develop and 
promote back-office systems for after-trade services for all equity and debt instruments. 
Clearing and settlement of equity instruments are completed three business days after the 
transaction (T+3).  
 
3.3. Performance of the Thai Stock Market 
 
The performance of the Thai stock market can be analysed from various aspects. The first 
view is in terms of the market size. The SET Index’s monthly close since the establishment 
in April 1975 until December 2014 are plotted in Figure 1, and the measurement of the 
market size by market capitalisation from 1988 are shown in Figure 2, while the major 
events affecting the Thai stock market are listed in Table 2.  
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Figure 1: Monthly SET Index (April 1975 – December 2014) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
 
 
Figure 2: Annual SET Index and Market Capitalisation (1988 –2014) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
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Table 2: Major Events affecting the Stock Exchange of Thailand during 1975-2014 
Apr 1975 First trading day of the SET on 30th April 1975 
Mar 1976  SET Index closed at historical low at 76.44 points on 17th March 1976 
1979  Oil crisis 
1981 Global liquidity squeeze and high interest rate 
Apr 1981 Coup d'état 
Sep 1985 Coup d'état 
May 1986 Dissolution of parliament 
Oct 1987 Black Monday 
1989 Speculation in real estate market 
Oct 1989 Mini Black Monday 
Aug 1990 Persian Gulf War 
Feb 1991 Coup d'état 
May 1992 Public demonstration leading to the Black May incident 
Jan 1994 SET Index was at its all-time high closing price at 1753.73 points on 
4th January 1994 with a price-earnings ratio of 31 times 
Jan 1995 Mexican peso crisis 
Feb 1995 Losses in derivatives investment by Baring Securities Singapore 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
Jul 1997 Thailand abandoned the currency peg regime and adopted a managed 
float system 
Aug 1997 Granted IMF Reform Package 
Dec 1997 Closure of finance companies 
Sep 1998 SET Index closed at the second lowest level in the history at 207.31 
on 4th September 1998  
Mar 1999 Introduction of economic stimulation measures 
Aug 1999 Measures on private consumption stimulation and financial 
institution rehabilitation 
Jan 2001 General election 
May 2001 Thai market underweighted by the MSCL 
Sep 2001 September 11 attacks 
Jun 2002 WorldCom scandal  
Jul 2002 - Apr 2003 Iraq War 
Mar 2003 SARS outbreak 
Jan – Dec 2003 Thailand’s economic recovery 
Jan – Feb 2004 Avian Influenza outbreak 
Feb – Apr 2004 South Thailand insurgency  
Feb – Mar 2004 Demonstration against the privatisation of  the Electricity Generating 
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) 
May – Jul 2004 Increasing trends of oil price  and interest rates 
Sep 2006 Coup d'état 
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Dec 2006 Introduction of the unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) on 
short-term capital flows by the Bank of Thailand (BOT) 
Feb 2008 Lifting of the URR measure 
May 2008 Public demonstrations with the People's Alliance for Democracy 
seizing the airport 
Oct 2008 The second and third implementations of the first-stage circuit 
breaker after the SET Index fell by more than 10 percent during 
trading hours, as a result of the Subprime Crisis in the US on 10th and 
27th October 2008. 
Nov 2008 US Federal Reserve introduced Quantitative Easing measure (QE1) 
Feb 2009 Thailand’s Administrative Court suspended the development of 
sixty-five projects in the Map Thaput Industrial Estate, worth an 
estimated US$8 billion, due to inadequate health impact assessments 
May 2009 The Government of Dubai requested for delayed debt repayments of 
Dubai World company 
Mar 2010 Morgan Stanley changed recommendation for Thai stock market to 
overweight  
Apr 2010 Emergency Decree imposed in Bangkok, Thailand’s capital city 
Jul 2010 Most European banks passed the stress test 
Nov 2010 Second round of Quantitative Easing measure by the US Federal 
Reserve (QE2) 
Feb 2011 Egyptian Revolution 
Mar 2011 Tsunami in Japan 
Jul 2011 Investor confidence in the Thai market improved 
Oct – Dec 2011 Severe flooding in Thailand 
Sep 2012 US Federal Reserve’s QE3 and the ECB’s asset purchase programme 
May 2013 Public demonstration against an amnesty bill in Bangkok  
May 2014 Coup d'état  by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) 
 
From the beginning of the bourse in 1975 until 1977, the development of the SET had been 
rather gradual. Then, the first noticeable boom period was during 1977-1979. The number 
of newly listed companies rose as business owners raised funds to support the economic 
expansion as presented in Figure 3. However, the oil price crisis in 1979 led to high inflation, 
and the Thai baht was devalued in 1981. The index was consequently relatively steady 
during 1979-1982.  
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Figure 3: Number of List Companies and Newly Listed Companies (1975 –2014) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
 
The index then advanced during 1986-1988 as a result of a further devaluation of the Thai 
baht in 1984 which led to strong exports. The market gradually turned bearish after the 
Black Monday in October 1987. From 1990, economics policies aiming at financial 
liberalisation and deregulation were increasingly introduced. Volatility in the market also 
increased in 1990 due to the Persian Gulf War. The index was affected again by the coup 
d’état in 1991 and the following Black May incident, which was the clash between police 
and military officers and protestors leading to loss of lives and many injured in 1992. Excess 
liquidity in the market helped the index regained from late 1993 and saw the index reached 
all-time high in January 1994.  
 
However, speculation in both real estate and stock markets, together with speculative attacks 
on the Thai baht led to Thailand switching from fixed currency regime to a managed floating 
system on 2nd July 1997, which signalled the start of the Asian Financial Crisis.  The index 
plummeted as far 207.31 points in September 1998, before the various economic 
programmes led to a recovery in 2003.  
 
Thailand had another coup d’état in September 2006. Later that year, the Bank of Thailand 
introduced the unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) on short-term capital flows. The 
measure required 30 percent of all capital inflows into Thailand to be held in non-interest 
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bearing deposits at the central bank for one year. The SET Index closed at 730.55 on 18th 
December 2006. The URR was announced in the evening that day and led the SET Index 
to plunge by more than 20 percent during trading hours of 19th December 2006. The 
circuit breakers were triggered for the first time at both 10 percent and 20 percent stages. 
The Index rebounded and closed at 14.84 percent loss, marking one of the worst trading 
days in the SET’s history. The global crash led by the Subprime Crisis in the US resulted 
in circuit breakers with 30-minute trading halt being activated on two occasions in 
October 2008.  
 
In 2011, Thailand faced one of the most severe floodings in the history. Sixty-five out of 77 
provinces in Thailand were declared disaster areas, including part of Bangkok – the capital 
city – was inundated. The World Bank (2011) estimated this flooding to be the world’s 
fourth costliest in 2011 with US$45.7 billion in economic damages and losses due to this 
flooding. 
 
From the establishment of the Stock Exchange of Thailand 1975 until 2014, Thailand had 
enjoyed the compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 8.1 percent in nominal GDP per 
capita based on Figure 4. Compared to other markets, the total market capitalisation of the 
SET and the mai had the CAGR of 22.4 percent, while the debt market and the total credit 
extended by commercial banks had CAGR of 18.5 percent and 13 percent, respectively 
(Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2015b). 
 
Figure 5 presented the combined total market capitalisation of the SET and the mai and 
comparison to the nominal GDP. Overall, it showed the Thai stock market has been growing 
strongly relative the economic growth and its market capitalisation represented 
approximately 154 percent of nominal GDP in 2014.   
 
  
 52 
 
Figure 4: Thailand’s Nominal GDP per capita (1975 – 2014) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the Office of the National Economic and Social 
Development Board of Thailand 
 
 
Figure 5: Total Market Capitalisation (SET and mai) and Percentage of Nominal GDP (1990 – 2014) 
 
Source: Bank of Thailand and Stock Exchange of Thailand 
  
 53 
 
Next, the returns on investment in the SET is considered. Over the period of 40 years from 
establishment, the market had experienced various crises such as the Persian Gulf War, the 
Asian Financial Crisis, the dot-com bubble, and the Subprime Crisis. It yielded a CAGR of 
approximately 8.86 percent, while saving deposits and gold would earn 6.50 percent, and 
5.62 percent, respectively (Stock Exchange of Thailand, 2015b).  In other words, investing 
in the stock market, saving deposits, or gold for 40 years would have generated nominal 
returns of about 27, 11, and 8 times of the initial investment, respectively. Historical market 
dividend yields, price-earnings (P/E) ratios, and price-to-book-value (P/BV) ratios were also 
reported in Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8.  
 
Regarding liquidity, the SET’s average daily total turnover and foreign investors’ turnover 
were displayed in Figure 9. Participation of foreign investors in the SET have been 
significant in terms of percentage of total turnover shown in Figure 10. It represented 
roughly between 20 to 30 percent of transaction value by all types of investors. The position 
of foreign investors also appeared to somewhat correlate with the performance of the SET. 
This is illustrated in Figure 11.  
 
Finally, the number of listed companies and the total market capitalisation by industry group 
demonstrated the level of concentration in the SET. They can be referred to from Figure 12 
and Figure 13. 
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Figure 6: SET’s Monthly Market Dividend Yield (1975 – 2014) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
 
 
 
Figure 7: SET’s Monthly Price-earnings Ratios (1975 – 2014) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
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Figure 8: SET’s Monthly P/BV Ratios (1975 – 2014) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Average Daily Turnover in the SET (2004-2014) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
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Figure 10: Transactions by investor type in the SET during 2004- 2013 (%) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
 
 
Figure 11: Monthly Foreign Net Buy (3-month Moving Average) and the SET Index (2001 –2014) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
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Figure 12: Listed Companies by Industry Group (As of December 2014) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
 
 
Figure 13: Total Market Capitalisation by Industry Group (As of December 2014) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
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3.4. Thai Stock Market’s Presence in Asia and the World 
 
The SET’s total market capitalisation to GDP ratio, the number of listed companies, and the 
total market capitalisation in billion US dollar as compared to selected Asian markets were 
presented in Figure 14, Figure 15, and Figure 16, respectively. Overall, they suggested the 
Thai stock market was still comparatively small in terms of the absolute market size, the 
market size relative to the size of the economy, and the participation of listed firms. The 
SET had fairly high liquidity when share turnover velocity was considered in Figure 17. 
 
Figure 18 reported the market share of the SET out of selected exchanges in Asia ex-
Japan. It suggested that the market share of the Thai stock market based on market 
turnover had been in decline since 2012, while the share based on market capitalisation in 
2013 dropped from the 2012 level with the share in 2014 also remained unchanged.  
 
Historical P/E ratio and market yields of selected Asian stock exchanges as of November 
2014 were illustrated in Figure 19 and Figure 20. They implied that the profitability of Thai 
stocks was quite poor, although the dividend yield was on part with other stock markets. In 
terms of the broad index performance, Figure 21 showed that the SET was one of the 
markets that did well in 2014 with a one-year return of approximately 15 percent, although 
that was still far from top markets, like, Shanghai Stock Exchange or BSE India, who 
generated 53 and 37 percent return, respectively.  
 
Lastly, Figure 22, Figure 23, and Figure 24 compared the position of the SET in the global 
market in terms of domestic market capitalisation, the total value of share trading in 
billion US dollar, and the number of listed companies, respectively. The results indicated 
that the Thai stock market ranked 25th out of 64 exchanges in terms of market 
capitalisation, 22nd out of 64 in terms of trade value, and 22nd out of 74 in terms of the 
number of listed companies.  
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Figure 14: Market Capitalisation to GDP (As of December 2014) 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) and IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Number of Listed Companies (As of December 2014) 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) 
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Figure 16: Market Capitalisation (As of December 2014) 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Share Turnover Velocity (As of December 2014) 
 
Note: Share velocity is calculated by share turnover/market capitalisation*12 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) 
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Figure 18: Market Share of the Thai Stock Market in Asian Markets (As of December 2014) 
 
Note: Asian markets included China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Thailand.  
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) 
 
 
Figure 19: Historical P/E ratio (As of November 2014) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand (2014) 
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Figure 20: Market Yield (As of November 2014) 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand (2014) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: One-year Return on the Index (As of December 2014) 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) 
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Figure 22: Domestic Market Capitalisation (As of December 2014) 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand 
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Figure 23: Average Monthly Total Value of Share Trading (For the year 2014) 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) 
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Figure 24: Number of Listed Companies (As of December 2014) 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) 
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Chapter 4: Methodology and Models 
 
This chapter elaborates on the methodology and data used in the following empirical 
chapters. The first section develops the speculative bubble models, namely, the Blanchard-
Watson model, the van Norden- Schaller (VNS) model, and the volume-augmented model. 
It is important to note that, by adopting these models, this thesis focuses on employing a 
direct test, where the behaviour of bubbles is assumed and checked for. That means when 
an evidence of a bubble is detected; it suggests that the data appears to contain the bubble 
of the kind developed by the model. In contrast, when no evidence of a bubble is discovered, 
it implies that only the type of bubble described in the model is not found, and there could 
still be a bubble in other forms. 
 
The next two sections then describe the restriction tests to determine the validity of the 
bubble hypothesis and the robustness checks against simpler simplification. The following 
section shows how the fundamental values are computed. Then, the next section explains 
the construction of the K-NI, which is an author’s calculated index. Finally, last two sections 
discuss the models of bubble transmission and the Granger-causality tests used to 
investigate contagion effects.  
 
4.1. Speculative Bubble Models  
 
Consider a simple asset-pricing model with the assumptions that investors are risk-neutral 
with rational expectations, discount rates are constant, and the market is in equilibrium. The 
period-to-period arbitrage condition would hold, such that the stock price is determined by 
the present value of its expected future cash flows received by investors which include future 
price and dividend to be paid in period 𝑡 + 1. This can be expressed as:  
 
 𝑝𝑡 =
𝐸𝑡(𝑝𝑡+1 + 𝑑𝑡+1)
(1 + 𝑖)
 
( 1 ) 
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where 𝑝𝑡 is the actual stock price at time 𝑡, 𝑑𝑡 is the cash dividend paid in period 𝑡, 𝐸𝑡(∙) is 
conditional expectation operator with respect to information set available at time 𝑡, 𝑖 is the 
discount rate or the equilibrium expected rate of return. 
 
From equation (1), expected future stock prices in period 𝑡 + 1 and beyond can be worked 
out and substituted back into the equation recursively. Given the assumption of rational 
expectations, the expectation of the future expected value implies the expectation as formed 
now or at 𝐸𝑡(𝐸𝑡+1(∙𝑡+2)) = 𝐸𝑡(∙𝑡+2). This gives the fundamental stock price of:  
 
 𝑝𝑡
𝑓
= ∑
1
(1 + 𝑖)𝑔
𝐸𝑡(𝑑𝑡+𝑔)
∞
𝑔−1
 ( 2 ) 
The actual stock price in period 𝑡  is equal to its fundamental price plus the bubble 
component 𝑏𝑡, and the error term, 𝜈𝑡, which has a mean of zero and a constant variance: 
 
 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝑏𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡 
( 3 ) 
 
In other words, the deviations of actual prices from their fundamental values are caused by 
the bubble term. Note that ?̂?𝑡 can then be simply estimated as the difference between actual 
price and the corresponding fundamental value of a particular stock. All assets must satisfy 
the arbitrage condition. This suggests that the bubble component should also follow 
equation (1): 
 𝐸𝑡(𝑏𝑡+1) = (1 + 𝑖)𝑏𝑡 
( 4 ) 
 
4.1.1. The Blanchard-Watson Model 
 
A speculative bubble model was developed by Blanchard (1979) and Blanchard and Watson 
(1982). Each period in this model, the bubble component may survive and continue to grow 
(state 𝑆) or burst and collapse completely (state 𝐶) with the probability that next-period 
return would be in the bubble surviving regime of 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = 𝑞, with 0 < 𝑞 < 1, or that 
it could be in the bubble collapsing regime with the probability of 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝐶) = 1 − 𝑞. When 
the bubble crashes, it will disappear and stock price will revert to the fundamental level. If 
the bubble survives, the investor needs to be additionally compensated for the extra risk 
 68 
 
taken. Therefore, the stochastic process generating the expected bubble in period 𝑡 + 1 will 
be as followed: 
 
 𝐸𝑡(𝑏𝑡+1|𝑆) =
(1 + 𝑖)𝑏𝑡
𝑞
 
( 5 ) 
 𝐸𝑡(𝑏𝑡+1|𝐶) = 0 
( 6 ) 
 
Note that when the bubble does crash, it will collapse completely in a single period, which 
is a rather strong assumption. Furthermore, the fact that it would deflate completely, this 
implies that the bubble can never grow again and that there can be only one bubble in the 
entire period covered in the data. Lastly, the probability of collapse is assumed to be constant 
over time. These issues present some challenges to the model.  
 
4.1.2. The VNS Model 
 
Van Norden and Schaller (2002) (hereafter VNS) then developed a model for periodically 
partially collapsing speculative bubbles allowing for both positive and negative bubbles and 
a time-varying probability of collapse. They made two extensions to the Blanchard-Watson 
model.  
 
First, they noted that the probability of a bubble surviving reduces as bubble size increases 
and that bubbles could be either positive or negative ones. They consequently revised the 
probability function by adding the absolute value of relative bubble size (𝐵𝑡 = 𝑏𝑡/𝑝𝑡) to be:  
 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = 𝑞(𝐵𝑡) 
( 7 ) 
 
where 𝑑𝑞(𝐵𝑡) 𝑑|𝐵𝑡| < 0⁄ . For this, they adopted the following Probit models to ensure that 
the estimates of 𝑞 is between 0 and 1: 
 
 𝑞(𝐵𝑡) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡|)  
( 8 ) 
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where Ω is the standard normal cumulative density function, Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜) is the mean probability 
of a bubble surviving in next period, and 𝛽𝑞𝑏  is the sensitivity of the probability to survive 
to the absolute value of relative bubble size. 
 
Secondly, VNS let the expected bubble component in state 𝐶 be a function of relative bubble 
size to allow for partial collapse, so 
 
 𝐸𝑡(𝑏𝑡+1|𝐶) = 𝑢(𝐵𝑡) ∙ 𝑝𝑡 
( 9 ) 
 
It is further assumed that 𝑢(𝐵𝑡) is a continuous and everywhere differentiable function, such 
that the model can be linearised for estimation purpose and  𝑢(0) = 0 , 0 ≤
𝑑𝑢(𝐵𝑡) 𝑑(𝐵𝑡)⁄ ≤ 1 which shows that, in the collapsing state, the expected relative bubble 
size in period 𝑡 + 1 will shrink. Specifically, it cannot be larger than the relative bubble size 
in period 𝑡 and must be smaller than the surviving state bubble. 
 
Given this new setup, the expected bubble size in surviving regime will then be:  
 
 𝐸𝑡(𝑏𝑡+1|𝑆) =
(1 + 𝑖)
𝑞(𝑏𝑡)
𝑏𝑡 −
1 − 𝑞(𝐵𝑡)
𝑞(𝐵𝑡)
𝑢(𝐵𝑡) ∙ 𝑝𝑡 
( 10 ) 
 
This implies that the expected bubble size in state 𝑆 is a decreasing function of probability 
𝑞 (increasing function of probability of collapse, 1 − 𝑞) and probability 𝑞 is an increasing 
function of absolute relative bubble size. In other words, as the bubble grows and the 
probability of collapse increases, investors need larger compensation for their risk. Note 
that, if 𝑞(𝐵𝑡) = 𝑞 and 𝑢(𝐵𝑡) = 0, this model reverts to Blanchard-Watson setup. 
 
Under certain assumptions about the dividend process, the gross return for stock in the VNS 
model is determined by the non-linear switching model: 
 
 𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = [𝑀(1 − 𝐵𝑡) +
𝑀𝐵𝑡
𝑞(𝐵𝑡)
−
1 − 𝑞(𝐵𝑡)
𝑞(𝐵𝑡)
𝑢(𝐵𝑡)] 
( 11 ) 
 𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1|𝐶) = [𝑀(1 − 𝐵𝑡) + 𝑢(𝐵𝑡)] 
( 12 ) 
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where 𝑀 is the expected growth rate of explosive bubble component, 𝐸𝑡 (𝑏𝑡+1) 𝑏𝑡⁄ . 
 
For estimation purpose, the model can be linearised by taking the first-order Taylor series 
approximation of 𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) and 𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1|𝐶) with respect to 𝐵𝑡 around some arbitrary 𝐵0. 
This yields a linear regime-switching model: 
 
 𝑟𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑠𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡+1 
( 13 ) 
 𝑟𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜 + 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡+1 
( 14 ) 
 
with a single state-independent probability switching regimes: 
 𝑞(𝐵𝑡) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡|) 
( 15 ) 
 
where: 
 𝛽𝑠𝑏 = −
1
𝑞(𝐵0)2
∙
𝑑𝑞(𝐵0)
𝑑𝐵𝑡
∙ [(1 + 𝑖)𝐵0 − 𝑢(𝐵0) +
1 − 𝑞(𝐵0)
𝑞(𝐵0)
∙ [1 + 𝑖 −
𝑑𝑢(𝐵0)
𝑞(𝐵𝑡)
]] ( 16 ) 
 
 𝛽𝑐𝑏 = [
𝑑𝑢(𝐵0)
𝑑𝐵𝑡
− (1 + 𝑖)] ( 17 ) 
 
and 𝜀𝑠,𝑡+1 and 𝜀𝑐,𝑡+1 are the unexpected gross returns in period 𝑡 + 1 in the surviving and 
collapsing state, respectively. The two disturbance terms are assumed to have a zero mean, 
constant variance and i.i.d. normal random variables. Assuming that 𝑖 ≥ 0, it can be proved 
that 𝛽𝑠𝑏 ≥ 0 and 𝛽𝑐𝑏 ≤ 0, thus, 𝛽𝑠𝑏 ≥ 𝛽𝑐𝑏 . 
 
4.1.3. Volume-augmented Model 
 
Brooks and Katsaris (2005) noted that investors could regard an increase in volume traded 
as a sign for other investors trying to unload their ‘bubbly’ assets to avoid the next burst of 
the bubble, which will, in turn, result in the realisation of the bubble collapse. The unusual 
volume is then negatively correlated with the probability of a bubble surviving in the next 
period. Also, investors need to be further compensated for these signals of possible change 
in the long-run trend in stock prices as well. Brooks and Katsaris (2005), therefore, extend 
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the model by including also the abnormal volume terms in both the surviving-regime gross 
returns equation and the probability function, such that the expected bubble size is: 
 
𝐸𝑡(𝑏𝑡+1)
= {
(1 + 𝑖)𝑏𝑡
𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡)
−
1 − 𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡)
𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡)
𝑢(𝐵𝑡) ∙ 𝑝𝑡 with probability 𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡)
𝑢(𝐵𝑡) ∙ 𝑝𝑡 with probability 1 − 𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡)
 
( 18 ) 
 
where 𝐴𝑉𝑡  is a measure of abnormal volume in period 𝑡  and 𝜕(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡) 𝜕𝐴𝑉𝑡 < 0⁄ . 
Assuming dividends follow a geometric random walk with drift, it can be shown that the 
expected gross return in period 𝑡 + 1 can be written as: 
 
 𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = [𝑀(1 − 𝐵𝑡) +
𝑀𝐵𝑡
𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡)
−
1 − 𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡)
𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡)
𝑢(𝐵𝑡)] 
( 19 ) 
 𝐸𝑡(𝑟𝑡+1|𝐶) = [𝑀(1 − 𝐵𝑡) + 𝑢(𝐵𝑡)] 
( 20 ) 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = 𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡) 
( 21 ) 
 
where 𝛽𝑞𝑣 is the sensitivity of the probability to survive to the measure of unusual trading 
volume. This can again be linearised by taking first first-order Taylor series approximation 
around arbirrayarbitrary 𝐵0 and 𝐴𝑉0 which yields a linear switching regression model:  
 
 𝑟𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑠𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡+1 
( 22 ) 
 𝑟𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜 + 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡+1 
( 23 ) 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = 𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡) 
( 24 ) 
 
The model is estimated using maximum likelihood approach with the assumption that the 
disturbance is normally distributed. The log-likelihood function is: 
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ℓ(𝑟𝑡+1|𝜉) = ∑𝑙𝑛 [𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆)
𝜔 (
𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝛽𝑠𝑜 − 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝐵𝑡 − 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝜎𝑠
)
𝜎𝑠
𝑇
𝑡=1
+ 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝐶)
𝜔 (
𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝛽𝑐𝑜 − 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝐵𝑡
𝜎𝑐
)
𝜎𝑐
] 
( 25 ) 
 
where 𝜉 is the set of parameters including 𝛽𝑠𝑜, 𝛽𝑠𝑏, 𝛽𝑠𝑣, 𝛽𝑐𝑜, 𝛽𝑐𝑏, 𝛽𝑞𝑜, 𝛽𝑞𝑏 , 𝛽𝑞𝑣, 𝜎𝑠, 𝜎𝑐 and 
𝜔 is standard normal probability density function, , 𝜎𝑠 and 𝜎𝑐 are the standard deviations of 
the disturbances in surviving and collapsing state, respectively, and 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝐶) = 1 −
𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆). The estimations of the all models are performed using MATLAB. Particularly, 
as 𝜎𝑠 , 𝜎𝑐   cannot be negative, these estimations are essentially constrained optimisations 
where the constraints are that the two standard deviation parameters are non-negative. 
However, it is more efficient to work with unconstrained optimisation problems. The 
objective function was therefore modified to include the exponentials of 𝜎𝑠 and 𝜎𝑐 instead. 
The estimated parameters of 𝜎𝑠and 𝜎𝑐  are later obtained by taking the logarithms of the 
estimated values from the optimisation process.  The standard errors for hypothesis testing 
were taken from the inverse of the Hessian matrix at the optimum.  
 
4.2. Speculative Bubble Model Restrictions LR Tests  
 
Apart from testing the significance of the parameters, there are some additional conditions 
for this model of periodically collapsing speculative bubbles to have explanatory power for 
stock market returns, in other words, for the null hypothesis of no bubble to be rejected. The 
restrictions are: 
𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜 (𝑅1)
𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0 (𝑅2)
𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏 (𝑅3)
𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0 (𝑅4)
𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0 (𝑅5)
𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0 (𝑅6)
 
 
Firstly, the model assumes two distinct regimes and restriction (R1) specifies that the 
average return of the two regimes should not be the same. However, it does not require that 
the mean return in the bubble-collapsing regime must be smaller than that in the bubble-
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surviving regime. This is because the equations for the two regimes are basically derived 
based on two independent distributions. Although the bubble-collapsing state may be 
thought to have higher volatility than that of the bubble-surviving state, it does not warrant 
that the average return must be lower. Realisations of next-period return following bubble 
collapses are typically low, but that due to the effects coming from both the average return 
and the relative bubble term, and not necessarily just the average return itself. Thus, the 
restriction test only requires the two average returns to be different – so that they are indeed 
two distinct regimes – and not that one is higher than another. 
 
Next, restriction (R2) ensures that the expected return should be negative if the bubble 
collapses. Restriction (R3) means the return compensating for the existence of bubble when 
it survives should be larger than in the case where the bubble collapses. Restrictions (R4) 
and (R5) imply that the probability of the bubble surviving in the next period will be lower 
as the size of bubble grows and the abnormal volume increase, respectively. Lastly, as 
investors would require a higher return to compensate for the higher risk signalled by the 
increase in unusual volume, restriction (R6) is needed. Likelihood ratio (LR) tests can be 
performed to test all of these restrictions on the estimated parameters. The tests are two-
tailed for restriction (R1) and one-tailed for restrictions (R2) to (R6). 
 
These six restriction tests describe the sign and relative size of the coefficients as postulated 
by the volume-augmented model. If the data contains a bubble of the kind proposed by the 
model, the estimated parameters should satisfy these conditions. Therefore, for this thesis, 
they will serve as a decision criteria for concluding whether a particular set of data displays 
any evidence of bubble-like behaviour. Specifically, adopting the approach of Anderson et 
al. (2010), the result will be interpreted as showing some signs of bubble when at least two 
restriction tests are rejected. When three or more tests are refuted, the result will be taken as 
strong evidence. In other words, to detect a bubble, it is necessary for the data to have at 
least two of the hypothesised characteristics, but it will only be sufficient when three or 
more conditions are met.  
 
  
 74 
 
4.3. Robustness against Stylised Alternatives LR Tests 
 
The ability of the models to explain the variability of stock returns can be further checked 
by testing them against simpler models that are already nested within this more general 
framework. This is also done by likelihood ratio tests.  
 
4.3.1. Volatility Regimes Model 
 
First, a tested against a simple model of changing volatility can be performed. This model 
can be expressed as followed: 
 
 𝑟𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝑢𝑠,𝑡+1 , 𝑢𝑠,𝑡+1~(0, 𝜎𝑠) 
( 26 ) 
 𝑟𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝑢𝑐,𝑡+1 , 𝑢𝑐,𝑡+1~(0, 𝜎𝑐) 
( 27 ) 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = 𝑞 = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜) 
( 28 ) 
 
This suggests that the next period mean returns are the same in both regimes, the bubble 
component has no predictive ability for returns in next period, and the probability of 
switching between regimes is fixed. However, the two regimes are different in terms of 
disturbance variances. These assumptions can be translated into the following joint 
restrictions: 𝛽𝑐𝑜 = 𝛽𝑠𝑜 = 𝛽𝑜, 𝛽𝑐𝑏 = 𝛽𝑠𝑏 = 𝛽𝑠𝑣 = 𝛽𝑞𝑏 = 𝛽𝑞𝑣 = 0, and 𝜎𝑠 ≠ 𝜎𝑐. 
 
4.3.2. Mixture of Normals Model 
 
An alternative is to allow for next period mean returns, as well as, the residual variances, to 
be different in two regimes: 
 
 𝑟𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑠𝑜 + 𝑢𝑠,𝑡+1 , 𝑢𝑠,𝑡+1~(0, 𝜎𝑠) 
( 29 ) 
 𝑟𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜 + 𝑢𝑐,𝑡+1 , 𝑢𝑐,𝑡+1~(0, 𝜎𝑐) 
( 30 ) 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = 𝑞 = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜) 
( 31 ) 
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This can be referred to as a mixture of normal distributions model, which means the 
restrictions are only 𝛽𝑐𝑏 = 𝛽𝑠𝑏 = 𝛽𝑠𝑣 = 𝛽𝑞𝑏 = 𝛽𝑞𝑣 = 0. 
 
4.3.3. Fads Model 
 
Cutler et al. (1991) proposed a model with a mean reversion in prices or fads model: 
 
 𝑟𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝑢𝑠,𝑡+1 , 𝑢𝑠,𝑡+1~(0,𝜎𝑠) 
( 32 ) 
 𝑟𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑜 + 𝛽𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐,𝑡+1 , 𝑢𝑐,𝑡+1~(0, 𝜎𝑐) 
( 33 ) 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = 𝑞 = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜) 
( 34 ) 
 
In this model, the next period mean returns are the same across regimes. The bubble 
components determine returns in both regimes with the same linear function, but do not 
have explanatory power over the probability of regime switching. Lastly, the two regimes 
have different disturbance variances. The restrictions are thus:  𝛽𝑠𝑜 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜 = 𝛽𝑜 ,  𝛽𝑠𝑏 =
𝛽𝑐𝑏 = 𝛽𝑏  and 𝛽𝑠𝑣 = 𝛽𝑞𝑏 = 𝛽𝑞𝑣 = 0. 
 
4.3.4. VNS Model 
 
Finally, the volume-augmented model by Brooks and Katsaris (2005) can be tested against 
the VNS model. This is equivalent to testing whether the unusual trading volume adds any 
explanatory power to the speculative bubble model. The restriction is: 𝛽𝑠𝑣 = 𝛽𝑞𝑣 = 0. 
 
These results were investigated to compare the different model of bubbles and find out the 
specification that fits best with the available data. It could also help justify the use of the 
volume-augmented model if the likelihood ratio tests against the more parsimonious models 
are rejected. Nevertheless, they were not conducted to check for the existence of bubbles. 
Precisely, the volatility regimes and the mixture of normals models do not include any 
bubble term, and if these two non-bubble models provide a better fit to the data, there may 
indeed not be any bubbles in the Thai stock market. However, following the approach of 
Anderson et al. (2010), when these two simpler models were not rejected, the evidence was 
still judged to contain evidence of bubbles. 
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4.4. Measure of Fundamental Values 
 
In order to obtain the series of bubble components, the fundamental prices needed to be 
constructed first. The literature suggests a number of approaches for that. For example, it 
can be done by considering the classic Gordon (1982) model:  
 
 𝑝𝑡
𝑓
=
𝑑𝑡
𝑟 − 𝑔
 ( 35 ) 
 
where 𝑔 is the growth rate of dividend. This method assumes that the fundamental price is 
a function of current dividends, their expected rate of growth, and expected rate of return. 
Many previous studies assumed further that log dividends follow a random walk with drift 
process: 
 
 𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝜖𝑡 
( 36 ) 
 
where 𝐷𝑡  is log dividends. It is possible to show that the fundamental price is then a function 
of multiple of current dividends: 
 
 𝑝𝑡
𝑓
= 𝜌𝑑𝑡 
( 37 ) 
 
where 
 
 𝜌 =
1 + 𝑟
𝑒(𝛼+𝜎
2/2) − 1
 
( 38 ) 
 
Under this approach, the relative bubble size is constructed as: 
 
 𝐵𝑡 =
𝑏𝑡
𝑝𝑡
=
𝑝𝑡 − 𝑝𝑡
𝑓
− 𝜈𝑡
𝑝𝑡
= 1 −
𝜌𝑑𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡
𝑝𝑡
 
( 39 ) 
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Following the approach of van Norden and Schaller (2002) and Anderson et al. (2010), this 
research will use the sample mean of historical price/dividend ratio as a proxy for 𝜌. In order 
to ensure that calculations were made with a sufficient data, the first sample mean of 
price/dividend ratio – which will be used to compute estimates of fundamental price and the 
relative bubble term – would start from the 12th observation to allow for one year of data 
points. As the sample mean is calculated separately for each period, using data from the first 
observation up to the current one, the sample size for computation of sample mean in the 
following periods will be updated and expanded by the recent observations. That is, this 
research does not use the mean of entire sample in all estimations, rather the sample mean 
of historical price/dividend ratio for each estimation period would vary.  
 
In any case, it could be argued that more recent observations might carry more relevant 
information and should, thus, be given a higher weight in the computation. However, with 
the approach discussed above, the weight would be equal for all historical observations, and, 
decreasing in the case of later time periods with a larger number of observations. This study 
will also investigate a 12-month weighted average, as well as, an exponential moving 
average as alternative approaches.   
 
Note also that this method assumes a specific stochastic process of dividends and a fixed 
interest rate. The first assumption can be relaxed with the Campbell and Shiller (1987) 
approach where they allow for variation in expected dividend growth over time. This 
method used uses the information based on the difference between the stock price and a 
multiple of current dividends to forecast future dividend changes. Campbell and Shiller 
(1988) allowed for variation in interest rates over time to be predicted as well. 
 
4.5. Sectoral and Industrial Index Data  
 
The availability of the official Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)’s Industry Group indices 
is quite limited, while the Sectoral indices contain considerable sector-specific noise and 
comprise too many sectors which make it difficult for interpretation. The Datastream-
calculated indices are also inappropriate, as they include extended periods of zero reported 
dividend yields. Therefore, the K-NI series is a market-capitalisation-weighted index that 
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imitates the SET’s eight Industry Group indices but is extended to cover periods of more 
than 20 years by using information from the Sectoral indices, will be investigated. 
 
The Stock Exchange of Thailand provides two levels of sectoral indices, which are industry 
group indices and sectoral indices. Similar to the main SET Index, these indices are also 
market capitalisation-weighted with the base value of 100 points. Adjustments are also 
made, for instance, when a stock moves from one industry group or sector to another. 
 
The sectoral indices series was launched on 2nd May 1975, based on prices on 30th April 
1975, which was the first trading day of the SET. The industry group indices series, 
however, was only introduced from 5th January 2004 based on 31st December 2003.Several 
revisions in terms of addition of new sectors or reclassifications were announced since. As 
of 2013, companies listed on the SET’s main board are classified into eight industry groups 
and 27 sectors1, based on fundamentals. Table 3 summarises the groupings. 
 
Data utilised in the empirical investigation in this chapter were retrieved from Datastream. 
Table 4 shows the starting observations of the sectoral indices obtained. There are three 
main data types required for the analysis with the volume-augmented model. They are price 
index, dividend yield and trading volume. Datastream only contains the price index from 
January 2004, dividend yield from June 2005 and trading volume from December 2007 for 
all the industry groups. This means there is a limited time frame to the study sample ending 
in December 2012 giving only 49 observations after allowing for 12-month burn-in periods.  
 
As for the sectoral indices, although Datastream includes the price index of many sectors 
started from the late 1970s or early 1980s, the dividend yield series are only available from 
September 1988 onwards. Therefore, the longest series available for estimation, after 
allowing for 12 months burn-in periods, could only begin from August 1989, which includes 
280 observations ending December 2012. Other sectoral indices data that become available 
later will have a shorter sample size.  
 
                                               
1 As of January 2014, there are eight industry groups and 28 sectors with the addition of Construction Services 
(CONS) sector under Property & Construction industry group. Property Fund sector was also renamed to 
Property Fund & REITs (PF&REIT).  
 79 
 
An alternative dataset for this investigation of disaggregated indices was the Datastream- 
calculated indices. For Thailand, 50 stocks were monitored and classified into ten industry 
groups. This full list is shown in Table 5. The advantages of using these Datastream-
calculated indices are that they have reasonably long historical data and are more 
manageable as compared to working with 27 sectoral indices. However, the drawback is 
that some of the indices, such as Technology (TECNO) or Telecommunications (TELCM), 
only include a few stocks, two and three, respectively. Moreover, dividends were not paid 
by many Thai-listed firms during the period from the late 1990s and thus, dividend yields 
would be reported as zero. This gives rise to estimation problems in several of the 
specifications.    
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Table 3: List of Industry Group and Sectors in the SET 
Industry Group Sector 
Symbol Description Symbol Description 
AGRO 
Agro & Food 
Industry 
AGRI Agribusiness 
FOOD Food and Beverage 
CONSUMP Consumer Products 
FASHION Fashion 
HOME Home & Office Products 
PERSON Personal Products & Pharmaceuticals 
FINCIAL Financials 
BANK Banking 
FIN Finance and Securities 
INSUR Insurance 
INDUS Industrials 
AUTO Automotive 
IMM Industrial Materials & Machinery 
PAPER Paper & Printing Materials 
PETRO Petrochemicals & Chemicals 
PKG Packaging 
STEEL Steel 
PROPCON 
Property & 
Construction 
CONMAT Construction Materials 
PFUND Property Fund 
PROP Property  Development 
RESOURC Resources 
ENERG Energy & Utilities 
MINE Mining 
SERVICE Services 
COMM Commerce 
HELTH Health Care Services 
MEDIA Media & Publishing 
PROF Professional Services 
TOURISM Tourism & Leisure 
TRANS Transportation & Logistics 
TECH Technology 
ETRON Electronic Components 
ICT Information & Communication Technology 
 
Source: Stock Exchange of Thailand 
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Table 4: Starting Observations of the Sectoral Indices 
Sector 
Price 
Index 
Dividend 
Yield 
Trading 
Volume 
Banking Apr 1975 Sep 1988 Apr 1975 
Commerce Apr 1975 Sep 1988 Apr 1975 
Construction Materials Apr 1975 Sep 1988 Apr 1975 
Finance & Securities Apr 1975 Sep 1988 Apr 1975 
Petrochemicals & Chemicals Apr 1975 Sep 1988 Apr 1975 
Professional Services Apr 1975 Sep 1988 Apr 1975 
Fashion Jun 1975 Sep 1988 Jun 1975 
Food & Beverage Jun 1975 Sep 1988 Jun 1975 
Automotive Dec 1975 Sep 1988 Dec 1975 
Insurance Mar 1977 Sep 1988 Mar 1977 
Paper & Printing Materials  Dec 1977 Sep 1988 Dec 1977 
Mining  Jan 1978 Sep 1988 Jul 1979 
Energy & Utilities Apr 1979 Sep 1988 Apr 1979 
Packaging Nov 1980 Sep 1988 Nov 1980 
Media & Publishing Dec 1982 Feb 1989 Dec 1982 
Tourism & Leisure  Jul 1987 Sep 1988 Jul 1987 
Property Development Jun 1988 Oct 1988 Jun 1988 
Electronic Components  Aug 1988 Oct 1988 Apr 1987 
Personal Products & Pharmaceuticals  Sep 1988 Sep 1988 Sep 1988 
Transportation & Logistics Dec 1988 Dec 1988 Dec 1988 
Health Care Services Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 
Home & Office Products Jun 1990 Mar 1991 Apr 1975 
Information & Communication 
Technology 
Mar 1991 Mar 1991 Aug 1990 
Agribusiness Sep 1991 Sep 1988 Dec 1978 
Industrial Materials & Machinery Jul 2006 Jul 2006 Jul 2006 
Property Fund Mar 2009 Mar 2009 Mar 2009 
Steel Dec 2010 Jan 2011 Jan 2011 
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Table 5: Datastream-calculated Indices 
Datastream Group Company SET's Industry Group SET's Sector 
Market Value 
(Dec 2013) 
Percentage of 
Datastream Group 
Basic Materials 
Indorama Ventures Industrials Petrochemicals & Chemicals 115,060.70 41.53% 
Banpu Resources Energy & Utilities 87,638.56 31.63% 
IRPC Resources Energy & Utilities 74,381.19 26.84% 
Consumer Goods 
Charoen Pokphand Foods Agro & Food Industry Food & Beverage 210,995.10 52.00% 
Sermsuk Agro & Food Industry Food & Beverage 24,994.63 6.16% 
Thai Union Frozen Prds. Agro & Food Industry Food & Beverage 74,019.75 18.24% 
Land and Houses Property & Construction Property Development 95,747.50 23.60% 
Consumer Services 
Minor International Agro & Food Industry Food & Beverage 97,232.81 8.55% 
CP All Services Commerce 388,518.90 34.16% 
Home Product Center Services Commerce 98,772.31 8.68% 
Siam Makro Services Commerce 157,199.90 13.82% 
Robinson Dept.Store Services Commerce 57,476.67 5.05% 
Big C Supercenter Services Commerce 151,799.90 13.35% 
BEC World Services Media & Publishing 105,500.00 9.28% 
Central Plaza Hotel Services Tourism & Leisure 46,237.53 4.07% 
Thai Airways Intl. Services Transportation & Logistics 34,706.05 3.05% 
 
Source: Datastream 
  
 83 
 
Table 5 (continued) 
Datastream Group Company SET's Industry Group SET's Sector 
Market Value 
(Dec 2013) 
Percentage of 
Datastream Group 
Financials 
Bank of Ayudhya Financials Banking 233,854.40 9.41% 
Bangkok Bank Financials Banking 353,135.90 14.21% 
Kiatnakin Bank Financials Banking 33,972.73 1.37% 
Krung Thai Bank Financials Banking 261,352.20 10.51% 
Thanachart Capital Financials Banking 41,209.59 1.66% 
Siam Commercial Bank Financials Banking 524,374.40 21.10% 
Kasikornbank Financials Banking 399,674.60 16.08% 
TMB Bank Financials Banking 102,038.70 4.11% 
CIMB Thai Bank Financials Banking 41,537.20 1.67% 
Bangkok Life Assurance Financials Insurance 80,276.00 3.23% 
SCB Life Assurance Financials Insurance 68,894.00 2.77% 
Central Pattana Property & Construction Property Development 191,861.90 7.72% 
Pruksa Real Estate Property & Construction Property Development 46,234.87 1.86% 
BTS Group Hdg. Services Transportation & Logistics 107,228.00 4.31% 
Health Care 
Bgk.Dusit Med.Svs. Services Health Care Services 199,058.60 75.22% 
Bumrungrad Hospital Services Health Care Services 65,570.38 24.78% 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Datastream Group Company SET's Industry Group SET's Sector 
Market Value 
(Dec 2013) 
Percentage of 
Datastream Group 
Industrials 
Siam City Cement Property & Construction Construction Materials 91,999.94 9.66% 
Siam Cement Property & Construction Construction Materials 482,400.40 50.67% 
Berli Jucker Services Commerce 69,184.13 7.27% 
Siam Global House Services Commerce 47,037.89 4.94% 
Airports Of Thailand Services Transportation & Logistics 261,428.40 27.46% 
Oil & Gas 
PTT Global Chemical Industrials Petrochemicals & Chemicals 355,071.80 17.21% 
Bangchak Petroleum Resources Energy & Utilities 45,094.21 2.19% 
PTT Resources Energy & Utilities 862,601.20 41.80% 
PTT Exploration & Prdn. Resources Energy & Utilities 674,897.30 32.70% 
Thai Oil Resources Energy & Utilities 125,971.60 6.10% 
Technology 
Jasmine International Technology Information & Communication Technology 56,028.48 18.85% 
Shin Technology Information & Communication Technology 241,283.10 81.15% 
Telecommunications 
Advanced Info Ser. Technology Information & Communication Technology 657,053.80 64.28% 
Total Access Comms. Technology Information & Communication Technology 235,005.20 22.99% 
True Corporation Technology Information & Communication Technology 130,045.40 12.72% 
Utilities 
Electricity Generating Resources Energy & Utilities 66,861.00 27.45% 
Glow Energy Resources Energy & Utilities 102,766.20 42.19% 
Ratchaburi Electricity Resources Energy & Utilities 73,950.00 30.36% 
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Because of the various limitations of available datasets, namely the short sample period of 
industry group indices, difficulties managing 27 sectoral indices, and the reliability of 
Datastream-calculated indices, this chapter will therefore also explore the properties of a 
new index computed to tackle these issues. This index is referred to as the K-NI. The K-NI 
reproduces the industry indices by using the available sectoral indices. Precisely, the 
sectoral index is market-capitalisation-weighted, so it is calculated as: 
 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑘𝑖
𝑗=1
∑ 𝑃𝑖,𝑗,0 ∗ 𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑜
𝑘𝑖
𝑗
 ( 40 ) 
 
where 𝑆𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the sectoral index of sector i at time t, 𝑃𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 and 𝑁𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 are price and number of 
shares of stock j in the sector i at time t, respectively. The variable 𝑘𝑖 is the number of stocks 
in the sector i and the subscript 0 denotes the time at base value.  The industry group index 
is also calculated in a similar manner.  For example, if industry group m contains sector 1 
and sector 2, the industry group index can be computed as:  
 
 𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑚,𝑡 =
(𝑀𝑉1,1,𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝑀𝑉1,𝑘1,𝑡) + (𝑀𝑉2,1,𝑡 + ⋯+ 𝑀𝑉2,𝑘2,𝑡)
(𝑀𝑉1,1,0 + ⋯+ 𝑀𝑉1,𝑘1,0) + (𝑀𝑉2,1,0 + ⋯+ 𝑀𝑉2,𝑘2 ,0 )
 ( 41 ) 
 
where 𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑚𝑡 is the industry group index of industry group m at time t, 𝑀𝑉𝑖𝑗𝑡  are market 
capitalisation of stock j in the sector i at time t, which is basically 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑖𝑗𝑡 . It can be 
rearranged to show that:  
 
 𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑚𝑡 =
𝑆𝐼1,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝑉1,0 + 𝑆𝐼2𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝑉2,0
𝑆𝑀𝑉1,0 + 𝑆𝑀𝑉2,0
 ( 42 ) 
 
where 𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖,0 is the sector’s total market capitalisation on the base day, which is ∑ 𝑀𝑉𝑖,𝑗,0
𝑘𝑖
𝑗 . 
This can easily be extended to work with industry groups consisting of more than two 
sectors. In order to construct the K-NI, the market values of all stocks on 31st December 
2003 were,  therefore, collected to compute the 𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑖,0 for each industry group.  
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The dividend yield series were calculated as: 
 
 𝐼𝐷𝑌𝑚,𝑡 =
∑ 𝑆𝐷𝑌𝑝,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑝,𝑡
𝑞𝑚
𝑝=1
∑ 𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑝,𝑡
𝑞𝑚
𝑝=1
 ( 43 ) 
 
where 𝐼𝐷𝑌𝑚,𝑡 is the industry group’s dividend yield, 𝑆𝐷𝑌𝑝,𝑡 and 𝑆𝑀𝑉𝑝,𝑡  are dividend yield 
and the market capitalisation of sector p, respectively. The variable 𝑞𝑚 is the number of 
sector in the industry group.  
 
Lastly, the trading volume considered in this chapter is the average daily trading volume in 
the particular month. The daily trading volume is worked out by summing up the trading 
volume of each stock in the industry group. 
 
The advantage of the new K-NI is that it extends the industry group indices to start from 
September 1988, which means 280 observations are available after balancing with available 
dividend yield and trading volume data and allowing for 12-month burn-in periods. An 
exception is the Technology industry group where one observation is lost, due to dividend 
yield data starting from October 1988. Figure 25 shows comparisons of the K-NI and the 
original series only for the comparable period from June 2005 to December 2012. Overall, 
the two series tend to move very closely together, with the correlation coefficients, ranging 
from 0.9424 to 0.99997, supporting this conclusion. 
 
Note also that, as a market-capitalisation-weighted index, there are a couple of limitations 
with the K-NI. Firstly, it is subject to a concentration bias.  It means that the K-NI – as an 
industry group index – would represent some sub-indices (i.e. the sectoral indices) more 
heavily, based on their market capitalisation. Alternatively, calculations based on fixed-
weight, capped-weight, or equally-weighted methods have been proposed, but the K-NI 
used a standard market-capitalisation-weighted approach to be in line with most indices 
observed in practice, including the official Stock Exchange of Thailand’s SET index series.     
 
Secondly, the K-NI is also prone to a calculation bias. It refers to the fact that a movement 
of a sectoral index with a large market capitalisation included in a particular industry group 
would have a stronger influence on the index – and the same applies for the price change of 
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a stock in a sectoral index. In other words, it mixes up the impact of price and number of 
shares. Also, this would lead to increased overall volatility when the constituents with high 
market value fluctuate, as well. The index weighted by actual free-float, instead of the 
registered number of shares, could partially help reduce the bias. However, in order to be 
consistent with the SET series and to keep computation more straightforward, this has not 
been pursued.     
 
Finally, it is also important to note that, the under-priced instruments would bear a lower 
weight in the market-capitalisation-weighted index, while those with inflated prices – 
potentially, a bubble – would represent a more significant proportion of the index. This 
would result in a substantial mispricing, which investors trading based on the index would 
be at risk.  
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Figure 25: The K-NI and the Original SET’s Industry Group Indices (June 2005 – December 2013) 
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Figure 25 (continued) 
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Figure 25 (continued) 
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Figure 25 (continued) 
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4.6. Contagion Models 
 
Anderson et al. (2010) proposed to extend the original volume-augmented model proposed by 
Brooks and Katsaris (2005) to study the linkages between sectors or industry groups by also 
including the lagged bubble size and abnormal trading volume of all other industry groups in 
the model, and not just lagged bubble size and abnormal trading volume of the particularly 
industry group whose returns are being considered. The model for g industry groups will then 
be: 
 𝑟𝑠,𝑡+1
𝑖 = 𝛽𝑠𝑜
𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗
𝑖 𝐵𝑗𝑡
𝑔
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗
𝑖 𝐴𝑉𝑗𝑡
𝑔
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑠,𝑡+1
𝑖  ( 44 ) 
 𝑟𝑐,𝑡+1
𝑖 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜
𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗
𝑖 𝐵𝑗𝑡
𝑔
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑐,𝑡+1
𝑖  ( 45 ) 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 |𝑆) = 𝑞(𝐵𝑗𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑗𝑡) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜
𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗
𝑖 |𝐵𝑗𝑡|
𝑔
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗
𝑖 𝐴𝑉𝑗𝑡
𝑔
𝑗=1
) ( 46 ) 
 
where the superscript i and the added subscript j refers to the industry groups, while all other 
variables and parameters have the same definitions as discussed previously. The likelihood 
function is also modified in a similar manner to be:  
ℓ(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 |𝜉) = ∑𝑙𝑛
[
 
 
 
 
𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 |𝑆)
𝜔 (
𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 − 𝛽𝑠𝑜
𝑖 − ∑ 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗
𝑖 𝐵𝑗𝑡
𝑔
𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗
𝑖 𝐴𝑉𝑗𝑡
𝑔
𝑗=1
𝜎𝑠
𝑖 )
𝜎𝑠
𝑖
𝑇
𝑡=1
+ 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 |𝐶)
𝜔 (
𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 − 𝛽𝑐𝑜
𝑖 − ∑ 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗
𝑖 𝐵𝑗𝑡
𝑔
𝑗=1
𝜎𝑐
𝑖 )
𝜎𝑐
𝑖
]
 
 
 
 
 
( 47 ) 
 
This model which includes lagged bubble and volume terms from all industry groups (hereafter 
Model A) will be estimated g times – one for each industry group as a dependent variable. The 
number of parameters to be estimated is 5 + 5𝑔 or 45 in the case of eight industry groups.  As 
this model can be quite large and could be problematic to estimate, Anderson et al. (2010) also 
suggest several ways to simplify it.  
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1. Drop the lagged volume terms from the surviving regime equation (and the likelihood 
function) (hereafter, model type P). 
2. Drop the lagged volume terms from the probability equation (hereafter, model type R) 
3. Drop the lagged volume terms from both the surviving regime and probability equations 
(hereafter, model type V) 
 
An alternative approach is to model the return of a particular industry group with its own lagged 
bubble size and trading volume and the market-wide index’s, instead of all other industry 
groups (Anderson et al., 2010). The bubble contagion model that includes the market data as a 
proxy (hereafter, Model M) thus become:  
 
 𝑟𝑠,𝑡+1
𝑖 = 𝛽𝑠𝑜
𝑖 + 𝛽𝑠𝑏
𝑖 𝐵𝑖𝑡+𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑀
𝑖 𝐵𝑀𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑣
𝑖 𝐴𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑀
𝑖 𝐴𝑉𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡+1
𝑖  ( 48 ) 
 𝑟𝑐,𝑡+1
𝑖 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜
𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐𝑏
𝑖 𝐵𝑖𝑡+𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑀
𝑖 𝐵𝑀𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡+1
𝑖  ( 49 ) 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖 |𝑆) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜
𝑖 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏
𝑖 |𝐵𝑖𝑡|+𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑀
𝑖 |𝐵𝑀𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣
𝑖 𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑀
𝑖 𝐴𝑉𝑀𝑡) 
( 50 ) 
 
where all variables and parameters are as defined earlier and the new subscript M denotes 
market data. 
 
The results from Model M can show whether an industry group is affected by the bubble in the 
overall market. However, it does not identify the precise source of transmission. The final 
model (hereafter Model J) is developed to determine the impact of bubbles from different 
industry groups on the industry group being considered, but still maintains the efficiency of 
estimation with a small number of parameters to be estimated. Model J regresses each industry 
group as a dependent variable on its own lagged bubble size and trading volume as well as 
lagged bubble size and trading volume from one other industry groups. It is then repeated for 
all other industry groups. Specifically, the model is:  
  
 𝑟𝑠,𝑡+1
𝑖𝑗
= 𝛽𝑠𝑜
𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑠𝑏
𝑖𝑗
𝐵𝑖𝑡+𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗
𝑖𝑗
𝐵𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑣
𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗
𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑉𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠,𝑡+1
𝑖𝑗
 ( 51 ) 
 𝑟𝑐,𝑡+1
𝑖𝑗
= 𝛽𝑐𝑜
𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑐𝑏
𝑖𝑗
𝐵𝑖𝑡+𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗
𝑖𝑗
𝐵𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑡+1
𝑖𝑗
 ( 52 ) 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1
𝑖𝑗 |𝑆) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜
𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽𝑞𝑏
𝑖𝑗 |𝐵𝑖𝑡|+𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗
𝑖𝑗 |𝐵𝑗𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣
𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗
𝑖𝑗
𝐴𝑉𝑗𝑡) 
( 53 ) 
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where all notation is as above and the subscript j refers to a second industry group considered 
for a potential influence on the dependent variable. 
 
Note that the impact of a particular industry group index or the market index could work 
through up to five different channels, namely the bubble terms in the two return equations and 
state-determining equation, and abnormal trading volume terms in the surviving state equation 
and the probability equation. In order to determine the overall significance, a block exogeneity 
test will be conducted. The test re-estimates the model without the data from a specific industry 
group j by assuming 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗
𝑖𝑗
= 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗
𝑖𝑗
= 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗
𝑖𝑗
= 𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗
𝑖𝑗
= 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗
𝑖𝑗
= 0 . It then performs a nested 
likelihood ratio (LR) test to compare the restricted model to the unrestricted full model with 
the null hypothesis that the full model is no better. Therefore, if the test is rejected, it would 
suggest the industry group j is a significant factor in determining return in the dependent 
industry group. In other words, there is evidence of bubble contagion from industry group j to 
the industry group being investigated.  
 
The results from Model A and Model J will be evaluated using the LR test in a similar fashion. 
If the test fails to reject the null hypothesis, the results from a more parsimonious Model J will 
be chosen over those from Model A.  The integrated block exogeneity test results from the two 
models will be presented. 
 
4.7. Granger Causality Test 
 
Lastly, this study will also consider the conventional bivariate Granger Causality test 
(Granger, 1969) on both returns and relative bubble size from all industry groups. 
Specifically, the model is:   
𝑋1(𝑡) = ∑𝐴11,𝑗𝑋1(𝑡 − 𝑗) + ∑ 𝐴12,𝑗𝑋2(𝑡 − 𝑗) + φ1(𝑡)
ℎ
𝑗
ℎ
𝑗
 ( 54 ) 
𝑋2(𝑡) = ∑𝐴21,𝑗𝑋1(𝑡 − 𝑗) + ∑ 𝐴22,𝑗𝑋2(𝑡 − 𝑗) + φ2(𝑡)
ℎ
𝑐
ℎ
𝑗
 ( 55 ) 
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where 𝑋1(𝑡) and 𝑋2(𝑡) are the returns (or relative bubble size) of two selected industry 
groups in time period 𝑡, 𝑐 is the number of lags with ℎ as the maximum, and φi are the 
residuals.  
In this thesis, the pairwise testing will have a maximum number of lags set for 12 months and 
the optimal lag length is chosen using the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The null 
hypothesis of the test is that the independent variable does not Granger-cause the dependent 
variable. Precisely, in checking whether 𝑋2 Granger-causes 𝑋1, the null hypothesis is that all 
the 𝐴12,𝑐  coefficients are all zero. If rejected, it means the independent variable 𝑋2 precedes 
the dependent variable 𝑋1 or there is evidence of possible linkages between two industry 
groups.  The analysis is different from the speculative bubble model approach as it allows for 
lags of more than one period but it does not permit states of different bubble behaviour.   
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Chapter 5: Empirical Results for the Aggregate Market Index 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter studies the Stock Exchange of Thailand’s market-wide SET Index. Data on the 
monthly price index, corresponding dividend yield, and trading volume since the establishment 
of the exchange in April 1975 until December 2012 were obtained from Datastream. Implied 
cash dividends were calculated from the dividend yields. The price index and dividend series 
were converted into real (constant price) series using Thailand’s Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
retrieved from the same database. Monthly trading volume is calculated as an average daily 
volume in a certain month. This is done to avoid the impact of events with exceptionally high 
or low trading volumes. Abnormal trading volume was computed as the percentage deviation 
of trading volume from the moving average of 3-, 6-, 12-, and 18-month periods.  
 
The structure is organised as followed. The empirical evidence is discussed in the next section. 
Particularly, it presents estimation results from the main model, various robustness checks and 
model extensions. It also justifies the use the methodology with the analysis on probability 
statistics obtained from the models. Finally, the last section offered a conclusion. 
 
5.2. Empirical Evidence on the market-wide SET Index 
 
The following sections present the results of the speculative bubble models for the SET Index. 
The volume-augmented model was estimated to assess the presence of bubble-like behaviour 
in the Thai stock market over the sample of April 1975 to December 2012. The tables are 
separated into panels. The top two panels contain the results from model estimations. They 
include estimated coefficients with asterisks denoting their significance levels, the maximised 
log-likelihood function values, and three information criteria statistics. The third panel presents 
the coefficient restriction tests, which helps evaluate the hypothesis of no-bubble. In order to 
determine whether this volume-augmented model is better at explaining return variations than 
simpler models, the log-likelihood tests against four more parsimonious specifications were 
performed as robustness checks. Their results can be found in the fourth panel. Lastly, the last 
panel shows the starting observation and number of observations included in estimations. Note 
 97 
 
that the first 11 observations in the sample were excluded from the estimations to allow for a 
burn-in period. That is to ensure that the simple average of dividend yield which was used a 
proxy for the calculation of fundamental values covers at least 12 observations.   
 
5.2.1. The Base Model: Volume-augmented Model  
 
An initial estimation used monthly data with the following definitions. The fundamental value 
was computed using the dividend multiple approach with simple average as a proxy (see 
Section 4.4 Measure of Fundamental Values). Abnormal trading volume was defined as a 
percentage change of the current period’s trading volume to the moving average of the latest 
12 periods. Precisely, the current trading volume is included in the calculation of the moving 
average and the monthly trading volume employed in the estimation is the average daily trading 
volume within the given month. Alternative descriptions of the variables – such as weighted 
or exponential weighted moving averages of dividend multiple, other numbers of lags included 
in the trading volume’s moving average, exclusion of current period data from the moving 
average computation, and the ratio of current trading volume to moving average instead of 
percentage deviation – were also investigated as further robustness checks in Section 5.2.2. 
 
With regard to the base model, the results are shown in Table 6. Overall, they reveal that the 
volume-augmented model formalised in equations (22) to (24) captures significant additional 
variations in returns and probability functions when compared to the volatility regimes model 
[equations (26) to (28)], the mixture of normal distributions model [equations (29) to (31)], the 
fads model [equations (32) to (34)], and also the VNS model [equations (13) to (17)]. To assess 
the evidence of a bubble, the number of restriction tests rejected are counted. In this case, only 
two of the coefficient restrictions are satisfied, but all estimated parameters have the expected 
signs. Thus, it can be argued that there is some evidence supporting the rejection of the no-
bubble hypothesis. Most of the estimated regression coefficients are statistically significant.  
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Table 6: The Base Model: Volume-augmented 
 
The Base 
Model 
VNS Fads 
Mixture of 
Normals 
Volatility 
Regimes 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0057*** 1.0075*** 1.0078*** 1.0088*** 1.0096*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0235 0.0347** 0.0081   
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0112*     
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0263*** 1.0185***  1.0134***  
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0374 -0.0257    
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.5147*** 1.4124*** 0.4332* 0.4291 0.4464* 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -3.1159*** -3.4989***    
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.3121     
𝜎𝑠  0.0444*** 0.0422*** 0.0493*** 0.0494*** 0.0498*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1210*** 0.1156*** 0.1284*** 0.1279*** 0.1287*** 
Log-Likelihood 516.7845 513.9311 495.5600 495.3250 495.2720 
AIC -2.2983 -2.2945 -2.2248 -2.2237 -2.2280 
SBIC -2.3437 -2.3308 -2.2474 -2.2464 -2.2461 
HQIC -2.2618 -2.2652 -2.2065 -2.2054 -2.2134 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0433 0.3805    
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  1.1832 0.7229    
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  2.5183 2.9553*    
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  29.8211*** 35.5400***    
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  2.1841     
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  3.7030*     
Volatility regimes 43.0251*** 37.3181*** 0.5760 0.1059  
Mixture of normals 42.9191*** 37.2122***    
Fads 42.4490*** 36.7421***    
VNS 5.7069*     
Starting observation Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Mar 1976 
No. of observations 441 441 441 441 441 
 
Note: The top panel reports estimated parameters from the volume-augmented model as formalised in 
equations (22) to (24), the VNS model in equations (13) to (17), the fads model in equations (32) to 
(34), the mixture of normals in equations (29) to (31), and the volatility regimes in equations (26) to 
(28) with definitions of variables elaborated in the text. The second panel shows maximised log-
likelihood statistics and other information criteria. The third and fourth panels present likelihood ratio 
statistics for tests of coefficient restrictions and robustness checks against simpler specifications. 
Starting observations and number of observations included in the estimation are contained in the last 
panel. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Consider the return equations, the coefficient 𝛽𝑠𝑜 and 𝛽𝑐𝑜 are 1.0057 and 1.0263, respectively. 
This means that the average net monthly return in the surviving and collapsing regime are 
0.57% and 2.63% per month or 7.06% and 36.55% per year, respectively. Note that the average 
return when the bubble survives turns out to be smaller than when it collapses. Although this 
is rather counter-intuitive, it does not violate any assumption of the model. The theory only 
postulates that the two regimes should have different average returns.  The estimated 
parameters of the relative bubble term (𝛽𝑠𝑏 and𝛽𝑐𝑏)  are statistically insignificant in both 
regimes and the difference between the two regimes is also not statistically significant, as 
shown by restriction (R3). Specifically, when the 𝐵𝑡 = 0.5 or when half of the actual price is 
a deviation from fundamental price, the expected returns with normal trading volume increase 
to 1.75% (23.07% annualised) in the surviving state and fall to 0.76% (9.51% annualised). 
Note that this result is consistent with Anderson et al. ( 2010) who found a positive 𝛽𝑠𝑏 which 
suggested investors in the S&P500 were compensated for holding bubbly assets if the bubble 
survives and continues to grow. Finally, investors are compensated for the additional risk of 
holding assets with abnormal trading volume, as 𝛽𝑠𝑣 is positive and statistically significant. 
 
Turning to the probability function, abnormal trading volume was included to proxy for 
investors offloading bubbly assets. As it increases, the prospect of bubble surviving will 
diminish. The result shows that 𝛽𝑞𝑣  is indeed negative but not statistically significant. The 
average probability, when there is no deviation from fundamental value and the trading volume 
is normal, can be calculated as the cumulative normal distribution function of 𝛽𝑞𝑜 which turns 
out to be 93.51%. Also, as bubble size grows larger, it is less likely to continue. The coefficient 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  is statistically significant and estimated to be -3.1159 which suggest that, assuming normal 
trading volume, the probability of bubble surviving in next period when 𝐵𝑡 = 0.5 will fall to 
only 48.28%. In fact, the average relative bubble size in the sample is 0.2865, which suggests 
that the probability of being in the bubble surviving state when there is no abnormal trading 
volume is actually 81.95%, on average. 
 
Finally, returns usually observe very significant fall in the period where the bubble bursts. 
Thus, the standard deviation in the collapsing state is expected to be greater than in the bubble 
continues to survive. This view is supported by the evidence where 𝜎𝑠 and 𝜎𝑐  were estimated 
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to be 4.44% and 12.10% on a monthly basis. Thus, the result is consistent with the speculative 
bubble model.  
 
5.2.2. Further Robustness Checks 
 
As further robustness checks, models with alternative measurements of the variables were 
estimated, and their results were compared to the base model discussed in the previous section. 
 
5.2.2.1. Measures of Fundamental Value 
 
Table 7 presents the results when the fundamental value is computed using dividend multiple 
approach with different proxies. As discussed in Section 4.4, the base model utilised a simple 
average of the all past price/dividend ratios as a proxy for the dividend multiple used in the 
calculation of the fundamental value. However, it is arguable that the more recent observations 
should be more relevant in forecasting evolution of prices. Therefore, the exponential moving 
average and 12-month weighted average were tested. The former model gives a qualitatively 
and quantitatively comparable result with lower log-likelihood function values at optimum 
when compared to the base model, although it performs better in terms of restriction test 
rejection. The latter yields a less satisfactory result with a test against the VNS model cannot 
be rejected. The last column shows the estimation based on a fundamental value method by 
Campbell and Shiller (1987). The result is mostly similar to the base model, except for the 
statistically insignificant negative 𝛽𝑞𝑜  and positive 𝛽𝑞𝑏 . It also has a smaller log-likelihood 
value. Hence, the rest of this study will focus on the simple average dividend multiple approach 
as a proxy for fundamental value.  
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Table 7: Measures of Fundamental Values 
 The Base Model 
Exponential 
Moving Average 
Weighted 
Moving Average 
Campbell and 
Shiller (1987) 
Fundamental 
Value 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0057*** 1.0075*** 1.0099*** 1.0053*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0235 0.0140 0.0836* 0.0056 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0112* 0.0125* 0.0117 0.0120 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0263*** 1.0169*** 1.0084*** 1.0200*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0374 -0.0163 -0.0119 -0.0250 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.5147*** 1.5738*** 1.4717*** -0.5034 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -3.1159*** -3.3550*** -6.9478*** 1.0091 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.3121 -0.4874 -0.3128 -0.4593 
𝜎𝑠  0.0444*** 0.0476*** 0.0526*** 0.0384*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1210*** 0.1249*** 0.1313*** 0.1097*** 
Log-Likelihood 516.7845 516.4507 495.3832 504.2660 
AIC -2.2983 -2.2968 -2.2576 -2.2416 
SBIC -2.3437 -2.3422 -2.3041 -2.2869 
HQIC -2.2618 -2.2603 -2.2203 -2.2050 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0433 0.3583 0.0092 1.1819 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  1.1832 0.3372 0.0514 2.4072 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  2.5183 0.7555 1.4771 2.8693* 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  29.8211*** 29.7288*** 25.3182*** 7.8063*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  2.1841 4.3226** 1.7475 2.3462 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  3.7030* 3.6955* 3.2381* 2.1789 
Volatility regimes 43.0251*** 42.3573*** 37.9953*** 17.9880*** 
Mixture of normals 42.9191*** 42.2514*** 37.8807*** 17.8821*** 
Fads 42.4490*** 41.8379*** 35.8551*** 17.5411*** 
VNS 5.7069* 8.4136** 4.4379 4.5323 
Starting observation Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Feb 1977 Mar 1976 
No. of observations 441 441 430 441 
 
Note: Results from the volume-augmented model with the data based on a simple average of past 
price/dividends ratio as a proxy for dividend multiple used in the determination of the fundamental 
values and subsequently the relative bubble term. The fundamental values of alternative datasets were 
calculated with exponential weighted or 12-month weighted average as a proxy for dividend multiple 
or the Campbell-Shiller (1987) approach as discussed in Section 4.4. ***, **, * denote statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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5.2.2.2. Trading Volume’s Moving Average 
 
There are three issues about the way abnormal volume is computed. They are about the 
appropriate number of lags to be included in the calculation of the moving average, whether 
the current period’s trading volume should be included in such calculations and whether the 
percentage deviation from the moving average or the ratio of current period’s trading 
volume to the moving average is a fitting functional form for abnormal trading volume. All 
of these matters are more empirical than theoretical and were investigated here.  
 
The results based on 3-, 6-, 12-, and 18-period lags are shown in Table 8. In general, all 
specifications offer qualitatively similar results. The model with 12-period lag produced the 
most convincing results, as it yielded the highest log-likelihood statistics. The volume-
augmented model with 3- and 6-period lag of trading volume’s moving average are not 
better than the original VNS model, as the test cannot be rejected. While the model with 18-
period lag has additional explanatory power from the simple models and the restriction (R5) 
rejected, it has the lowest log-likelihood value in all four specifications. 
 
The base model measured moving average (MA) by including the current period’s trading 
volume. That is a z-month moving average, 𝑀𝐴(𝑧)𝑡 = (𝑉𝑡 + 𝑉𝑡−1 + ⋯+ 𝑉𝑡−𝑧+1)/𝑧, where 
𝑉𝑡  is the average daily trading volume in month 𝑡. The alternative is to include only previous 
periods and exclude the current data, or is 𝑀𝐴′(𝑧)𝑡 = (𝑉𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑡−2 + ⋯+ 𝑉𝑡−𝑧)/𝑧. This 
mostly had a small impact on all specifications. Only the result of 12-period lag is shown in 
Table 8. The 𝛽𝑠𝑣  is no longer statistically significant and the log-likelihood statistics is 
marginally lower than that of the base model. Also, one extra observation is lost. Thus, 
moving averages in this research will be calculated with the latest 12 periods, not the 
previous 12 periods. 
 
 103 
 
Table 8: Measures of Abnormal Trading Volume 
 The Base Model MA(3) MA(6) MA(18) 
MA’(12) – 
excluding current 
period’s 
MA(12) – ratio of 
current period to the 
moving average 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0057*** 1.0072*** 1.0062*** 1.0056*** 1.0053*** 0.9945*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏   0.0235 0.0339* 0.0292* 0.0193 0.0210 0.0235 
𝛽𝑠𝑣   0.0112* 0.0057 0.0115 0.0121 0.0119 0.0112* 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0263*** 1.0193*** 1.0227*** 1.0280*** 1.0269*** 1.0263*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0374 -0.0272 -0.0331 -0.0397 -0.0375 -0.0374 
𝛽𝑞𝑜   1.5147*** 1.4222*** 1.4765*** 1.4937*** 1.4990*** 1.8268*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -3.1159*** -3.4561*** -3.2892*** -2.8960*** -3.0017*** -3.1159*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣   -0.3121 0.0445 -0.0731 -0.3738 -0.3536 -0.3121 
𝜎𝑠  0.0444*** 0.0426*** 0.0441*** 0.0453*** 0.0445*** 0.0444*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1210*** 0.1163*** 0.1195*** 0.1211*** 0.1204*** 0.1210*** 
Log-Likelihood 516.7845 514.0748 515.1138 505.5330 514.8884 516.7845 
AIC -2.2983 -2.2861 -2.2908 -2.2783 -2.2949 -2.2983 
SBIC -2.3437 -2.3314 -2.3361 -2.3243 -2.3404 -2.3437 
HQIC -2.2618 -2.2495 -2.2542 -2.2413 -2.2583 -2.2618 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0433 0.4313 0.7059 1.2161 1.2103 1.0433 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  1.1832 0.7786 1.0029 1.2886 1.2139 1.1832 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏   2.5183 2.9451* 2.7820* 2.2371 2.3339 2.5183 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  29.8211*** 34.3480*** 32.9309*** 24.0231*** 27.3593*** 29.8211*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  2.1841 0.0090 0.0621 3.4331* 2.3826 2.1841 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  3.7030* 0.2799 2.3579 3.6290* 3.5371* 3.7030* 
Volatility regimes 43.0251*** 37.6055*** 39.6836*** 40.9997*** 42.0678*** 43.0251*** 
Mixture of normals 42.9191*** 37.4996*** 39.5776*** 40.9077*** 41.9357*** 42.9191*** 
Fads 42.4490*** 37.0295*** 39.1075*** 40.4514*** 41.4560*** 42.4490*** 
VNS 5.7069* 0.2874 2.3654 6.3678** 4.9370* 5.7069* 
Starting observation Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Sep 1976 Apr 1976 Mar 1976 
No. of observations 441 441 441 435 440 441 
 
Note: Results from the volume-augmented model with different definitions of the abnormal trading volume terms. The base model used abnormal trading volume 
with moving average of trading volume computed from data in the latest 12 periods. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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The last column in Table 8 shows the result of the data with abnormal trading volume 
computed as a ratio of current volume to the moving average, instead of percentage 
deviations. This is done because it is more consistent with other variables in the model. 
Specifically, the gross return - the dependent variable - is the ratio of next period’s price 
index to the current period and the relative bubble term is the ratio of the bubble deviation 
to the current price. However, with this definition of the abnormal trading volume, the 
coefficient 𝛽𝑠𝑜 by itself does not offer any meaningful interpretation. This is because when 
trading volume is normal or when it is at the same level as the moving average, the abnormal 
trading volume takes a value of 1. The average gross monthly return in the surviving regime 
is, therefore, the sum of 𝛽𝑠𝑜 and 𝛽𝑠𝑣 which is 0.9945+0.0012=1.0057 which is equal to the 
estimate of 𝛽𝑠𝑜  based on percentage deviation abnormal trading volume with a small 
rounding error. This also invalidates the restriction (R1). The test was, thus, revised to test 
whether 𝛽𝑠𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠𝑣 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  for this case. Similarly, the coefficient 𝛽𝑞𝑜  by itself does not 
contain any economic meaning. The average probability, when there is no deviation from 
fundamental value and the trading volume is normal, can be calculated as the cumulative 
normal distribution function of the sum of 𝛽𝑞𝑜 and 𝛽𝑞𝑣 which also turns out to be 93.51% , 
which is precisely what was found earlier with the percentage deviation specification. 
Except for 𝛽𝑠𝑜 and 𝛽𝑞𝑜, note that all test statistics, including the final log-likelihood score, 
with the two measures are alike. Nevertheless, the model with percentage deviation is 
preferred, as it allows simpler interpretations. 
 
5.2.2.3. Value of Relative Bubble in the Probability Equation 
 
As set out in equation (24), the absolute value – rather than the actual value – of the relative 
bubble was included in the probability equation. This suggests that the size of the bubble – 
not the sign –determines the likelihood whether the next period is in the surviving state. It 
is possible that the kind of the bubble – positive or negative bubble – might have different 
effects. Therefore, a specification that includes the actual value of relative bubble was 
estimated. Table 9 showed that the result was very similar to the base model. The main 
reason is perhaps that only roughly 20% of the sample period had negative bubbles. 
Moreover, a model with squared relative bubble term instead of the absolute value was also 
tested. The result is qualitatively similar to the base model as well. The coefficient 𝛽𝑠𝑏 is 
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now statistically significant but, overall, the model has marginally lower log-likelihood 
statistics when compared to the base model. 
 
Table 9: Relative Bubble Term in Probability Equation 
 The Base Model 𝐵𝑡 𝐵𝑡
2 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0057*** 1.0053*** 1.0058*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0235 0.0293 0.0260* 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0112* 0.0092 0.0118* 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0263*** 1.0304*** 1.0261*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0374 -0.0467 -0.0376 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.5147*** 0.7035*** 1.1286*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -3.1159*** -2.0340*** -4.3575*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.3121 -0.1739 -0.3098 
𝜎𝑠  0.0444*** 0.0397*** 0.0449*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1210*** 0.1135*** 0.1204*** 
Log-Likelihood 516.7845 514.6047 516.7831 
AIC -2.2983 -2.2885 -2.2983 
SBIC -2.3437 -2.3338 -2.3437 
HQIC -2.2618 -2.2519 -2.2618 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0433 1.9840 1.0080 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  1.1832 2.1075 1.2239 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  2.5183 2.9514* 2.8272* 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  29.8211*** 25.4613*** 29.8182*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  2.1841 0.6410 1.9063 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  3.7030* 2.6765 3.8660** 
Volatility regimes 43.0251*** 38.6653*** 43.0222*** 
Mixture of normals 42.9191*** 38.5594*** 42.9162*** 
Fads 42.4490*** 38.0893*** 42.4461*** 
VNS 5.7069* 1.3472 5.7040* 
Starting observation Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Mar 1976 
No. of observations 441 441 441 
 
Note: Results from the volume-augmented model with different definitions of the relative bubble 
terms in the probability equation (24). The absolute value of relative bubble term was used in the 
base model. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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5.2.2.4. Splitting Sample at July 1997 
 
In July 1997, Thailand switched from a fixed exchange rate regime to a managed floating 
system. It likely caused a major structural change in the economy. To investigate this issue, 
the sample was then split into two sub-periods. The results for the sub-samples are presented 
in Table 10. The sub-sample before July 1997 included 255 observations and the one starting 
July 1997 only covered 168 observations. With shorter sample periods, the model, 
understandably, worked slightly less well in terms of expected signs, the statistical 
significance of parameters and robustness tests against simple models. Still, there seems to 
appear some evidence of a bubble in the data in both sub-periods. Interestingly, considering 
the bubble-related parameters (𝛽𝑠𝑏, 𝛽𝑐𝑏 , 𝛽𝑞𝑏), the influence of bubble variables on the stock 
prices seems to have come through the probability function in the first sub-sample and more 
through the return functions in the latter. Besides, the average probability of bubble 
surviving into the next period has dropped from 99.12% in the sub-sample before July 1997 
to only 20.56% in the sub-sample from July 1997 (based on 𝛽𝑞𝑜  changing from 2.3741 to -
0.8218). In other words, the chance to be in a bubble-collapsing state – which is 
characterised by higher volatility (𝜎𝑐 > 𝜎𝑠 ) – was greater in the sub-period starting from 
1997. This can possibly be explained with the increased risk coming from exchange rate 
floatation, as well as, other uncertainties in the global and domestic markets during that 
point in time.  Furthermore, the statistically significant 𝛽𝑞𝑏  estimated to be -6.8696 implied 
that the effect from the bubble term on the probability of the bubble surviving in the next 
period for the first sub-period with fixed exchange rate was negative statistically significant. 
However, the same effect for the second sub-period with floating exchange rate was 
statistically insignificant. This issue will be further investigated in the following section. 
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Table 10: Splitting Sample at July 1997 
 The Base Model 
Before July 
1997 
From July 
1997 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0057*** 1.0055*** 1.1007*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0235 0.0526 0.4175*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0112* 0.0069 0.0243 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0263*** 1.0177*** 0.9993*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0374 -0.0097 -0.0374*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.5147*** 2.3741*** -0.8218** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -3.1159*** -6.8696*** -1.1076 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.3121 -0.2507 0.1678 
𝜎𝑠  0.0444*** 0.0351*** 0.0545*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1210*** 0.0984*** 0.0678*** 
Log-Likelihood 516.7845 328.8238 196.0619 
AIC -2.2983 -2.5006 -2.2150 
SBIC -2.3437 -2.5790 -2.3341 
HQIC -2.2618 -2.4447 -2.1396 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0433 0.2809 7.7905*** 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  1.1832 0.0616 56.9467*** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  2.5183 1.3573 7.6331*** 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  29.8211*** 26.1614*** 2.1545 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  2.1841 0.9101 4.0007** 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  3.7030* 2.0660 0.7084 
Volatility regimes 43.0251*** 42.3958*** 14.7227** 
Mixture of normals 42.9191*** 39.6701*** 14.6161** 
Fads 42.4490*** 39.5945*** 13.5701** 
VNS 5.7069* 2.6009 0.7817 
Starting observation Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Jun 1998 
No. of observations 441 255 168 
 
Note: Results from the volume-augmented model with the full sample in the base model, the sub-
samples before 1997 and from 1997. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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5.2.3. Model Extensions 
 
5.2.3.1. Abnormal Trading Volume in the Collapsing Regime 
 
The base model assumes that abnormal trading volume signals that bubble is about to burst, 
and investors should be compensated for this additional risk they take. Therefore, the 
abnormal trading volume was included in the return equation in the surviving regime. 
However, it excluded this term in the collapsing regime, which implicitly suggested that the 
investors will not get the extra return for holding bubbly assets with abnormal trading 
volume or that the bubble is probably not going to collapse any further, once the return is 
already in the collapsing regime. To test whether this hypothesis is valid, the abnormal 
trading volume term with the coefficient 𝛽𝑐𝑣 is introduced into the collapsing regime return 
equation as well. Therefore, the revised model is: 
 
 𝑟𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑠𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡 + 𝑢𝑠,𝑡+1 , 𝑢𝑠,𝑡+1~(0,𝜎𝑠) 
( 56 ) 
 𝑟𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜 + 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐,𝑡+1 , 𝑢𝑐,𝑡+1~(0,𝜎𝑐) 
( 57 ) 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = 𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡) 
( 58 ) 
 
The result is shown in Table 11. Overall, the two estimations have very similar results. The 
parameter of 𝛽𝑐𝑣 is positive but not statistically significant. Although, the log-likelihood 
statistics improved with the abnormal trading volume included in the collapsing regime, the 
log-likelihood ratio test against the original volume-augmented model and the VNS model 
were not rejected. Therefore, the base model is deemed appropriate. 
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Table 11: Abnormal Trading Volume in the Collapsing Regime 
 
The Base 
Model 
Model with 𝛽𝑐𝑣 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0057*** 1.0059*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0235 0.0244 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0112* 0.0102 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0263*** 1.0229*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0374 -0.0369 
𝛽𝑐𝑣   0.0085 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.5147*** 1.4932*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -3.1159*** -3.1496*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.3121 -0.3080 
𝜎𝑠  0.0444*** 0.0439*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1210*** 0.1198*** 
Log-Likelihood 516.7845 516.9905 
AIC -2.2983 -2.2947 
SBIC -2.3437 -2.3446 
HQIC -2.2618 -2.2545 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0433 1.0433 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  1.1832 1.1832 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  2.5183 2.5183 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  29.8211*** 29.8211*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  2.1841 2.1841 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  3.7030* 3.7030* 
Volatility regimes 43.0251*** 43.4369*** 
Mixture of normals 42.9191*** 43.3309*** 
Fads 42.4490*** 42.8609*** 
VNS 5.7069* 6.1188 
Volume-augmented  0.4118 
Starting observation Mar 1976 Mar 1976 
No. of observations 441 441 
 
Note: Results from the standard volume-augmented model and the model with the addition of 
abnormal trading volume term in the bubble-collapsing state [equations (56) to (58)]. ***, **, * 
denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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5.2.3.2. Dummy Variables for Exchange Rate Regime 
 
The alternative approach to detect the impact of a change in exchange rate regime is to 
introduce a dummy variable. Dummy variables, 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡, which take a value of 0 before July 
1997 and 1 starting from July 1997 were added to all the three equations in the model.  
 
𝑟𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑠𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 + +𝑢𝑠,𝑡+1 
( 59 ) 
𝑟𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜 + 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐,𝑡+1 
( 60 ) 
𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡+𝛽𝑞𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡) 
( 61 ) 
 
Furthermore, slope dummies, where the dummy variables created earlier were allowed to 
interact with all other independent variables, were also added. The models with both types 
of dummy variables then become:   
 
𝑟𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑠𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑓𝑏𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑠𝑓𝑣𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑉𝑡 + 𝑢𝑠,𝑡+1 
( 62 ) 
𝑟𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜 + 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑓𝑏𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐,𝑡+1 
( 63 ) 
𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡+𝛽𝑞𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝑞𝑓𝑏𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∗ |𝐵𝑡|
+ 𝛽𝑞𝑓𝑣𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑉𝑡) 
( 64 ) 
 
Consider first the results of the extended model in Table 12. The intercept dummy variables 
in both the surviving and collapsing regimes were statistically significant. Specifically, the 
fact that 𝛽𝑠𝑓  is positive and 𝛽𝑐𝑓 is negative also suggests that investors are compensated for 
taking this additional risk when the bubble survives and they are penalised further if the 
bubble bursts with the flexible exchange rate. The specification also yields higher log-
likelihood function values at the optimum. The evidence for the second model with 
additional slope dummy variables is less convincing. Some parameters, particularly the 
interactive terms, turned statistically insignificant. This may possibly be caused by 
multicollinearity among the variables, as the correlation coefficients of the pair 𝐵𝑡 and 
𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑡, the pair 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡  and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐵𝑡, and the pair 𝐴𝑉𝑡  and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑉𝑡 are 0.89, 
0.67, and 0.65, respectively.   
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The robustness checks against simpler specifications now include the standard volume-
augmented model and the model with intercept dummy variables. Although the test statistics 
for the model that also includes additional slope dummy variables against the intercept 
dummy variables was not statistically significant, the hypothesis that the model with 
intercept dummy variables is equally as good as the standard volume-augmented model was 
rejected. It indicated that the dummy variables were able to capture additional variations. 
This could also mean that the collapse of the Thai baht was relevant for stock returns.  
 
As for the evidence of a bubble, the result of the model with only the intercept dummy 
variables has four restriction tests rejected, compared to just two in the case of the standard 
volume-augmented model. Using the same assessment criteria, this can be taken to imply a 
strong evidence of the bubble in the Thai stock market. Besides, while it could be argued 
that inclusion of dummy variables may have picked up the effects of a bubble behaviour 
and the evidence would be weakened, allowing for a structural break in the data with the 
dummy variable has actually strengthened the conclusion.   
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Table 12: Dummy Variables (DV) for Floating Exchange Rate 
 The Base Model Intercept DV Slope DV 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0057*** 0.9995*** 1.0004*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0235 0.0054 0.0169 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0112* 0.0114* 0.0101* 
𝛽𝑠𝑓    0.0230** 0.0225* 
𝛽𝑠𝑓𝑏     -0.0298 
𝛽𝑠𝑓𝑣     -0.0267 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0263*** 1.0363*** 1.0432*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0374 -0.0238 -0.0451 
𝛽𝑐𝑓   -0.0296* -0.0342 
𝛽𝑐𝑓𝑏    0.0206 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.5147*** 1.5512*** 1.9238*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -3.1159*** -3.1404*** -4.2542*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.3121 -0.4100 -0.3835 
𝛽𝑞𝑓    -0.5669** -1.2862** 
𝛽𝑞𝑓𝑏     2.3202 
𝛽𝑞𝑓𝑣     -0.5120 
𝜎𝑠  0.0444*** 0.0390*** 0.0384*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1210*** 0.1141*** 0.1136*** 
Log-Likelihood 516.7845 522.1657 523.8827 
AIC -2.2983 -2.3091 -2.2943 
SBIC -2.3437 -2.3681 -2.3759 
HQIC -2.2618 -2.2616 -2.2284 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0433 3.5710* 2.2145 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  1.1832 0.6241 0.7124 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  2.5183 0.6468 1.1059 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  29.8211*** 28.8692*** 20.9979*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  2.1841 3.7175* 2.6505 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  3.7030* 4.5266** 3.7640* 
Volatility regimes 43.0251*** 53.7874*** 57.2213*** 
Mixture of normals 42.9191*** 53.6815*** 57.1154*** 
Fads 42.4490*** 53.2114*** 56.6453*** 
VNS 5.7069* 16.4693*** 19.9032** 
Volume-augmented  10.7624** 14.1963* 
Intercept DV   3.4339 
Starting observation Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Mar 1976 
No. of observations 441 441 441 
 
Note: Results from the standard volume-augmented model, the model with one set of intercept 
dummy variables, and the model with one set of intercept and slope dummy variables formalised in 
equations (59) to (64), assuming the July 1997 breakpoint. ***, **, * denote statistically significant 
at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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5.2.3.3. Endogenous Break Model 
 
Motivated by the results in the previous section on dummy variables, it is intriguing to 
investigate whether there is a structural break in the data. Instead of forcing a break at July 
1997, this section allowed the break to be endogenously determined by the model. This is 
done by re-estimating the model with intercept dummy variables with the 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡 variable 
starting to take a value of 1 at different time period. Note that this assumes that there is only 
one single break in the entire sample. Also, in the same spirit with Gregory and Hansen 
(1996), the first and last 15% observations will not be considered as possible breakpoints. 
Figure 26 showed the log-likelihood statistics at different breakpoints. The breakpoint with 
the highest log-likelihood statistics is from July 1990, which is consistent with the period 
that Thailand’s financial markets were in the process of liberalisation. The results are 
presented in Table 13. They are essentially comparable to those obtained previously.  
 
Figure 26: Log-likelihood Statistics with Different Breakpoints 
 
Note: Results from the model with one set of intercept dummy variables. 
 114 
 
 
Table 13: Model with One Endogenous Structural Break 
 The Base Model 
Intercept DV 
(𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 1 
from July 1997) 
Intercept DV 
(𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 1 
from July 1990) 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0057*** 0.9995*** 1.0033*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0235 0.0054 0.0332 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0112* 0.0114* 0.0085* 
𝛽𝑠𝑓    0.0230** 0.0204* 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0263*** 1.0363*** 1.0577*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0374 -0.0238 -0.0178 
𝛽𝑐𝑓   -0.0296* -0.0533*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.5147*** 1.5512*** 1.9160*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -3.1159*** -3.1404*** -3.6575*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.3121 -0.4100 -0.3813 
𝛽𝑞𝑓    -0.5669** -1.2419*** 
𝜎𝑠  0.0444*** 0.0390*** 0.0354*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1210*** 0.1141*** 0.1043*** 
Log-Likelihood 516.7845 522.1657 528.1670 
AIC -2.2983 -2.3091 -2.3364 
SBIC -2.3437 -2.3681 -2.3953 
HQIC -2.2618 -2.2616 -2.2888 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0433 3.5710* 6.4879** 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  1.1832 0.6241 0.4260 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  2.5183 0.6468 2.0945 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  29.8211*** 28.8692*** 22.8229*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  2.1841 3.7175* 2.9818* 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  3.7030* 4.5266** 3.2068* 
Volatility regimes 43.0251*** 53.7874*** 65.7900*** 
Mixture of normals 42.9191*** 53.6815*** 65.6841*** 
Fads 42.4490*** 53.2114*** 65.2140*** 
VNS 5.7069* 16.4693*** 28.4719*** 
Volume-augmented  10.7624** 22.7650*** 
Starting observation Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Mar 1976 
No. of observations 441 441 441 
 
Note: Results from the standard volume-augmented model, and the model with one set of intercept 
dummy variables. The intercept dummy variables were included to capture the effects of a structural 
break. Initially, the break was assumed to be in July 1997 when Thailand switched to a managed-
float exchange rate system. However, investigating with endogenously determined break suggested 
that the most appropriate breakpoint, given the dataset, was actually in July 1990. ***, **, * denote 
statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Model with Two Endogenous Breaks2 
 
The previous model which allows for one endogenous structural break in the sample yields 
the result that differs from the initial expectation that the break could be at July 1997 where 
Thailand moved from fixed exchange rate system to a managed floating one. It showed that 
there is another significant breakpoint in the sample, which was in the early 1990s where 
the Thai financial market started to be liberalised. This provoked another research attempt 
to investigate whether there could be more than one structural break in the entire data series 
that cover almost 40 years. A model with two sets of intercept dummy variables with 
endogenous breakpoints was developed. It can be formalised as: 
 
𝑟𝑠,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑠𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑙𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑠𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑠,𝑡+1 
( 65 ) 
𝑟𝑐,𝑡+1 = 𝛽𝑐𝑜 + 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑙𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑐𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 + 𝑢𝑐,𝑡+1 
( 66 ) 
𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡+𝛽𝑞𝑙𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑞𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡) 
( 67 ) 
 
where 𝐿𝑡 and 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 are intercept dummy variables taking a value of 1 starting from date 
𝑡𝐿 and 𝑡𝐹 – which 𝑡𝐿 precedes 𝑡𝐹 – respectively, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Based on this extended model, a procedure similar to the previously section on one 
endogenous break were conducted.  Figure 27 shows the combination of breakpoints that 
gives the highest log-likelihood statistics were September 1996 and August 1998. This is to 
say, there appear to be three sub-periods in the sample: before the crisis, during the crisis, 
and after the crisis. Detailed results of the model based on imposing two sets of intercept 
dummy variables as suggested by the iteration exercise can be found in Table 14.  
 
  
                                               
2 Note that the models with more than two breakpoints were not explored due to computation difficulties. 
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Figure 27: Selected Log-likelihood Statistics of Model with Two Breakpoints 
 
 
The model with two structural breaks at September 1996 and August 1998 results in higher 
log-likelihood statistics at optimum. In fact, it performs very well, such the robustness check 
against simple specifications – including the standard volume-augmented model and the 
model with one structural break – are all rejected. This indicates that this model provides 
the best fit with the given dataset.  
 
Moreover, recall that the standard volume-augmented model and the model with one 
structural break had two and four restriction tests rejected, respectively. This model with 
two structural breaks has five out of the whole six restriction tests refuted, implying an even 
stronger evidence of bubble-like behaviour in the Thai stock market.  
 
With regard to the estimated parameters, not only that allowing for two breakpoints – 
especially, around the period of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis – is more consistent with 
the facts than crudely splitting the entire sample period into just two sub-periods before and 
after a particular event, the extended model also offers some other interesting insights. 
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Table 14: Model with Two Endogenous Structural Breaks 
 The Base Model 
One IDV  
(at Sep 1996) 
One IDV  
(at Aug 1998) 
Two IDVs 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0057*** 1.0025*** 0.9995*** 1.0025*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0235 0.0212 0.0054 0.0161 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0112* 0.0105* 0.0114* 0.0113** 
𝛽𝑠𝑙    -0.0910** 
𝛽𝑠𝑓    0.0211** 0.0230** 0.1045** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0263*** 1.0369*** 1.0363*** 1.0522*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0374 -0.0267 -0.0238 -0.0526 
𝛽𝑐𝑙    -0.0947*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑓   -0.0305* -0.0296* 0.0760** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.5147*** 1.8990*** 1.5512*** 1.8597*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -3.1159*** -4.0792*** -3.1404*** -3.4703*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.3121 -0.4110 -0.4100 -0.3487 
𝛽𝑞𝑙    -2.2452* 
𝛽𝑞𝑓    -1.0588** -0.5669** 1.8298* 
𝜎𝑠  0.0444*** 0.0369*** 0.0390*** 0.0408*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1210*** 0.1083*** 0.1141*** 0.1161*** 
Log-Likelihood 516.7845 524.2757 522.1657 537.9468 
AIC -2.2983 -2.3187 -2.3091 -2.3671 
SBIC -2.3437 -2.3777 -2.3681 -2.4397 
HQIC -2.2618 -2.2712 -2.2616 -2.3086 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0433 2.6175 3.5710* 4.7163** 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  1.1832 0.9397 0.6241 2.2833 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  2.5183 1.7529 0.6468 2.9342* 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  29.8211*** 30.4802*** 28.8692*** 31.2501*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  2.1841 2.8004* 3.7175* 2.7968* 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  3.7030* 3.6949* 4.5266** 4.8264** 
Volatility regimes 43.0251*** 58.0073*** 53.7874*** 85.3495*** 
Mixture of normals 42.9191*** 57.9014*** 53.6815*** 85.2435*** 
Fads 42.4490*** 57.4313*** 53.2114*** 84.7734*** 
VNS 5.7069* 20.6892*** 16.4693*** 48.0313*** 
Volume-augmented  14.9823*** 10.7624** 42.3244*** 
Intercept DV    27.3421*** 
Starting observation Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Mar 1976 
No. of observations 441 441 441 441 
  
Note: Results from the standard volume-augmented model, the model with one and two sets of 
intercept dummy variables (IDV) [equations (59) to (61) and (65) to (67)] to allow for structural 
breaks at September 1996 and August 1998. The model with one break assumes the breakpoint at 
either September 1996 or August 1998 for comparability with the model with two breaks. The 
robustness check for the model with two breaks was tested against the model with one break in 
September 1996, due to higher log-likelihood statistics at maximum. ***, **, * denote statistically 
significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Given the setup of the dummy variables, it is important to clarify that the period before the 
crisis will have the average returns in the two regimes and the average surviving probability 
of 𝛽𝑠𝑜 , 𝛽𝑐𝑜 , and 𝛽𝑞𝑜 , respectively. The intercept terms for the period around the crisis – from 
September 1996 to July 1998 – would include the effect of the first dummy variable, 𝐿𝑡, so 
that they are 𝛽𝑠𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠𝑙 , 𝛽𝑐𝑜 + 𝛽𝑐𝑙 , and 𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑙 , respectively. Finally, the period after the 
crisis will also contain in the impact of the second dummy variable, 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 , as well. The 
average returns if the bubble survives would be 𝛽𝑠𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠𝑙 + 𝛽𝑠𝑓 , and 𝛽𝑠𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠𝑙 + 𝛽𝑠𝑓 , 𝛽𝑐𝑜 +
𝛽𝑐𝑙 + 𝛽𝑐𝑓  if it bursts, while the average probability that the next-period return is in the 
bubble-surviving regime would be 𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑙 + 𝛽𝑞𝑓 .  
 
Consider the estimated intercept coefficients for the bubble-surviving regime, the gross 
return denoted by 𝛽𝑠𝑜  is 1.0025, which means a net return of 0.25%. This number fell 
significantly during the crisis period as 𝛽𝑠𝑙 = −0.0910, resulting in the average gross return 
of 0.9116 or a net return of -8.8%. After the crisis, the average gross return rebounded 
strongly to 𝛽𝑠𝑜 + 𝛽𝑠𝑙 + 𝛽𝑠𝑓 = 1.0161, implying a net return 1.6%. In other words, this 
suggests that, provided there is no bubble and trading volume is normal, investors would 
earn an even higher return in the Thai stock market after the 1997 crisis. The returns in the 
bubble-collapsing regime, however, do not have the same effects. The average return 
declined quite drastically during the crisis. Although it did recover afterwards, the 
improvement was not sufficient to offset the drop. As for the probability equation, a similar 
pattern to the bubble-collapsing state was found. Precisely, the coefficients of average 
bubble-surviving probability computed from intercept terms applicable in the periods 
before, during, and after the crisis are 1.8597, -0.3856, and 1.4442. These estimates indicate 
that the average probability of bubble living on in the next period is 96.9% in the period 
before September 1996, while it nosedives to only 35% around the time of the Asian 
Financial Crisis, and it bounces back to 92.6% from August 1998 onwards. Therefore, it 
could be concluded that, after the crisis, it is slightly less likely that a bubble would survive 
in Thai stock market, but investors are compensated with higher returns if they successful 
ride the bubbles.   
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5.2.3.4. Relative Bubble Term in the Probability Equation Revisited 
 
To further investigate the asymmetric impact of positive and negative bubbles on the 
likelihood of the bubble surviving in next period, a dummy variable for a positive bubble is 
added to the probability equation. Specifically, a dummy variable, 𝐷𝑡, which takes a value 
of 1 if the relative bubble is positive and 0 otherwise was added into the probability function:  
 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = 𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡 , 𝐷𝑡) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑑𝐷𝑡 ∗ |𝐵𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡) 
( 68 ) 
 
Table 15 presented the evidence of this specification. All estimated parameters in the return 
equations are very similar to the base model. The parameter 𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑑  is negative but statistically 
insignificant. The log-likelihood test against the standard volume-augmented model is also 
not rejected, suggesting that this specification is not capturing the extra variability of the 
returns. In other words, the type of bubble is actually not a crucial factor determining the 
probability whether the next period’s return will be in the surviving or collapsing state.  
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Table 15: Nonlinearity in Relative Bubble and Abnormal Trading Volume 
 The Base Model Model with 𝐷𝑡 Model with 𝐴𝑉𝑡
2 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0057*** 1.0062*** 1.0051*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0235 0.0307 0.0206 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0112* 0.0090 0.0062 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0263*** 1.0258*** 1.0299*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0374 -0.0376 -0.0399 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.5147*** 1.6332*** 1.3999*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -3.1159*** -2.9021*** -3.0707*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑑   -0.5233  
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑣    0.4449 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.3121 -0.2162 -1.0244** 
𝜎𝑠  0.0444*** 0.0405*** 0.0437*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1210*** 0.1147*** 0.1199*** 
Log-Likelihood 516.7845 517.6047 519.2908 
AIC -2.2983 -2.2975 -2.3052 
SBIC -2.3437 -2.3474 -2.3551 
HQIC -2.2618 -2.2573 -2.2649 
Volatility regimes 43.0251*** 44.6653*** 48.0376*** 
Mixture of normals 42.9191*** 44.5593*** 47.9317*** 
Fads 42.4490*** 44.0892*** 47.4616*** 
VNS 5.7069* 7.3471* 10.7195** 
Volume-augmented  1.6402 5.0126** 
Starting observation Mar 1976 Mar 1976 Mar 1976 
No. of observations 441 441 441 
 
Note: Results from the standard volume-augmented model, the model with the addition of dummy 
variable, 𝐷𝑡 , classifying between positive and negative bubbles [equation (68)], and the model with 
the squared abnormal trading volume term [equation (69)] to examine the non-linear impact of 
trading volume on probability. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively.  
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5.2.3.5. Nonlinearity of Abnormal Trading Volume in the Probability 
Function 
 
In order to test for nonlinearity effects of abnormal trading volume in the probability 
function, the squared abnormal trading volume term, 𝐴𝑉𝑡
2, was introduced. The probability 
function is then:  
 
 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = 𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡) 
( 69 ) 
 
Table 15 presents the results from this new probability function. The evidence was very 
interesting in several aspects. The robustness test is rejected, implying that additional 
variation was captured. Estimated coefficients have expected signs with reasonable 
magnitudes and are statistically significant. Specifically, the coefficients 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑣 and 𝛽𝑞𝑣  were 
estimated to be 0.4449 and -1.0244, respectively. This suggested a convex parabolic 
relationship between abnormal trading volume and the probability of bubble surviving. 
Precisely, the level of abnormal trading volume that gives the lowest probability of 
surviving is when  𝐴𝑉𝑡 = 1.1513 . This means that when the observed trading volume 
deviates from the moving average less than 115.13% (which is when trading volume is 
below 2.15 times of the moving average), the increase in trading volume will result in lower 
probability of bubble surviving. In other words, investors may be offloading the bubbly 
assets. However, as the trading volume increases above the threshold of 2.15 times of the 
moving average, any further increase in volume will suggest a higher chance of bubble 
continue to grow in the next period. Investors are rushing to buy the bubbly assets, as they 
believe the price will continue to rise. This is consistent with a concept in behavioural 
finance known as herding. 
 
5.2.4. Probabilities 
 
Both the volume-augmented and the extended model with intercept dummy variables allow 
for computations of several probability values, and they can be obtained in two ways.  
 
With the regard to the types of probability the models yield, the most straightforward ones 
are the likelihood that the return will be in either the bubble surviving,  𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) , or 
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collapsing regime, 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝐶), in the next period. They can be calculated as 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) =
𝑞(𝐵𝑡, 𝐴𝑉𝑡) = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡)  for the volume-augmented model 
and 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆) = Ω (𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡+𝛽𝑞𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡)  for the extended model with 
intercept dummy variables, while the bubble-bursting probabilities, 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝐶), are simply, 
1 − 𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆). The probability of extreme cases where the stock index would crash, which 
is to be at least two standard deviations below the mean of past gross returns, given the 
probabilities of being in a surviving and collapsing regimes, can be computed with the 
following equation: 
 
 
𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1 < 𝐾)𝑡 = 𝑞(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆)𝑡Ω(
𝐾 − 𝛽𝑠𝑜,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑠𝑏,𝑡𝐵𝑡 − 𝛽𝑠𝑣,𝑡𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝜎𝑠,𝑡
)
+ 𝑞(𝑟𝑡+1|𝐶)𝑡Ω (
𝐾 − 𝛽𝑐𝑜,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑐𝑏,𝑡𝐵𝑡
𝜎𝑐,𝑡
) 
( 70 ) 
 
or 
 
𝑃(𝑟𝑡+1 < 𝐾)𝑡 = 𝑞(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆)𝑡Ω(
𝐾 − 𝛽𝑠𝑜,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑠𝑏,𝑡𝐵𝑡 − 𝛽𝑠𝑣,𝑡𝐴𝑉𝑡 − 𝛽𝑠𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡
𝜎𝑠,𝑡
)
+ 𝑞(𝑟𝑡+1|𝐶)𝑡Ω(
𝐾 − 𝛽𝑐𝑜,𝑡 − 𝛽𝑐𝑏,𝑡𝐵𝑡 − 𝛽𝑐𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡
𝜎𝑐,𝑡
) 
( 71 ) 
   
where 𝑞(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆)𝑡 = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡| + 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡)  or 𝑞(𝑟𝑡+1|𝑆)𝑡 = Ω(𝛽𝑞𝑜 + 𝛽𝑞𝑏|𝐵𝑡| +
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝐴𝑉𝑡+𝛽𝑞𝑓𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡)  and 𝐾  is the threshold for a crash and it is defined as 𝐾 = 𝜇𝑡 −
2(𝜎𝑟,𝑡), where 𝜇𝑡 is the mean of past gross returns and 𝜎𝑟,𝑡 is the standard deviation of gross 
returns. Likewise, the probability of a rally, where the return could be at least two standard 
deviations above the mean of past gross returns, can be computed in a similar fashion.  
 
Finally, these probability values can be derived from the point estimates of the base model 
regression using all the samples, or they could be obtained from a sequential or recursive 
estimation, where only the data up to and including the current period are included. To 
ensure a sufficient number of observations with the latter methodology, only approximately 
half of the sample was assessed. That is, only the estimates starting from August 1994 were 
available. 
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Figure 28 and Figure 29 show examples of probabilities obtained from the estimation. The 
former displays the natural logarithms of real-series SET index on the primary axis and the 
probabilities of being in a bubble collapsing regime calculated from the point estimates from 
the volume-augmented model on the secondary axis, while the latter was based on 
probability estimates from sequential estimations.  Both figures reveal very similar patterns, 
especially as the number of observations increases and approach a full sample. This is 
confirmed by the correlation coefficient between the two series from August 1994 onwards 
which turns out to be 0.9611. It can be seen that the model correctly forecasted several of 
the episodes of corrections after periods of bubble building ups, such as September-October 
1987, May-June 1990, or the all-time peak at December 1993-January 1994, by showing 
high probabilities of a collapse. Interestingly, the period roughly between August 1998 and 
June 1999 saw the index picked up from the all-time low, but the likelihood of a collapse 
stayed relatively high. As the model also allows for a negative bubble or a price-decreasing 
bubble, this is consistent with the investors overselling Thai stocks as the crisis hit the 
market and thus the index fell too low beyond the fundamental values. A similar situation 
may have taken place again after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  
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Figure 28: Probability of a Collapse with the Volume-augmented Model (Point Estimates) 
 
Figure 29: Probability of a Collapse with the Volume-augmented Model (Sequential Estimates) 
 
Note: Based on equation (70) 
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Investors would be keen to make abnormal profits and avoid significant losses. As discussed 
earlier, the probabilities of a crash and a rally can also be found from the model. The 
previous figure only considered the level of the index, but it is probably more appropriate 
to look at the total return to investors, meaning to include pro-rata dividends. As for the 
likelihood of a crash and/or a rally, it is quite informative also to monitor the change of the 
probabilities from the previous period. Figure 30 and Figure 31 present the total net one-
month return on the primary axis and the percentage change of crash and rally probabilities, 
respectively. As both types of probabilities focus on extreme events, they tend to rise at the 
same time when volatility in the market is high.  
 
Consider the two figures, there are two major events of highly fluctuating probabilities, 
namely, the period around the financial crisis in 1997 and the period around the collapse of 
the Lehman Brothers in 2008. Table 16 provides a closer look at the numbers. Specifically, 
at the end of June 1997, the probability of a next-period crash decreased by 15%, the 
likelihood of a next-period rally increased by 42% and the net return based on a real-series 
SET index with a pro-rata dividend when invested then and held until the end of July 1997 
was indeed 25.80%.  Then, at the end of July 1997, the probability of a crash skyrocketed 
by 381% and the net return nose-dived to -26.19%. In the following period, the same 
probability dropped by 87%, and the return was a positive 8.41%. The likelihood of a rally 
was a better indicator in several other periods, for instance, October-November 1997 and 
December 1997- January 2008. Over the entire sub-sample from August 1994, the changes 
in the probability of a crash and a rally were correct by approximately 57% and 52%, 
respectively. Both of them provided good signals in about 30% of the time. The event 
around the collapse of Lehman Brothers revealed a somewhat less convincing result. The 
bankruptcy was announced on 15 September 2008 in the US, and the probability of a crash 
at the end of September 2008 rose by 98% with the net next-month return plummeted to -
28.90%. The following period saw an increase of 557% in the crash probability, but 
investors incurred only a small loss of 1.74%. 
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Figure 30: Probability of a Crash with the Volume-augmented Model (Sequential Estimate) 
 
Figure 31: Probability of a Rally with the Volume-augmented Model (Sequential Estimate) 
 
Note: Based on equation (70) 
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Table 16: Selected Results of Net One-month Total Return and Percentage Change in Probabilities of a 
Crash and a Rally 
Period 
Net Total 
Return 
%Δ Probability of a 
Crash 
%Δ Probability of a 
Rally 
Jun 97 25.80% -15% 42% 
Jul 97 -26.19% 381% 242% 
Aug 97 8.41% -87% -85% 
Sep 97 -18.25% 210% 133% 
Oct 97 -11.81% -68% -65% 
Nov 97 -5.28% 44% 58% 
Dec 97 31.88% 7% 90% 
Jan 98 6.26% 154% 68% 
Feb 98 -13.66% 101% 66% 
Mar 98 -10.71% 87% 28% 
Apr 98 -21.33% 16% -5% 
May 
98 -18.12% 
-5% -2% 
Jun 98 -0.14% -17% -5% 
Jul 98 -19.65% 8% 3% 
Aug 98 18.81% -8% -3% 
Sep 98 30.85% 25% 19% 
    
Aug 08 -12.65% 13% 7% 
Sep 08 -28.90% 98% 33% 
Oct 08 -1.74% 557% 710% 
Nov 08 14.44% -22% 18% 
 
Note: The shaded cells denote when the increase (decrease) in the probability of a crash or a decrease 
(positive) in the probability of a rally coincides with a negative (positive) net one-month total return.  
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Figure 32 compares the likelihood of a collapse with point estimates from the volume-
augmented model those from the model with intercept dummy variables, 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 1, from 
July 1997 onwards. The two lines were almost identical before July 1997. However, they 
seem to have diverged thereafter although they, in general, were still moving in the same 
direction. This is supported by the descriptive statistics shown in Table 17. The correlation 
coefficients between the probabilities obtained from the two models showed a drop from 
99.57% to 98.46% moving from the first sub-sample before July 1997 to the one after. In 
fact, the model with intercept dummy variables yielded a higher probability of a collapse on 
average at 46.65% as compared to 39.66% from the volume-augmented model. The basic 
volume-augmented model assumes no structural change over the sample and produced 
roughly the same average probability over the sub-samples, while the model with intercept 
dummy variables returned two distinct average probabilities before and after July 1997 at 
40.60% and 55.02%, respectively. This is consistent with the intuition that the second sub-
sample after July 1997 should be more volatile and more likely that the bubble will burst as 
the exchange rate was allowed to move more freely. 
 
Figure 32: Comparison of Probabilities of a Collapse with Point Estimates from the Volume-augmented Model and 
the Model with Intercept Dummy Variables 
Note: Based on equations (70) and (71) 
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Table 17: Descriptive Statistics of Probabilities of a Collapse with Point Estimates from the Volume-
augmented Model and the Model with Intercept Dummy Variables 
  
Volume-augmented 
Model 
Model with 
Intercept DV 
Mean 
Overall 39.66% 46.65% 
Before July 1997 40.58% 40.60% 
From July 1997 38.39% 55.02% 
Standard Deviation 
Overall 24.66% 25.98% 
Before July 1997 23.80% 24.62% 
From July 1997 25.83% 25.56% 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Overall 93.96% 
Before July 1997 99.57% 
From July 1997 98.46% 
 
Unfortunately, the same analysis with the percentage change of probabilities of a crash 
and/or a rally with sequential estimations cannot be done. This is because when attempting 
to estimate the first few probabilities after July 1997, the estimations did not include 
sufficient observations with dummy variables equal to one. Thus, they gave unreliable 
probability figures. Nonetheless, the analysis based on point estimates instead was 
conducted. It suggested that percentage change in the likelihood of a next-period crash and 
rally have a similar level of predictability on net one-month total return. Precisely, they gave 
proper signals for 54% and 48% of the time, and, they were both correct at the same time at 
a slightly lower level at 27%.     
 
Overall, the evidence implied the probabilities produced from the models were reasonably 
helpful in forecasting the state of the returns and to time the market before a crash or a rally. 
Brooks and Katsaris (2005a and 2005b) offer a more formal approach for determining the 
predictability and usefulness for investors in terms of profitability by comparing the results 
to other trading strategies.  
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5.3. Conclusions 
 
This chapter analyses asset price bubbles in the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) from the 
establishment of the exchange in April 1975 until December 2012. The results from the 
volume-augmented regime-switching speculative bubble model show some evidence in 
support of the bubble-like behaviour in the SET. The results are robust to specifications and 
various extensions applied.  
 
One particular significant extension in this chapter was the investigation of the possible 
structural break. This is pursued because the period studied covers about 25 years of data 
and Thailand also adopted a new exchange rate regime in 1997 after being severely affected 
by the Asian financial crisis. The evidence suggests that returns differ significantly before 
and after the floatation of Thai baht. However, once the breakpoint was allowed to be 
determined endogenously by the data, the most appropriate split is in July 1990, which 
coincides with the period where Thailand was implementing policies of financial 
liberalisation. Then again, when two breakpoints were allowed instead, the breaks fall on to 
September 1996 and August 1998, separating the series into three sub-periods, namely pre-
crisis, the crisis, and post-crisis periods. Overall, the inclusion of dummy variables in the 
model to allow for structural breaks in the series has improved the fit with the data. 
Moreover, it has strengthened the evidence of a bubble in the Thai stock market. 
 
The result section also presents the probabilities statistics obtained from the model 
estimations. They help justify the use of this periodically collapsing regime-switching 
model, even though they do not forecast all the crashes and rallies perfectly. This is because 
if they do, that would mean the investors would be able to predict asset prices with certainty 
and would have violated the notion of speculative bubbles that were caused by investors 
taking the risk of not knowing the timing of a collapse. 
 
At this point, it would be interesting to examine the bubbles further with more disaggregated 
data to see whether the bubbles were caused by one or few particular popular sectors like 
technology, real estate or finance, and do not represent the whole market or it is actually a 
widespread phenomenon. The next chapter will investigate bubble-like behaviour in 
industry group and sectoral indices in the Stock Exchange of Thailand.  
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Chapter 6: Disaggregated Indices: Analysis and Results 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter examined the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET)’s market-wide SET 
Index and concluded that there is some evidence of bubble-like behaviour. This chapter 
extends the discussion by looking at more disaggregated indices. 
 
There are several benefits from investigating disaggregated indices. Firstly, the results 
would shed light on whether the bubble behaviour observed in the aggregated index was a 
pervasive phenomenon, or it was limited to some segments. The particular groups of stocks 
with bubbly assets could also be discovered and analysed. More precisely, the nature of 
business could be a major factor determining the bubble formation. This has important 
implications for both regulators and investors, as they monitor price movements. In addition, 
the evidence based on aggregated and disaggregated indices can be compared. Jung and 
Shiller (2005) postulated that bubbles could be detected more clearly with more 
disaggregated indices. This is because the changes on an individual stock were averaged out 
as more assets are included in the aggregated index. Finally, the analysis in this chapter also 
serves as a preliminary examination of bubble transmission within the Thai stock market, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter.   
 
Initially, three datasets were investigated. There were eight SET’s industry group indices, 
27 SET’s sectoral indices, and the ten Datastream-calculated indices. However, each of 
them suffered various limitations. For example, the industry group indices were only 
available for an extremely short span, such that reliable estimates for the empirical models 
cannot be obtained. The results are, therefore, reported in Appendix 1. On the other hand, 
the analyses of the sectoral indices were complicated and less manageable, as there were 27 
indices to be considered. This is particularly critical for the bubble contagion analysis to be 
pursued in the next chapter. The Datastream-calculated indices also encountered some 
issues. It has a classification system that differs from the SET’s official series and it only 
tracked a few stocks for each index. More importantly, there were a couple of indices with 
extended periods of zero reported dividend yields, which weakened the reliabilities of 
fundamental value calculation, and the subsequent bubble computations as well.  
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Consequently, this chapter also considered a newly computed index series called the K-NI. 
It was constructed based on the same methodology as the SET’s industry group indices but 
employed the data from SET’ sectoral indices to extend the K-NI to include almost 300 
observations, which allow the bubble detection tests with different specifications to be 
applied, while remaining tractable with eight indices. The detailed construction of the K-NI 
can be found in Chapter 4.  
 
The next section discusses the empirical evidence based on the different datasets. Then, the 
last section offered a summary. 
    
6.2. Empirical Evidence 
 
This section presents the results of the speculative bubble model by Van Norden and 
Schaller (2002) (hereafter VNS) [equations (13) to (17)], the volume-augmented model by 
Brooks and Katsaris (2005) [equations (22) to (24)] and, when applicable, the models with 
intercept dummy variables [equations (59) to (61) and (65) to (67)] as reviewed in Chapter 
4 and Chapter 5 with different data sets as discussed in the previous section. Abnormal 
trading volumes are computed as percentage deviation of the current month’s (average 
daily) trading volume from the moving average. Moving average is based on the mean of 
the last 12 months’ trading volume, up to and including the current month. Price indices are 
converted to real series using the Thailand’s Consumer Price Index (CPI).  
 
The previous chapter concluded that there is some evidence for bubble-like behaviour in the 
market-wide SET index. This chapter will further explore the Thai market in more details. 
Analyses on the disaggregated indices will reveal which industry groups or sectors contain 
bubbles. Precisely, this is done by formulating different types of bubbles and imposing 
restrictions implied by the specifications. If the model fits the data satisfactorily, i.e. having 
at least two restriction tests rejects and preferably more, it would suggest that there is a 
bubble in the industry group or sector. However, if the model does not work very well, it 
does not imply that there is no bubble at all, rather, there is no identifiable bubble of the 
kind postulated by the model. 
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Meanwhile, given an extremely limited number of observations of the SET’s official 
industry group indices available, the results from estimations are rather unreliable. 
Therefore, they are reported in Appendix 1. The remainder of this section will investigate 
results based on other datasets.  
   
6.2.1. Results based on the SET’s Sectoral Indices 
 
This section elaborates on results from the SET’s 27 sectoral indices. It will analyse the 
disaggregated indices in each industry group to determine whether which sector is driving 
the bubble-like behaviour if any. 
 
The results with the VNS model were presented in Table 18. It implies that there is evidence 
of a bubble in Mining (Resources industry group), Information & Communication 
Technology (Technology), and some evidence in Tourism & Leisure (Services), although 
the specification may not always capture more variability of returns than simpler models. 
With two sectors without results, that means there are 22 other sectors with no bubble-like 
behaviour as estimated with the VNS model. 
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Table 18: SET’s Sectoral Indices: VNS model 
Industry Group Agro & Food Industry Consumer Products  Financials 
Sector Agribusiness 
Food & 
Beverage 
Fashion 
Home & Office 
Products 
Personal Products 
& Pharmaceuticals 
 Banking 
Finance & 
Securities 
Insurance 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9840*** 1.0099*** 0.9981*** 0.9846*** 0.9980*** 1.0112*** 0.9962*** 1.0131*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0195 0.0098 -0.0052 -0.0436*** 0.0106 -0.0232 -0.0075 0.0306*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0255*** 1.0171*** 1.0076*** 0.9962*** 1.0792*** 1.0200*** 1.0576*** 1.0150*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0049 -0.0482 -0.1118 -0.1426** -0.0051 0.0019 -0.0332 -0.0384 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  -0.2813 0.7377** 1.1757*** 1.2643*** 0.9602*** 0.9529*** 0.9988*** 1.2754*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   0.3791 0.0687 -0.8641 -0.4934 0.1203 -1.1712*** -0.4561* -0.5393 
𝜎𝑠  0.0412*** 0.0482*** 0.0469*** 0.0546*** 0.0602*** 0.0625*** 0.0912*** 0.0427*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.0956*** 0.1175*** 0.1301*** 0.1819*** 0.2349*** 0.1989*** 0.3072*** 0.1395*** 
Log-Likelihood 295.6041 360.9656 377.7722 293.6140 278.5711 227.9404 143.6333 393.1143 
AIC -2.2557 -2.5212 -2.6412 -2.2849 -1.9327 -1.5710 -0.9688 -2.7508 
SBIC -2.3185 -2.5783 -2.6984 -2.3489 -1.9898 -1.6281 -1.0260 -2.8080 
HQIC -2.2110 -2.4795 -2.5996 -2.2396 -1.8910 -1.5293 -0.9272 -2.7092 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  6.7169*** 0.1269 0.1371 0.0769 4.0174** 0.0984 1.8648 0.0041 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  2.3546 1.6534 2.5079 3.8233* 0.0050 0.0000 0.5174 0.8132 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000 2.1889 1.9840 1.8930 0.0461 0.0000 0.2413 2.4932 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.0000 0.0000 1.2748 1.3212 0.0000 9.2078*** 2.9787* 1.6326 
Volatility regimes 8.2308* 3.7948 6.5760 25.1094*** 6.8635 10.8283** 6.9452 20.1728*** 
Mixture of normals 2.6964 2.9033 5.3908 23.5827*** 2.6260 10.0995** 4.4643 17.7106*** 
Fads 7.2896* 3.0887 5.1740 6.1306 4.6225 10.0557** 6.1061 5.7002 
Starting observation Sep 1991 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Feb 1992 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 
No. of observations 255 280 280 250 280 280 280 280 
Note: Results from the VNS model [equations (13) to (17)]. The top panel presents estimated parameters from the relevant models, while the second panel reports maximised 
log-likelihood statistics and other information criteria. The third and fourth panels show likelihood ratio statistics for tests of coefficient restrictions and robustness checks against 
simpler specifications. Starting observations and number of observations included in the estimation are contained in the last panel. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 18 (continued) 
Industry Group Industrials 
Sector Automotive 
Industrial 
Materials & 
Machinery 
Paper & 
Printing 
Materials 
Petrochemicals 
& Chemicals 
Packaging Steel 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9940***  0.9929*** 1.0030*** 0.9986***  
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0182*  -0.0131** 0.0038 -0.0210  
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0848***  1.0588*** 1.0258*** 1.0480***  
𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.1796*  0.0582 0.0051 0.0361  
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.0538***  0.8500** 0.1576 1.5083***  
𝛽𝑞𝑏   0.2092  0.1387 -0.0437 -1.6700**  
𝜎𝑠  0.0649***  0.0561*** 0.0610*** 0.0635***  
𝜎𝑐  0.1360***  0.1434*** 0.1965*** 0.1467***  
Log-Likelihood 311.0180  323.5164 180.5813 297.9651  
AIC -2.1644  -2.2537 -1.2327 -2.0712  
SBIC -2.2216  -2.3108 -1.2899 -2.1283  
HQIC -2.1228  -2.2120 -1.1911 -2.0295  
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  7.1099***  5.0560** 1.0333 3.4253*  
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.0000  0.0000 0.0389 2.1915  
Volatility regimes 9.5125**  12.3875** 1.5594 12.8096**  
Mixture of normals 4.4333  5.9167 0.3237 10.6372**  
Fads 8.9973**  9.9838** 1.1478 10.4189**  
Starting observation Aug 1989 Jun 2007 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Dec 2011 
No. of observations 280 66 280 280 280 12 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 18 (continued) 
Industry Group Property & Construction Resources 
Sector 
Construction 
Materials 
Property 
Development 
Property Fund 
Energy & 
Utilities 
Mining  
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0086*** 0.9906*** 1.0034*** 1.0105*** 1.0058*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0099 -0.0047 0.0618* -0.0143** -0.0206 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0169*** 1.0699*** 0.4378 1.0235*** 1.0011*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0101 0.0377 3.4832 0.0072 -0.0019 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.3055*** 0.7697*** 2.1488** 1.1716** 0.1750 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -0.5367* -0.1938 -2.1784 0.2492 -3.0014** 
𝜎𝑠  0.0813*** 0.0871*** 0.0173*** 0.0799*** 0.0345*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.2031*** 0.2389*** 0.0000 0.2149*** 0.1506*** 
Log-Likelihood 232.6004 170.2642 113.8756 261.9049 178.5734 
AIC -1.6043 -1.1632 -6.2280 -1.8136 -1.2184 
SBIC -1.6614 -1.2205 -6.6986 -1.8707 -1.2755 
HQIC -1.5626 -1.1214 -6.1055 -1.7720 -1.1767 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.0486 4.2079** 41.5779*** 0.0617 3.3864* 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.1210 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 8.7897*** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.3726 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  3.9974** 0.5565 0.5970 0.0000 11.9337*** 
Volatility regimes 5.8794 4.8382 60.7540*** 4.1249 2.7769 
Mixture of normals 5.5561 1.2676 60.5042*** 4.1236 0.0000 
Fads 5.1342 4.7715 59.2950*** 0.4095 0.9180 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Sep 1989 Feb 2010 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 
No. of observations 280 279 34 280 280 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 18 (continued) 
Industry Group Services Technology 
Sector Commerce 
Health Care 
Services 
Media & 
Publishing 
Professional 
Services 
Tourism & 
Leisure  
Transportation 
& Logistics 
Electronic 
Components  
Information & 
Communication 
Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0072*** 1.0055*** 0.9866*** 0.9905*** 0.9911*** 0.9961*** 1.0025*** 0.9859*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0162 0.0177 -0.0246** -0.0051 -0.0034 -0.0114 0.0054 -0.0172*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.9990*** 1.0139*** 1.0628*** 1.0405*** 1.0354*** 1.0223*** 1.0203*** 1.5528*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0070 0.0108 0.0424 -0.0180 -0.0068 -0.0347 -0.0085 -0.2339*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.9544*** 1.2038* 0.5655 1.0093** 1.0448*** 0.2990 0.5226* 1.3647*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -1.2082* -0.7678 0.2734 -0.0012 -0.9898* 0.1920 -0.3662 0.3957 
𝜎𝑠  0.0658*** 0.0647*** 0.0645*** 0.0645*** 0.0426*** 0.0635*** 0.0603*** 0.0959*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1787*** 0.1328*** 0.1797*** 0.1914*** 0.1266*** 0.1794*** 0.1768*** 0.1276*** 
Log-Likelihood 324.9943 300.9897 245.0605 285.5802 366.6491 224.4793 222.6315 192.5427 
AIC -2.2642 -2.1308 -1.7691 -1.9827 -2.5618 -1.5630 -1.5386 -1.4763 
SBIC -2.3214 -2.1890 -1.8288 -2.0399 -2.6189 -1.6208 -1.5959 -1.5403 
HQIC -2.2226 -2.0886 -1.7261 -1.9411 -2.5201 -1.5210 -1.4968 -1.4310 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.0186 0.0960 4.8753** 1.6339 4.8941** 1.2697 0.5716 16.2674*** 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0077 0.0000 0.0000 0.2080 0.0378 1.2503 0.1341 21.4788*** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000 0.0468 0.0000 0.0995 0.0076 0.4813 0.2348 21.3998*** 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  52.6443*** 10.9898*** 0.0000 0.0000 2.7638* 0.0000 1.6284 0.0000 
Volatility regimes 5.9937 4.2594 8.1329* 3.3612 7.9586* 5.9187 2.7392 17.9693*** 
Mixture of normals 5.9917 3.9347 5.6797 1.4043 3.7125 4.6279 1.8290 13.4565*** 
Fads 3.5238 1.7740 6.0676 1.9939 6.2396 2.3521 2.7356 7.9198** 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Jan 1990 Aug 1990 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Nov 1989 Sep 1989 Feb 1992 
No. of observations 280 275 268 280 280 277 279 250 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 19 reports results with the volume-augmented model, which suggests bubbles in five 
sectors, namely, Banking (Financials), Industrial Materials & Machinery (Industrials)  – 
although the magnitudes of standard deviations in the two regimes are quite unrealistic, 
Packaging (Industrials), Tourism & Leisure (Services), Information & Communication 
Technology (Technology), and some evidence in four other sectors including Agribusiness 
(Agro & Food Industry), Property  Development (Property & Construction), Property Fund 
(Property & Construction), and Health Care Services (Services). No result was obtained for 
one sector, so that leaves 17 other sectors with no evidence of bubbles.  
 
To sum up, the basic VNS and volume-augmented models appear to have picked up 
evidence of bubbles in Financials industry group via Banking sector, Industrials industry 
via Packing and perhaps Industrial Materials & Machinery, and Technology industry via 
Information & Communication Technology. There was also some evidence in Agro & Food 
Industry via Agribusiness sector, Property & Construction industry via Property 
Development and Property Fund sectors, and Services industry via Tourism & Leisure and 
possibly Health Care Services. This means both Consumer Products and Resources 
industries are free of bubble-like behaviour. 
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Table 19: SET’s Sectoral Indices: Volume-augmented model 
Industry Group Agro & Food Industry Consumer Products Financials 
Sector Agribusiness Food & Beverage Fashion 
Home & Office 
Products 
Personal Products 
& Pharmaceuticals  
Banking 
Finance & 
Securities 
Insurance 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9843*** 1.0088*** 0.9975*** 0.9825*** 0.9980*** 1.0097*** 0.9956*** 1.0123*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0155 0.0082 -0.0011 -0.0491*** 0.0104 -0.0156 -0.0104 0.0287*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  -0.0048 0.0080 -0.0029 0.0050 0.0004 0.0008 0.0138 0.0031 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0278*** 1.0166*** 1.0100*** 1.0052*** 1.0794*** 1.0214*** 1.0537*** 1.0155*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0081 -0.0475 -0.1168 -0.1369* -0.0052 -0.0051 -0.0330 -0.0376 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  -0.1735 0.7857** 1.0819*** 1.4486*** 0.9562*** 1.1797*** 0.9846*** 1.2920*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  0.4431 0.0354 -0.6263 -0.6350 0.1315 -1.4709*** -0.4608* -0.5510 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.8314** -0.2190 -0.2483* -0.0342 0.0150 -0.6337** -0.2714 -0.0372 
𝜎𝑠  0.0427*** 0.0479*** 0.0457*** 0.0567*** 0.0603*** 0.0640*** 0.0881*** 0.0427*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.0975*** 0.1156*** 0.1245*** 0.1933*** 0.2352*** 0.1986*** 0.3011*** 0.1402*** 
Log-Likelihood 300.9068 362.8955 379.0067 294.3857 278.5836 232.9138 145.7608 393.6402 
AIC -2.2816 -2.5207 -2.6358 -2.2751 -1.9185 -1.5922 -0.9697 -2.7403 
SBIC -2.3601 -2.5921 -2.7072 -2.3551 -1.9899 -1.6637 -1.0411 -2.8117 
HQIC -2.2258 -2.4686 -2.5837 -2.2184 -1.8664 -1.5402 -0.9177 -2.6882 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  6.8671*** 0.1533 0.3067 0.2073 4.0232** 32.8933*** 1.9189 0.0109 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.1515 1.6110 3.0335* 2.7569* 0.0049 0.0169 0.5477 0.7708 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000 1.9881 2.5305 1.1750 0.0434 0.0000 0.1932 2.2722 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.0000 0.0000 0.6322 1.8263 0.0000 11.9792*** 3.0015* 1.7012 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  9.5122*** 1.5723 2.3829 0.0492 0.0000 9.9192*** 2.3111 0.0437 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.0000 2.9278* 0.0000 1.4917 0.0152 0.0043 1.8651 0.9599 
Volatility regimes 18.8361*** 7.6545 9.0450 26.6529*** 6.8884 20.7751*** 11.2002* 21.2247*** 
Mixture of normals 13.3017** 6.7630 7.8598 25.1262*** 2.6509 20.0463*** 8.7193 18.7625*** 
Fads 17.8950*** 6.9484 7.6431 7.6741 4.6475 20.0025*** 10.3611* 6.7520 
VNS 10.6053*** 3.8597 2.4690 1.5435 0.0250 9.9468*** 4.2550 1.0518 
Starting observation Sep 1991 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Feb 1992 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 
No. of observations 255 280 280 250 280 280 280 280 
 
Note: Results from the volume-augmented model [equations (22) to (24)]. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 19 (continued) 
 
Industry Group Industrials 
Sector Automotive 
Industrial 
Materials & 
Machinery 
Paper & Printing 
Materials 
Petrochemicals 
& Chemicals 
Packaging Steel 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9924*** 1.0254*** 0.9932*** 1.0030*** 0.9959*** 1.0046*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0158 0.0064 -0.0135** 0.0042 -0.0213 -0.1011 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  -0.0084* -0.0199* 0.0030 -0.0099 -0.0095 -0.0002 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0667*** 0.5789*** 1.0510*** 1.0247*** 1.0376*** 1.0983 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0740 -0.3658*** 0.0583 0.0047 0.0231 0.5109 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  0.9980*** 2.2497** 0.7896* 0.1484 2.0766** 2.6796*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -0.3296 1.1569 0.1455 -0.0626 -2.4721 1.1435 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.0904 2.0821 -0.1490 -0.2785 -1.2478 6.7339 
𝜎𝑠  0.0598*** 0.0826*** 0.0547*** 0.0580*** 0.0627*** 0.0284** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1347*** 0.0522** 0.1395*** 0.1934*** 0.1372*** 0.0000 
Log-Likelihood 312.7630 64.2172 323.8436 182.8099 307.6298 48.9932 
AIC -2.1626 -1.6429 -2.2417 -1.2344 -2.1259 -6.4989 
SBIC -2.2340 -1.9460 -2.3132 -1.3058 -2.1974 -8.1655 
HQIC -2.1105 -1.5119 -2.1897 -1.1823 -2.0739 -6.6485 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  2.8318* 6.2689** 5.0274** 1.0161 4.1821** 37.4830*** 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0000 4.8040** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000 20.0343*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.2502 0.0000 0.0000 0.0802 4.6375** 0.0000 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  0.4207 0.0000 0.6361 2.7864* 19.1648*** 0.0000 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.0000 0.0000 0.1982 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Volatility regimes 13.0025** 11.9030* 13.0418** 6.0166 32.1390*** 59.2768*** 
Mixture of normals 7.9233 0.0000 6.5711 4.7808 29.9666*** 28.1034*** 
Fads 12.4873** 11.7591** 10.6382* 5.6050 29.7484*** 58.1689*** 
VNS 3.4900 0.0000 0.6544 4.4572 19.3294*** 0.0000 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Jun 2007 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Dec 2011 
No. of observations 280 66 280 280 280 12 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 19 (continued) 
 
Industry Group Property & Construction Resources 
Sector 
Construction 
Materials 
Property 
Development 
Property Fund 
Energy & 
Utilities 
Mining  
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0066*** 0.9882*** 1.0112*** 1.0108*** 0.9841*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0056 -0.0104 0.0258 -0.0142* -0.0161** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0006 0.0079 0.0051 -0.0022 -0.0078 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0259*** 1.0817*** 0.7736*** 1.0225*** 1.1714*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0008 0.0476 1.7352** 0.0031 0.2647** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.4750*** 0.9382*** 1.3790* 1.1326** 1.3068** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -0.6342* -0.2529 -0.5876 0.2564 0.1548 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.3176 -0.2931 0.1221 -0.1344 -0.0725 
𝜎𝑠  0.0818*** 0.0903*** 0.0129*** 0.0789*** 0.1063*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.2050*** 0.2439*** 0.0566** 0.2080*** 0.1575*** 
Log-Likelihood 233.9446 171.8654 86.8530 262.2004 185.5944 
AIC -1.5996 -1.1603 -4.5208 -1.8014 -1.2542 
SBIC -1.6710 -1.2320 -5.1090 -1.8729 -1.3257 
HQIC -1.5475 -1.1081 -4.3677 -1.7494 -1.2022 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.2513 4.9903** 13.4439*** 0.0569 7.4694*** 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0374 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  4.7147** 0.3416 0.0213 0.0000 0.0000 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  2.2348 3.5421* 0.0000 0.2239 0.3622 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.0034 1.0667 57.7959*** 0.0000 0.0000 
Volatility regimes 8.5678 8.0406 6.7089 4.7159 16.8188*** 
Mixture of normals 8.2446 4.4700 6.4591 4.7147 13.8616** 
Fads 7.8226 7.9739 5.2500 1.0005 14.9599** 
VNS 2.6884 3.2024 0.0000 0.5910 14.0419*** 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Sep 1989 Feb 2010 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 
No. of observations 280 279 34 280 280 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 142 
 
Table 19 (continued) 
Industry Group Services Technology 
Sector Commerce 
Health Care 
Services 
Media & Publishing 
Professional 
Services 
Tourism & 
Leisure  
Transportation 
& Logistics 
Electronic 
Components  
Information & 
Communication 
Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0061*** 1.0060*** 0.9889***  0.9911*** 0.9954*** 1.0029*** 0.9867*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0209 0.0188 -0.0225**  -0.0035 -0.0119 0.0054 -0.0168*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0095 -0.0053 -0.0046  0.0015 0.0048 -0.0039 -0.0042 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0067*** 1.0110*** 1.0583***  1.0351*** 1.0230*** 1.0202*** 1.5543*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0072 0.0086 0.0395  -0.0075 -0.0344 -0.0088 -0.2337*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.6749** 1.6417*** 0.4892  1.0940*** 0.3152 0.5525** 1.3746*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -0.9914 -1.1721 0.3276  -1.0259* 0.2171 -0.3648 0.3923 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.2884 -0.4617 0.0797  -0.2452 -0.0808 -0.1568 -0.0166 
𝜎𝑠  0.0629*** 0.0663*** 0.0633***  0.0426*** 0.0640*** 0.0603*** 0.0959*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1596*** 0.1351*** 0.1786***  0.1261*** 0.1802*** 0.1775*** 0.1266*** 
Log-Likelihood 326.6385 303.3122 246.0198  368.2126 224.7945 223.3337 192.6848 
AIC -2.2617 -2.1332 -1.7613  -2.5587 -1.5509 -1.5293 -1.4615 
SBIC -2.3331 -2.2059 -1.8360  -2.6301 -1.6231 -1.6010 -1.5415 
HQIC -2.2096 -2.0804 -1.7075  -2.5066 -1.4984 -1.4771 -1.4048 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.0001 0.0320 3.9018**  4.9345** 1.3620 0.5361 19.6456*** 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  0.0480 1.1602 0.1371 24.6457*** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000 1.0099 0.0000  0.0112 0.4305 0.2384 24.5447*** 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  1.9291 20.3772*** 0.0000  2.8265* 0.0000 1.6593 0.0000 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  1.1425 4.0117** 0.0000  2.7341* 0.2066 0.8883 23.7626*** 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  2.0917 0.0000 0.0000  0.1168 0.5094 0.0000 0.0000 
Volatility regimes 9.2822 8.9045 10.0514  11.0856* 6.5490 4.1435 18.2537*** 
Mixture of normals 9.2801* 8.5798 7.5982  6.8395 5.2582 3.2334 13.7409** 
Fads 6.8123 6.4190 7.9861  9.3666* 2.9824 4.1399 8.2042 
VNS 3.2885 4.6450* 1.9185  3.1270 0.6303 1.4043 0.2844 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Jan 1990 Aug 1990 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Nov 1989 Sep 1989 Feb 1992 
No. of observations 280 275 268 280 280 277 279 250 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Given the length of the sample period and the various development of the Thai capital 
market, it is possible for industry structure to have changed. This can be investigated by 
extending the core models with dummy variables. The first model includes one set of 
dummy variables, 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑡𝑡 or the coefficients with subscript f, in all three equations. The 
break is set at July 1997 when Thailand started adopting a managed floating exchange rate 
regime. The new model now includes parameters 𝛽𝑠𝑓 , 𝛽𝑐𝑓, 𝛽𝑞𝑓 , which reveal the impact of 
the structural break on the return equations in both regimes and the probability equation.  
For instance, the results from the Agribusiness sector had 𝛽𝑠𝑓 = 0.0250, 𝛽𝑐𝑓 = −0.0154, 
and 𝛽𝑞𝑓 = −0.8827. This implied that investors are additionally compensated when the 
bubble survives since Thailand adopted the floating exchange rate system in July 1997, 
which essentially means more risks. However, they are also punished more severely when 
the bubble collapses. Finally, the probability of the bubble surviving in the next period has 
also reduced after the structural break.  
 
The results from all the sectors suggest four sectors with evidence of bubbles. They include 
Food and Beverage (Agro & Food Industry), Home & Office Products (Consumer 
Products), Media & Publishing (Services), and Information & Communication Technology 
(Technology), although three of them yield standard deviations that are contrary to 
expectations. Eight other sectors exhibit some evidence of bubbles. They are Agribusiness 
(Agro & Food Industry), Fashion (Consumer Products), Banking (Financials), Packaging 
(Industrials), Construction Materials (Property & Construction), Property Development 
(Property & Construction), Mining (Resources), and Commerce (Services). Ten sectors 
reveal no evidence of bubbles and five sectors that no results were obtained from the 
estimation. These are shown in Table 20.  
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Table 20: SET’s Sectoral Indices: Model with one set of intercept dummy variables at July 1997 
Industry Group Agro & Food Industry Consumer Products Financials 
Sector Agribusiness 
Food & 
Beverage 
Fashion 
Home & 
Office 
Products 
Personal Products 
& 
Pharmaceuticals 
Banking 
Finance & 
Securities 
Insurance 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9688*** 0.9888*** 0.9697*** 0.9824*** 0.9697*** 0.9992*** 0.9949*** 0.9991*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0124 0.0110 -0.0131 -0.0505*** -0.0019 -0.0260 -0.0188 0.0249*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  -0.0113 0.0096 -0.0023 0.0078* -0.0004 0.0045 0.0133 0.0028 
𝛽𝑠𝑓 0.0250** 0.0295*** 0.0346*** 0.0026 0.0396*** 0.0201 -0.0008 0.0178** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0425*** 1.0335*** 1.0138*** 0.8032*** 1.0564*** 1.0623*** 1.0544*** 1.0276*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0123 -0.0551 -0.0647 -0.2188*** 0.0166 0.0112 -0.0205 -0.0390 
𝛽𝑐𝑓 -0.0154 -0.0344 -0.0128 0.5024*** 0.0463 -0.0698 -0.0186 -0.0292 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  0.5909 0.4100 0.1109 2.0722*** 0.6587** 0.8879*** 0.4813 0.9972*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  0.3702 0.0378 -0.9575 -1.4790*** 0.1026 -1.4477*** -0.8878** -0.6086 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.9521*** -0.3330 -0.2787* -0.0502 0.0404 -0.4767* -0.2488 -0.0957 
𝛽𝑞𝑓 -0.8827* 0.4161 1.0690*** 1.0138** 0.4753* 0.2730 0.9280*** 0.5491* 
𝜎𝑠  0.0437*** 0.0449*** 0.0373*** 0.0726*** 0.0573*** 0.0595*** 0.0810*** 0.0420*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.0980*** 0.1075*** 0.1088*** 0.0015*** 0.2324*** 0.1920*** 0.2836*** 0.1392*** 
Log-Likelihood 306.6460 368.6703 390.5242 303.8706 287.9298 235.2338 150.2705 398.1049 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  4.5162** 3.0147* 3.3954* 15.6779*** 2.2443 2.4390 1.1983 0.5877 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.3585 2.3377 1.8197 18.5427*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.3032 0.7251 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000 2.9413* 0.7069 17.1702*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0017 1.8510 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.0000 0.0000 1.5167 16.4324*** 0.0000 10.5208*** 7.6252*** 1.9667 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  8.2210*** 2.9197* 2.8996* 15.6783*** 0.0000 6.4558** 1.8747 0.3297 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.0000 2.4515 0.0000 16.7366*** 0.0000 0.1660 2.0002 0.7544 
Volatility regimes 30.3147*** 19.2041** 32.0799*** 45.6227*** 25.5809*** 25.4149*** 20.2197** 30.1542*** 
Mixture of normals 24.7802*** 18.3126** 30.8947*** 44.0960*** 21.3434*** 24.6861*** 17.7388** 27.6919*** 
Fads 29.3735*** 18.4980** 30.6780*** 26.6439*** 23.3400*** 24.6423*** 19.3806** 15.6815** 
VNS 22.0838*** 15.4093*** 25.5039*** 20.5133*** 18.7175*** 14.5866** 13.2745** 9.9813* 
Volume-augmented 11.4785*** 11.5496*** 23.0349*** 10.2483** 18.6925*** 4.6398 9.0195** 8.9295** 
Starting observation Sep 1991 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Feb 1992 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 
No. of observations 255 280 280 250 280 280 280 280 
Note: Results from the model with one set of intercept dummy variables [equations (59) to (61)]. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 20 (continued) 
Industry Group Industrials 
Sector Automotive 
Industrial 
Materials & 
Machinery 
Paper & Printing 
Materials 
Petrochemicals & 
Chemicals 
Packaging Steel 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9730***  0.9727*** 0.9842*** 0.9882***  
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0289***  -0.0184*** 0.0069 -0.0139  
𝛽𝑠𝑣  -0.0076*  0.0027 -0.0027 -0.0086  
𝛽𝑠𝑓 0.0299***  0.0259** 0.0291 0.0126  
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.1574***  1.0330*** 1.0183*** 1.0252***  
𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.1862**  0.0385 0.0012 0.0109  
𝛽𝑐𝑓 -0.0962  0.0053 0.0079 0.0091  
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.1860***  0.2526 0.1349 2.6331*  
𝛽𝑞𝑏  0.3032  -0.1158 0.0115 -3.1258  
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.0318  -0.1366 -0.3172 -1.4732  
𝛽𝑞𝑓 -0.2217  0.5432 -0.1571 -0.4726  
𝜎𝑠  0.0628***  0.0462*** 0.0540*** 0.0620***  
𝜎𝑐  0.1301***  0.1260*** 0.1890*** 0.1339***  
Log-Likelihood 317.2490  327.2005 184.6377 308.8037  
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  8.0160***  4.9130** 0.8273 0.9580  
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000  0.0000 0.0529 0.0000  
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.0000  0.0732 0.0000 5.2634**  
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  0.0543  0.8298 3.1340* 17.4821***  
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.0000  0.2429 0.0000 0.0000  
Volatility regimes 21.9744***  19.7556** 9.6722 34.4868***  
Mixture of normals 16.8951**  13.2848 8.4365 32.3145***  
Fads 21.4592***  17.3519** 9.2606 32.0962***  
VNS 12.4619**  7.3681 8.1128 21.6773***  
Volume-augmented 10.8565**  6.7137* 3.6556 2.3478  
Starting observation Aug 1989 Jun 2007 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Dec 2011 
No. of observations 280 66 280 280 280 12 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 20 (continued) 
Industry Group Property & Construction Resources 
Sector 
Construction 
Materials 
Property 
Development 
Property Fund Energy & Utilities Mining 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9817*** 0.9613***  1.0365*** 0.9371*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0141 0.0052  -0.0283*** -0.0215*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0090 0.0066  -0.0048 -0.0016 
𝛽𝑠𝑓 0.0463*** 0.0480***  -0.0433*** 0.0681*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0992*** 1.1310***  0.8048*** 0.9878*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0058 0.0170  0.1427 0.0296* 
𝛽𝑐𝑓 -0.1031 -0.1023  0.3580 0.0210 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.7853** 0.8201***  1.7508*** -1.3089*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -0.7806* -0.4034  0.0726 0.3623** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.4469* -0.3328*  0.2640 -0.7057** 
𝛽𝑞𝑓 -0.5089 0.2797  -0.1594 0.3961 
𝜎𝑠  0.0775*** 0.0864***  0.0834*** 0.0320*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1826*** 0.2405***  0.2186*** 0.1508*** 
Log-Likelihood 239.5184 177.1705  266.7489 188.6629 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  2.0337 7.3646***  1.8513 3.5396* 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0683 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.4868 0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  5.0712** 2.1420  0.0000 0.0000 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  3.5144* 3.6085*  0.0000 2.7538* 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.6106 0.2867  0.0000 0.0000 
Volatility regimes 19.7154** 18.6507**  13.8131 22.9559*** 
Mixture of normals 19.3921** 15.0801*  13.8118* 19.9987** 
Fads 18.9702** 18.5839**  10.0976 21.0970*** 
VNS 13.8360** 13.8125**  9.6881* 20.1790*** 
Volume-augmented 11.1476** 10.6101**  9.0971** 17.2449*** 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Sep 1989 Feb 2010 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 
No. of observations 280 279 34 280 280 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 20 (continued) 
Industry Group Services Technology 
Sector Commerce 
Health Care 
Services 
Media & 
Publishing 
Professional 
Services 
Tourism & 
Leisure  
Transportation 
& Logistics 
Electronic 
Components  
Info. & Comm. 
Tech. 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9867***  1.0232***  0.9661*** 0.9820*** 0.9921*** 1.1173*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0147  0.0436  -0.0071 -0.0066 0.0147 0.0215 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0045  0.0632*  0.0033 0.0043 -0.0044 0.1318 
𝛽𝑠𝑓 0.0270**  0.0663  0.0374*** 0.0201 0.0204 -0.0511 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0104***  1.0181***  1.0333*** 1.0330*** 1.0275*** 0.9913*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0123  -0.0596***  -0.0045 -0.0380 -0.0142 -0.0209*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑓 0.0156  -0.0579***  0.0036 -0.0172 -0.0143 -0.0128 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  0.9173**  0.4146  0.8448*** 0.3120 0.5205* -0.0188 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -1.4033*  -0.5581  -1.0930* 0.2000 -0.4044 -1.5010*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.5206*  -0.2678*  -0.1962 -0.0221 -0.1478 -0.3709 
𝛽𝑞𝑓 1.0076**  -1.0381***  0.5420* -0.0842 0.0803 0.8995** 
𝜎𝑠  0.0577***  0.1585***  0.0399*** 0.0613*** 0.0598*** 0.2389*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1370***  0.0610***  0.1314*** 0.1765*** 0.1771*** 0.0710*** 
Log-Likelihood 331.6283  253.9513  383.7148 225.7518 224.2528 207.8020 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.4538  0.0172  5.2441** 1.6872 0.9288 2.8629* 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0000  16.6179***  0.0132 1.5866 0.2924 13.2352*** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000  4.4379**  0.0000 0.8743 0.7854 0.7236 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  3.4804*  1.2526  2.5374 0.0000 2.0073 26.3905*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  3.9720**  4.5654**  1.9967 0.0192 0.7723 2.6334 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.3987  3.4792*  0.8277 0.6175 0.0000 3.1693* 
Volatility regimes 19.2617**  25.9146***  42.0899*** 8.4637 5.9818 48.4880*** 
Mixture of normals 19.2596**  23.4614***  37.8439*** 7.1729 5.0716 43.9752*** 
Fads 16.7918**  23.8492***  40.3709*** 4.8971 5.9781 38.4385*** 
VNS 13.2680**  17.7816***  34.1314*** 2.5450 3.2426 30.5187*** 
Volume-augmented 9.9795**  14.6534***  31.0044*** 1.9147 1.8382 5.2060 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Jan 1990 Aug 1990 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Nov 1989 Sep 1989 Feb 1992 
No. of observations 280 275 268 280 280 277 279 250 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Finally, Table 21 presents the results with two sets of dummy variables at September 1996 
and August 1998 as determined by the results of the market-wide SET index discussed in 
the previous chapter. Note that the breaks coincide with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and 
practically separate the total sample into three sub-periods: the pre-crisis, the crisis where l 
dummy variables = 1, and the post-crisis where both l and f dummy variables are 1. In other 
words, the results are to be interpreted in the same manner as the volume-augmented model 
with the all the parameters with o, b, v subscripts and in the period before September 1996, 
to also consider the impact of parameters with the l subscript during September 1996 to 
August 1998, and to include the effects of both the l and f parameters after August 1998. 
Consider, for instance, the Food & Beverage sector,  𝛽𝑠𝑙 = −0.0543  suggests that the 
average return in the surviving regime during the crisis period of September 1996 to August 
1998 is lower than the pre-crisis period by 5.43% per month, and 𝛽𝑠𝑓 = 0.0756 implies that 
the average return when the bubble continues to grow in the post-crisis period of August 
1998 onwards is 7.56% per month higher than the crisis period. In other words, the return 
has rebounded and could be expected to be 2.13% per month higher than during the pre-
crisis period, on average.  
 
Regarding the evidence from all sectors, the bubble-like behaviour is found in two sectors, 
namely, Banking (Financials), and Information & Communication Technology 
(Technology) – though it was not proved to be more fitting that the model with only one set 
of dummy variables. Some evidence of a bubble is detected in nine sectors. They are 
Agribusiness (Agro & Food Industry), Fashion (Consumer Products), Home & Office 
Products (Consumer Products), Finance and Securities (Financials), Petrochemicals & 
Chemicals (Industrials), Packaging (Industrials), Property  Development (Property & 
Construction), Mining (Resources), and Media & Publishing (Services) sectors.  Results 
were not obtained for four sectors which leave 12 sectors with no evidence of bubbles. 
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Table 21: SET’s Sectoral Indices: Model with two sets of intercept dummy variables at September 1996 and August 1998 
Sector Agribusiness Food & Beverage Fashion 
Home & Office 
Products 
Personal Products & 
Pharmaceuticals 
Banking 
Finance & 
Securities 
Insurance 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9721*** 0.9978*** 0.9766*** 0.9785*** 0.9612*** 1.0190*** 1.0008*** 0.9941*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏   -0.0145 -0.0001 0.0044 -0.0408*** -0.0156 -0.0377** -0.0305*** 0.0116 
𝛽𝑠𝑣   -0.0107 0.0042 -0.0054 0.0042 0.0003 0.0102 0.0199** 0.0028 
𝛽𝑠𝑙  -0.0279 -0.0543*** -0.0610 -0.0608** -0.0032 -0.1836*** -0.2518*** -0.0303 
𝛽𝑠𝑓  0.0512*** 0.0756*** 0.0893 0.0722*** 0.0554** 0.1851*** 0.2426*** 0.0553** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0454*** 1.0310*** 1.0163*** 1.1103*** 1.0370*** 1.2283*** 1.1125*** 1.0303*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0116 -0.0315 -0.1813*** -0.2392*** -0.0641 -0.5572*** -0.0693 -0.0771 
𝛽𝑐𝑙 -0.0469 0.1499 -0.1073*** -0.1847 -0.2189 -0.6876*** -0.0080 -0.1003 
𝛽𝑐𝑓 0.0343 -0.2309 0.1590*** 0.0764 0.3548** 0.9623*** 0.0141 0.0720 
𝛽𝑞𝑜   0.6099 0.7631* 0.2376 1.7037*** 0.3049 2.0805*** 0.5777** 0.6410 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   0.2761 -0.6218 -1.8573 0.3374 0.5329 -3.7372*** -0.3350 0.0568 
𝛽𝑞𝑣   -0.9129** -0.1834 -0.5009 0.0144 0.0466 -0.9403*** -0.2516 -0.0889 
𝛽𝑞𝑙  -0.5762 0.8054 -0.8932 -1.7457** -0.1835 1.8853* 0.2484 0.1202 
𝛽𝑞𝑓  -0.1928 0.5687 3.2024 0.9226* 1.0436 -0.4884 0.4923 0.8481 
𝜎𝑠  0.0430*** 0.0511*** 0.0424*** 0.0527*** 0.0571*** 0.0743*** 0.0823*** 0.0425*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.0981*** 0.1194*** 0.0975*** 0.1528*** 0.2155*** 0.1781*** 0.2869*** 0.1450*** 
Log-Likelihood 309.5890 380.3547 404.5261 304.0023 295.2487 263.9480 172.9176 407.9945 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  4.4545** 1.1525 2.6285 0.9782 2.2285 8.4511*** 2.9402* 0.8012 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.2631 0.3418 4.4822** 8.0375*** 0.7099 10.5181*** 1.1127 1.5389 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.0000 0.3209 2.5800 6.0845** 0.3920 8.5358*** 0.3038 1.8497 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.0000 1.0858 1.7212 0.0000 0.0000 13.3854*** 1.0917 0.0000 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  10.0679*** 1.2989 4.4394** 0.0000 0.0000 18.0606*** 1.7323 0.2246 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.0000 1.4436 0.0000 1.1396 0.0083 1.1024 4.0081** 0.8335 
Volatility regimes 36.2006*** 42.5728*** 60.0837*** 45.8861*** 40.2186*** 82.8433*** 65.5139*** 49.9334*** 
Mixture of normals 30.6661*** 41.6814*** 58.8986*** 44.3594*** 35.9811*** 82.1145*** 63.0330*** 47.4712*** 
Fads 35.2594*** 41.8668*** 58.6818*** 26.9073*** 37.9777*** 82.0707*** 64.6747*** 35.4607*** 
VNS 27.9697*** 38.7781*** 53.5078*** 20.7767*** 33.3552*** 72.0151*** 58.5687*** 29.7605*** 
Volume-augmented 17.3644*** 34.9183*** 51.0387*** 19.2332*** 33.3302*** 62.0682*** 54.3137*** 28.7087*** 
One Intercept DV 4.1103 11.9375*** 9.9846** 12.8814*** 2.6832 45.8902*** 33.4380*** 6.9346* 
Starting observation Sep 1991 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Feb 1992 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 
No. of observations 255 280 280 250 280 280 280 280 
Note: Results from the model with two sets of intercept dummy variables [equations (62) to (64)]. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
 150 
 
Table 21 (continued) 
Sector Automotive 
Industrial Materials 
& Machinery 
Paper & Printing 
Materials 
Petrochemicals & 
Chemicals 
Packaging Steel 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9757***  0.9733*** 0.9735*** 1.0012***  
𝛽𝑠𝑏   -0.0433***  -0.0158*** 0.0106 -0.0335**  
𝛽𝑠𝑣   -0.0069  0.0000 -0.0005 -0.0005  
𝛽𝑠𝑙  -0.0631***  -0.0093 0.3900*** -0.0669***  
𝛽𝑠𝑓  0.0943***  0.0330 -0.3464*** 0.0723***  
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.1299***  1.0428*** 1.0226*** 1.0170***  
𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.1420  0.0653** -0.0088 0.0201  
𝛽𝑐𝑙 -0.1783  -0.0956 -0.1283*** 0.0884  
𝛽𝑐𝑓 0.1230  0.1765** 0.1430*** -0.0639  
𝛽𝑞𝑜   1.0546**  0.4167 -0.3381 2.3326***  
𝛽𝑞𝑏   0.3774  -0.4901 0.3471 -1.8716*  
𝛽𝑞𝑣   -0.0825  -0.0874 -0.2422 -1.0789***  
𝛽𝑞𝑙  -0.0614  -0.0346 -1.6037*** 0.4417  
𝛽𝑞𝑓  -0.0273  1.1578 1.6124*** -1.0666  
𝜎𝑠  0.0589***  0.0514*** 0.0450*** 0.0609***  
𝜎𝑐  0.1295***  0.1130*** 0.1675*** 0.1411***  
Log-Likelihood 331.1702  331.8773 190.7145 316.9688  
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  3.2848*  4.2090** 6.9425*** 0.0865  
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0000  0.0000 1.1462 0.0000  
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.0000  0.0000 1.6341 0.0000  
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.0000  0.7133 0.0000 5.5572**  
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  0.3473  0.4536 7.7142*** 18.4963***  
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.0000  0.7724 0.0000 0.0000  
Volatility regimes 49.8169***  29.1092*** 21.8258** 50.8170***  
Mixture of normals 44.7376***  22.6385** 20.5901** 48.6446***  
Fads 49.3017***  26.7056*** 21.4142** 48.4263***  
VNS 40.3044***  16.7218** 20.2664*** 38.0074***  
Volume-augmented 36.8144***  16.0674** 15.8092** 18.6780***  
One Intercept DV 17.6621***  2.9219 8.1194** 12.1831***  
Starting observation Jun 2007 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Dec 2011 
No. of observations 66 280 280 280 280 12 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 21 (continued) 
Sector 
Construction 
Materials 
Property 
Development 
Property Fund Energy & Utilities Mining  
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9898*** 0.9707***  1.0391*** 0.9848*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏   0.0083 -0.0079  -0.0195** 0.0355* 
𝛽𝑠𝑣   0.0075 0.0078  -0.0049 -0.0034 
𝛽𝑠𝑙  -0.0842* -0.1305***  -0.0986*** -0.0142 
𝛽𝑠𝑓  0.1178** 0.1668***  0.0630** 0.0470 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.1426*** 1.1556***  0.8696*** 0.9549*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0016 -0.0193  0.0498 -0.0201*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑙 -0.1770 -0.2514*  0.2529 -0.0449 
𝛽𝑐𝑓 0.0666 0.2266*  -0.0626 0.0979*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜   2.1808*** 0.8371***  1.4677** 1.0699*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -0.9294** -0.0878  0.1803 -0.2987* 
𝛽𝑞𝑣   -0.4865* -0.3259*  0.2941 0.5123* 
𝛽𝑞𝑙  -1.9731** -0.4959  -0.8295 0.1154 
𝛽𝑞𝑓  1.8859*** 1.0329  0.8058 -0.5261 
𝜎𝑠  0.0799*** 0.0883***  0.0792*** 0.1530*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.2049*** 0.2468***  0.2069*** 0.0329*** 
Log-Likelihood 250.7672 193.7047  271.4455 192.6394 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.9338 7.0632***  1.4307 0.5942 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0000 0.1232  0.0000 4.4992** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.0401 0.0381  0.0000 12.4039*** 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  6.2658** 0.0529  0.0000 0.7278 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  1.3876 3.5137*  0.0000 0.0000 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.5591 0.5420  0.0000 0.0000 
Volatility regimes 42.2129*** 51.7192***  23.2062** 30.9089*** 
Mixture of normals 41.8896*** 48.1486***  23.2049** 27.9518*** 
Fads 41.4677*** 51.6525***  19.4907* 29.0501*** 
VNS 36.3335*** 46.8810***  19.0812** 28.1320*** 
Volume-augmented 33.6451*** 43.6786***  18.4902*** 13.6649** 
One Intercept DV 16.2983*** 20.4559***  12.0642*** 2.0316 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Sep 1989 Feb 2010 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 
No. of observations 280 279 34 280 280 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   
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Table 21 (continued) 
Sector Commerce Health Care Services 
Media & 
Publishing 
Professional 
Services 
Tourism & 
Leisure  
Transportation & 
Logistics 
Electronic 
Components  
Information & 
Communication 
Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9890*** 0.9689*** 1.0319***  0.9660*** 0.9825*** 0.9925*** 1.0136*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏   -0.0137 -0.0599*** 0.0196  -0.0049 -0.0042 0.0115 -0.0192*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣   0.0046 -0.0029 0.0579*  0.0045 0.0032 -0.0019 -0.0077 
𝛽𝑠𝑙  -0.0660** -0.0963*** -0.0754  0.0004 -0.1057*** 0.4688*** -0.2228*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑓  0.0949*** 0.1709*** 0.1222*  0.0383** 0.1272*** -0.4554*** 0.1949*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0465*** 0.9859*** 1.0016***  1.0220*** 1.0247*** 1.0121*** 1.8357*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0750 0.0069 -0.0376**  -0.0059 -0.0346 0.0002 -0.4899*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑙 -0.1394 -0.0313 -0.0490  0.0287 0.0257 -0.0537 -0.8936*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑓 0.1072 0.1380 0.0259  -0.0042 -0.0268 0.0758* 0.7743*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜   0.9822** 1.6697 0.8414  0.7405** 0.3157 0.3871 1.3839*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -0.9016 -0.3303 -0.7500  -1.0013 -0.1067 -0.7050* 0.9887*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣   -0.3497 -0.2687 -0.3143*  -0.1605 0.0272 -0.1948 -0.0335 
𝛽𝑞𝑙  -0.0246 -0.3150 -0.4313  -0.1095 -0.5824 -1.4922*** -2.1099*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑓  1.0307 0.2004 -0.9597  0.8821 0.8209 1.8754*** 1.2863*** 
𝜎𝑠  0.0571*** 0.0636*** 0.1577***  0.0397*** 0.0576*** 0.0564*** 0.0822*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1435*** 0.1422*** 0.0578***  0.1313*** 0.1731*** 0.1518*** 0.0984*** 
Log-Likelihood 344.6066 327.3794 257.2330  387.0620 233.4061 230.7823 224.0134 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.3060 0.0284 0.5035  3.5848* 1.2082 0.3452 19.8517*** 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  1.1765 0.0000 7.7375***  0.0201 1.7167 0.0000 15.7783*** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.7717 0.0000 1.9177  0.0005 1.0403 0.1235 15.4638*** 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  1.1228 0.1984 1.5137  1.8191 0.1365 4.3825** 0.0000 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  1.0928 2.3473 4.6939**  1.2462 0.0000 1.1982 0.0282 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  16.3495*** 0.0000 3.4211*  1.5703 0.4250 0.0000 0.0000 
Volatility regimes 45.2182*** 57.0388*** 32.4780***  48.7844*** 23.7722** 19.0406* 80.9108*** 
Mixture of normals 45.2162*** 56.7141*** 30.0248***  44.5383*** 22.4814** 18.1305* 76.3980*** 
Fads 42.7483*** 54.5533*** 30.4127***  47.0654*** 20.2056** 19.0370* 70.8613*** 
VNS 39.2245*** 52.7794*** 24.3451***  40.8258*** 17.8535** 16.3015** 62.9415*** 
Volume-augmented 35.9360*** 48.1343*** 0.0000  37.6988*** 17.2232*** 12.0502* 37.6288*** 
One Intercept DV 11.7014*** 15.5688*** 4.7709  0.4248 10.1959** 0.0000 1.8854 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Jan 1990 Aug 1990 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Nov 1989 Sep 1989 Feb 1992 
No. of observations 280 275 268 280 280 277 279 250 
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Although the two models with structural breaks did not always obtain results in all sectors, 
from what is available, they have identified additional evidence of bubbles that were not 
picked up by the simpler models. For example, it detected some evidence in Fashion 
(Consumer Products), Home & Office Products (Consumer Products), Finance & Securities 
(Financials), Petrochemicals & Chemicals (Industrials), Mining (Resources), and Media & 
Publishing (Services). Nevertheless, the evidence for Packaging (Industrials) seems to have 
weakened. Lastly, they reaffirmed evidence suggested by either the VNS or the volume-
augmented models in many sectors, such as Agribusiness (Agro & Food), Banking 
(Financials), Property Development (Property & Construction), and Information & 
Communication Technology (Technology). Therefore, allowing for structural breaks 
appears to have improved the ability for the models to explain the variability of the returns 
in different sectors and industry groups. Specifically, when the results are available, the 
model with one structural break mostly performed better than the basic VNS and volume-
augmented models and the model with two sets of structural breaks were better than the 
model with one set of structural breaks. Although the model with two sets of dummy 
variables which is supposedly more demanding on the data and is perhaps less likely to 
obtain results, it surprisingly only failed to converge in four sectors, while the results from 
the model with one set of dummy variables were not available in five sectors. However, the 
effect of including the structural breaks on the strengths of bubble evidence is rather mixed. 
For most of the industry groups, the extended model does not lead to a change in the number 
of restriction tests rejected. Nonetheless, the evidence of a bubble has strengthened 
substantially in some cases – for instance, when one structural break is added to the model 
for the Home & Office Products. In several other cases, such as the Industrial Materials & 
Machinery and the Tourism & Leisure industry groups, the evidence turns out to be weaker 
when a structural break is allowed for.  
 
Overall, the results from all the different specifications indicated evidence of bubbles in two 
industry groups, namely, Financials (via Banking, and some evidence in Finance and 
Securities) and Technology (via Information & Communication Technology) and some 
evidence in Agro & Food (via Agribusiness), Consumer Products (via Fashion and Home 
& Office Products), Industrials (via Petrochemicals & Chemicals and Packaging), Property 
& Construction (via Property Development), Resources (via Mining), and Services (via 
Media & Publishing). In other words, there appears to be at least some evidence from all 
industry groups in the Thai stock market.  
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The most appropriate specification for each sector can be determined by considering the 
robustness checks with simpler models. The results revealed that 14 sectors were most 
suited to the model with two sets of structural breaks, and six sectors worked best with the 
model with one set of structural breaks. No sector fitted most with the volume-augmented 
model, and the basic VNS model would have been sufficient for estimating three sectors. 
Finally, there were four sectors where none of the four models performed optimally. This is 
summarised in Table 22.  
 
6.2.2. Results based on the Datastream-calculated Indices 
 
Table 5 listed the Datastream groups, elaborate on the companies included in each of them 
and the industry groups and sectors they are in under the classifications of the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand. Four groups are directly related. They are Health Care (100% SET’s 
Services – Health Care Services), Technology and Telecommunications groups (both 100% 
SET’s Technology – Information & Communication Technology), and Utilities (100% 
SET’s Resources – Energy & Utilities). Four groups that are mostly weighted with 
companies in a particular SET’s Industry groups are Consumer Goods (76% SET’s Agro & 
Food – Food & Beverage), Consumer Services (75% SET’s Services – Commerce), 
Financials (80% SET’s Financials – Banking), and Oil & Gas (83% SET’s Resources – 
Energy & Utilities). Datastream’s Industrials group is heavily weighted by 60% SET’s 
Property & Construction –Construction Materials and 27% SET’s Services – Transportation 
& Logistics, while the Basic Materials is split between 42% SET’s Industrials – 
Petrochemicals & Chemicals and 58% SET’s Resources – Energy & Utilities). It should be 
noted that, although companies with real estate business are quite significant in the Thai 
economy, they were not given a separate group and were either included in Financials or 
Consumer Goods. 
 
The results with the VNS model and the volume-augmented models are shown in Table 23 
and Table 24, respectively. They indicated some evidence in Health Care although the 
specifications were not better than simpler ones, Financials, Industrials, Oil & Gas, and 
Utilities groups. Table 25 reports the results from the model with one set of intercept dummy 
variables at July 1997. It picked up evidence of bubble-like behaviour in Technology and 
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Financials groups. While, it also supports some evidence of bubbles in Utilities, Health Care 
and Industrials, the results from these three groups did not perform better than the two basic 
models. Finally, the results with two structural breaks during the Asian Financial Crisis in 
the model are presented in Table 26.  It implies evidence of bubbles in Consumer Goods, 
Consumer Services, Financials, and Health Care. Some evidence in Industrials and Utilities 
groups were also detected. 
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Table 22: SET’s Sectoral Indices: Summary 
Industry Group Sector 
VNS 
model 
Volume-
augmented 
model 
Model with one 
set of structural 
breaks 
Model with two 
sets of structural 
breaks 
Evidence 
of 
bubbles 
Some 
evidence 
of bubbles 
Agro & Food 
Industry 
Agribusiness    X    X 
Food and Beverage       X     
Consumer 
Products 
Fashion     X  X 
Home & Office Products     X  X 
Personal Products & Pharmaceuticals    X     
Financials 
Banking       X X   
Finance and Securities     X  X 
Insurance     X   
Automotive       X     
Industrials 
Industrial Materials & Machinery       X  
Paper & Printing Materials X       
Petrochemicals & Chemicals     X  X 
Packaging     X  X 
Steel         
Property & 
Construction 
Construction Materials       X     
Property Fund X       
Property  Development     X     X 
Resources 
Energy & Utilities     X   
Mining    X    X 
Services 
Commerce       X     
Health Care Services     X   
Media & Publishing    X    X 
Professional Services         
Tourism & Leisure    X     
Transportation & Logistics       X     
Technology 
Electronic Components             
Information & Communication Technology X       X   
Note: X’s denote the most fitting model and its result 
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Table 23: Datastream-calculated Indices: VNS model 
 Basic Materials 
Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Services 
Financials Health Care 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0125*** 1.0089*** 0.9922*** 1.0166*** 1.0092*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0205 0.0016 -0.0334*** -0.0237 0.0064 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0024*** 1.0356*** 1.0607*** 1.0268*** 1.0272*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0184 -0.0128 0.0385 -0.0384 -0.1462 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  2.3969*** 0.4689 0.7072* 0.9554*** 0.7459 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -2.4136*** 0.0351 0.2860 -1.6302*** 0.8756 
𝜎𝑠  0.0882*** 0.0706*** 0.0649*** 0.0571*** 0.0657*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.2236*** 0.1861*** 0.1645*** 0.1783*** 0.1481*** 
Log-Likelihood 237.1912 223.4947 297.2474 246.9664 320.5967 
AIC -1.5279 -1.4913 -1.9283 -1.5931 -2.1633 
SBIC -1.5813 -1.5467 -1.9816 -1.6464 -2.2187 
HQIC -1.4884 -1.4506 -1.8888 -1.5536 -2.1226 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.0598 1.0190 5.1403** 0.1927 0.2901 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.5908 0.1265 0.0000 1.2960 4.0566** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  1.5393 0.1351 0.0000 0.0979 4.2174** 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  24.2366*** 0.0000 0.0000 16.2985*** 0.0000 
Volatility regimes 29.6317*** 1.5970 14.3286*** 17.8805*** 6.1088 
Mixture of normals 28.8154*** 0.1394 17.5456*** 17.5737*** 5.2002 
Fads 29.1940*** 1.5934 5.5373 13.5628*** 5.9947 
Starting observation Dec 1987 Nov 1988 Dec 1987 Dec 1987 Nov 1988 
No. of observations 300 289 300 300 289 
 
Note: Results from the VNS model. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 23 (continued) 
 Industrials Oil & Gas Technology Telecommunications Utilities 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9898*** 1.0002*** 0.9988*** 0.9698*** 1.0123*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0303** -0.0151** -0.0018 -0.0135*** 0.0007 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.1620*** 1.0957*** 1.6643*** 1.0402*** 1.0072*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0739** 0.0260 0.0584*** -0.0201 0.0001 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  2.3580*** 1.0687** 1.9472*** 1.0039*** 1.7483*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -1.7248** -0.0377 -0.0491 -0.0620 -0.2176*** 
𝜎𝑠  0.0969*** 0.0848*** 0.1244*** 0.0746*** 0.0493*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1865*** 0.1930*** 0.1014*** 0.2355*** 0.1552*** 
Log-Likelihood 161.4218 223.8945 140.2155 190.4388 232.4276 
AIC -1.3517 -1.5933 -1.0289 -1.5078 -2.2221 
SBIC -1.4222 -1.6524 -1.0912 -1.5739 -2.3013 
HQIC -1.3030 -1.5506 -0.9845 -1.4613 -2.1690 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  6.9729*** 3.7900* 6.2693** 1.3746 0.0307 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9343 0.0000 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0977 0.0260 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  1.1349 0.0177 0.5171 0.4284 23.4920*** 
Volatility regimes 11.0251** 7.8069* 7.6377 23.2932*** 32.4082*** 
Mixture of normals 10.8503** 5.4261 1.9552 19.0579*** 32.1017*** 
Fads 10.4137** 3.8301 7.3639* 4.8515 27.7616*** 
Starting observation Jan 1994 May 1990 Jul 1991 Oct 1992 Feb 1996 
No. of observations 227 271 257 242 202 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 24: Datastream-calculated Indices: Volume-augmented model 
 Basic Materials Consumer Goods Consumer Services Financials Health Care 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0115*** 1.0066*** 0.9894*** 1.0165*** 1.0087*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0178 -0.0020 -0.0360*** -0.0237 0.0082 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0079 0.0130 0.0002 -0.0029 0.0150** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0023*** 1.0416*** 1.1737*** 1.0272*** 1.0206*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0178 -0.0056 0.1649*** -0.0385 -0.1132 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  2.4777*** 0.6207 1.3619*** 1.1332*** 0.5491 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -2.5049*** 0.0249 -0.1187 -1.7232*** 0.8661 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.0910 -0.1727 0.5222* -0.6421*** -0.1582 
𝜎𝑠  0.0884*** 0.0740*** 0.0735*** 0.0585*** 0.0617*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.2232*** 0.1937*** 0.1239*** 0.1802*** 0.1377*** 
Log-Likelihood 237.5733 224.6975 300.1667 251.4424 322.5398 
AIC -1.5172 -1.4858 -1.9344 -1.6096 -2.1629 
SBIC -1.5838 -1.5550 -2.0011 -1.6763 -2.2321 
HQIC -1.4677 -1.4350 -1.8850 -1.5602 -2.1121 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.0491 1.3724 7.7653*** 0.2129 0.2140 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.5570 0.0179 0.0000 1.3319 4.2091** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  1.2516 0.0061 0.0000 0.1126 4.5419** 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  24.4005*** 0.0000 0.0446 13.6630*** 0.0000 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  0.0884 0.6297 0.0000 8.5593*** 0.4502 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.6502 0.9727 0.0054 0.0000 3.8530** 
Volatility regimes 30.3959*** 4.0025 20.1672*** 26.8325*** 9.9950 
Mixture of normals 29.5795*** 2.5449 23.3842*** 26.5257*** 9.0864 
Fads 29.9581*** 3.9989 11.3759** 22.5149*** 9.8809* 
VNS 0.7641 2.4055 5.8386* 8.9520** 3.8862 
Starting observation Dec 1987 Nov 1988 Dec 1987 Dec 1987 Nov 1988 
No. of observations 300 289 300 300 289 
Note: Results from the volume-augmented model. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 24 (continued) 
 Industrials Oil & Gas Technology Telecommunications Utilities 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9902*** 0.9964*** 0.9716*** 0.9753*** 1.0123*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0330** -0.0171** -0.0175* -0.0132*** 0.0014 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  -0.0146* -0.0202* 0.0020 -0.0157*** -0.0121 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.1550*** 1.0603*** 1.1265*** 1.0212*** 1.0095*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0677** 0.0086 0.0179* -0.0199 0.0002 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  2.3612*** 0.6793* 0.9356*** 0.8424*** 2.6790*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -1.8245** -0.1222 -0.1710** -0.0833 -0.3615** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  0.4790* -0.2468* 0.0864 0.2281 -1.8155** 
𝜎𝑠  0.0950*** 0.0707*** 0.0906*** 0.0667*** 0.0484*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1899*** 0.1655*** 0.2519*** 0.2205*** 0.1503*** 
Log-Likelihood 164.7350 226.3256 139.2672 196.0055 240.4114 
AIC -1.3633 -1.5965 -1.0060 -1.5372 -2.2813 
SBIC -1.4514 -1.6703 -1.0838 -1.6199 -2.3803 
HQIC -1.3024 -1.5431 -0.9504 -1.4792 -2.2150 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  6.2119** 4.2773** 4.2531** 0.8107 0.0114 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.2608 0.0000 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1394 0.1130 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  45.6318*** 0.2408 2.0484 0.8021 25.3992*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  0.0000 4.8565** 0.0000 0.0000 14.9783*** 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.0000 0.0000 1.6288 0.0000 0.0000 
Volatility regimes 17.6516*** 12.6690** 5.7410 34.4265*** 48.3758*** 
Mixture of normals 17.4767*** 10.2882* 0.0585 30.1913*** 48.0693*** 
Fads 17.0402*** 8.6922 5.4672 15.9848*** 43.7292*** 
VNS 6.6265** 4.8621* 0.0000 11.1333*** 15.9676*** 
Starting observation Jan 1994 May 1990 Jul 1991 Oct 1992 Feb 1996 
No. of observations 227 271 257 242 202 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 25: Datastream-calculated Indices: Model with one set of intercept dummy variables at July 1997 
 Basic Materials 
Consumer 
Goods 
Consumer 
Services 
Financials Health Care 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0055*** 1.0012*** 0.9825*** 1.0065*** 0.9933*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0212 0.0005 -0.0300*** -0.0495** 0.0071 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0087 0.0146 0.0011 0.0028 0.0137* 
𝛽𝑠𝑓 0.0094 0.0095 0.0157 0.0294** 0.0224** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0974*** 1.0470*** 1.2038*** 1.0622*** 1.0370*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0225 -0.0149 0.0121 -0.0302 -0.1100 
𝛽𝑐𝑓 -0.1099 -0.0197 -0.1866** -0.0589 -0.0358 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  2.6469*** 0.3011 0.9202** 0.9708*** 0.4095 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -2.2627*** -0.1318 0.5252 -1.7942*** 0.7702 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.1474 -0.2501 0.3912* -0.5252** -0.1661 
𝛽𝑞𝑓 -0.4118 0.6888** -0.4892 0.2712 0.2991 
𝜎𝑠  0.0882*** 0.0745*** 0.0657*** 0.0553*** 0.0610*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.2216*** 0.1936*** 0.1365*** 0.1783*** 0.1336*** 
Log-Likelihood 238.2708 227.2010 302.9809 255.6100 325.0491 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.5900 1.2298 19.1235*** 2.7467* 1.1788 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.8770 0.1217 0.0000 0.8257 2.6522 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  1.8706 0.1109 0.0000 0.0000 2.7120* 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  18.7527*** 0.1589 0.0000 12.0203*** 0.0000 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  0.2446 0.9685 0.0000 6.3358** 0.4048 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.7922 1.0305 0.1286 0.0472 3.6569* 
Volatility regimes 31.7908*** 9.0095 25.7956*** 35.1678*** 15.0136* 
Mixture of normals 30.9744*** 7.5519 29.0126*** 34.8610*** 14.1050* 
Fads 31.3531*** 9.0059 17.0043** 30.8501*** 14.8995* 
VNS 2.1591 7.4125 11.4670** 17.2873*** 8.9048 
Volume-augmented 1.3949 5.0070 5.6284 8.3353** 5.0187 
Starting observation Dec 1987 Nov 1988 Dec 1987 Dec 1987 Nov 1988 
No. of observations 300 289 300 300 289 
Note: Results from the model with one set of intercept dummy variables. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.    
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Table 25 (continued) 
 Industrials Oil & Gas Technology Telecommunications Utilities 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9710*** 1.0058*** 0.9820*** 0.9736*** 0.9389*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0304** -0.0267*** -0.0027 -0.0135*** -0.0009 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  -0.0141* -0.0156 0.0006 -0.0155*** -0.0123 
𝛽𝑠𝑓 0.0258 -0.0203 0.0214 0.0010 0.0688** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.2258*** 1.0752*** 1.7623*** 1.0869*** 1.0202*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0663** 0.0372* 0.0683*** -0.0189 0.0003 
𝛽𝑐𝑓 -0.0771 0.0620 -0.1488*** -0.0728 -0.0082 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  2.5237*** 0.4205 1.6954*** 0.9672* 5.4219** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -3.6744** -0.2780 -0.0665 -0.0890 -0.5189* 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  0.6186* -0.2291 -0.0908 0.2306 -2.6628* 
𝛽𝑞𝑓 1.7250 1.0017** 0.4911 -0.0785 -1.8971 
𝜎𝑠  0.0942*** 0.0777*** 0.1246*** 0.0685*** 0.0492*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1882*** 0.1567*** 0.0606*** 0.2228*** 0.1492*** 
Log-Likelihood 167.8363 229.7663 144.9461 196.2844 241.9207 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  3.4467* 2.9760* 10.6010*** 1.0610 1.2367 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9791 0.0000 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0778 0.0000 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  10.4727*** 1.0691 5.5342** 0.8067 23.2525*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  0.0000 1.3614 5.5337** 0.0000 14.6765*** 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.0000 0.0000 5.5455** 0.0000 0.0000 
Volatility regimes 23.8542*** 19.5504** 17.0989** 34.9844*** 51.3944*** 
Mixture of normals 23.6794*** 17.1696** 11.4163 30.7492*** 51.0879*** 
Fads 23.2428*** 15.5736** 16.8250** 16.5427** 46.7479*** 
VNS 12.8291** 11.7435** 9.4611* 11.6912** 18.9862*** 
Volume-augmented 6.2026 6.8814* 11.3579*** 0.5579 3.0186 
Starting observation Jan 1994 May 1990 Jul 1991 Oct 1992 Feb 1996 
No. of observations 227 271 257 242 202 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 26: Datastream-calculated Indices: Model with two sets of intercept dummy variables at September 1996 and August 1998 
 Basic Materials Consumer Goods Consumer Services Financials Health Care 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0121*** 1.0114*** 0.9838*** 1.0092*** 0.9972*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏   -0.0024 -0.0272 -0.0274*** -0.0370* 0.0025 
𝛽𝑠𝑣   0.0138 0.0224* 0.0003 0.0032 0.0066 
𝛽𝑠𝑙  -0.1468*** -0.1559*** -0.0869** -0.2100*** -0.1299* 
𝛽𝑠𝑓  0.1507*** 0.1718*** 0.1073*** 0.2288*** 0.1507** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.1410*** 1.4324*** 1.2148*** 1.1440*** 1.2197*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0204 -0.0020 0.0083 -0.1988*** -0.1103*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑙 -0.1037 -0.1249** -0.1416 -0.1949* -0.2209*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑓 -0.0115 -0.3120*** -0.0513 0.1870* -0.2575*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜   3.1587*** 1.9934*** 1.2438*** 1.1115*** 2.3995*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -3.8692** -1.1469** -0.0017 -1.4984*** -1.3852* 
𝛽𝑞𝑣   0.1304 0.2038 0.5465* -0.5043** 0.5561 
𝛽𝑞𝑙  2.4530 -0.0700 -1.1366 0.1381 -3.0650*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑓  -1.6385 -1.1183** 0.9839 0.2066 3.9565*** 
𝜎𝑠  0.0926*** 0.1053*** 0.0669*** 0.0605*** 0.0718*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.2267*** 0.0524*** 0.1376*** 0.1654*** 0.0676*** 
Log-Likelihood 245.8402 253.6041 310.9395 281.1562 328.1050 
AIC -1.5323 -1.6443 -1.9663 -1.7677 -2.1599 
SBIC -1.6389 -1.7550 -2.0729 -1.8744 -2.2706 
HQIC -1.4532 -1.5630 -1.8872 -1.6887 -2.0786 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.7250 20.7960*** 8.2948*** 10.6782*** 14.0171*** 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.4399 0.0288 0.0000 14.0752*** 5.4723** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.2358 0.0000 0.0000 7.8049*** 6.3177** 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  46.9563*** 14.5454*** 8.6404*** 14.4306*** 2.8191* 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 6.5785** 0.0000 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  2.0620 3.8614** 10.0721*** 0.0855 11.0164*** 
Volatility regimes 46.9297*** 61.8158*** 41.7126*** 86.2602*** 21.1254** 
Mixture of normals 46.1133*** 60.3582*** 44.9297*** 85.9534*** 20.2169** 
Fads 46.4920*** 61.8122*** 32.9214*** 81.9425*** 21.0114** 
VNS 17.2980** 60.2188*** 27.3841*** 68.3797*** 15.0166* 
Volume-augmented 16.5339** 57.8133*** 17.8391*** 59.4277*** 11.1305* 
One intercept DV 13.8282*** 27.7761*** 7.3337* 42.5254*** 2.0901 
Starting observation Dec 1987 Nov 1988 Dec 1987 Dec 1987 Nov 1988 
No. of observations 300 289 300 300 289 
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Table 26 (continued) 
 Industrials Oil & Gas Technology Telecommunications Utilities 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  0.9584*** 1.0050*** 0.9940*** 0.9819*** 0.9949*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏   0.0052 -0.0188** -0.0025 -0.0140*** 0.0019 
𝛽𝑠𝑣   -0.0155** -0.0212** -0.0026 -0.0145*** -0.0191* 
𝛽𝑠𝑙  -0.0288 -0.0616** -0.1373*** -0.2320*** 0.0217 
𝛽𝑠𝑓  0.0914** 0.0535* 0.1428*** 0.2243*** -0.0044 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0611*** 1.0734*** 1.7837*** 1.2360*** 1.1197*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.2707*** 0.0282 0.0853*** -0.0369 0.0007 
𝛽𝑐𝑙 -0.0087 0.0747 -0.1040 -0.2738 -0.1407 
𝛽𝑐𝑓 0.9945*** -0.0343 -0.3466*** 0.1136 0.0572 
𝛽𝑞𝑜   0.8372 0.3019 1.7367*** 1.3967*** 15.2894* 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -0.4213 -0.2372 -0.0495 0.0083 -0.4050* 
𝛽𝑞𝑣   -0.2191 -0.2410 -0.0193 -0.0143 -2.0297** 
𝛽𝑞𝑙  -0.8169 0.6119 -0.6997 -1.7960*** -12.5808 
𝛽𝑞𝑓  3.1376*** 0.4825 0.3497 1.5394*** 0.2007 
𝜎𝑠  0.1046*** 0.0755*** 0.1084*** 0.0705*** 0.0484*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.0979*** 0.1594*** 0.1380*** 0.2046*** 0.1478*** 
Log-Likelihood 174.6105 233.1050 159.6704 214.4116 244.8007 
AIC -1.3974 -1.6023 -1.1181 -1.6398 -2.2654 
SBIC -1.5384 -1.7203 -1.2426 -1.7720 -2.4238 
HQIC -1.3000 -1.5169 -1.0292 -1.5468 -2.1593 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.3263 2.5792 12.5793*** 1.7470 0.3769 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  13.0237*** 0.0000 0.0000 2.3719 0.0000 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏   13.0345*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.9058 0.0703 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.6527 0.7490 0.3750 0.0000 30.5770*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  0.9328 1.3887 0.0181 0.0101 36.2668*** 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Volatility regimes 37.4027*** 26.2279*** 46.5474*** 71.2388*** 57.1545*** 
Mixture of normals 37.2278*** 23.8471** 40.8649*** 67.0035*** 56.8479*** 
Fads 36.7912*** 22.2511** 46.2736*** 52.7971*** 52.5079*** 
VNS 26.3775*** 18.4210** 38.9097*** 47.9456*** 24.7462*** 
Volume-augmented 0.0000 13.5589** 40.8065*** 36.8123*** 8.7786 
One intercept DV 1.4350 4.2504 19.0825*** 23.1934*** 5.9822 
Starting observation Jan 1994 May 1990 Jul 1991 Oct 1992 Feb 1996 
No. of observations 227 271 257 242 202 
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All results based on Datastream-calculated indices are summarised in Table 27.  They 
appear to suggest evidence of bubbles in bubbles in Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, 
and Financials, and some evidence in Health Care, Industrials and Utilities groups. These 
results are largely consistent with those obtained from SET’s Sectoral indices discussed in 
the previous section. Precisely, at least some evidence of bubbles were identified in Food & 
Beverages, Banking, Property Development and Commerce sectors, while evidence was 
detected here in Consumer Goods, Consumer Services and Financials groups. Some 
evidence was also found Petrochemicals & Chemicals sector, but no evidence was picked 
up here in the Basic Materials group. The most striking discrepancies would be in the 
technology-related groups. No evidence of bubble was observed in either the Technology 
or Telecommunications groups, even though there was relatively strong evidence of a 
bubble in the SET’s Information & Communication Technology sector. This may partly be 
caused by issues with dividend yield data collected by Datastream. As Datastream only 
tracked a few stocks in each group and there were parts of the sample that contain an 
extended period of zero dividend yields, which were used in the calculation of fundamental 
values and, subsequently, relative bubble terms. Specifically, during April 1998 to March 
2001, there were 24, 13, 25, 24 and 7 consecutive months of dividend yields reported in 
Industrials, Oil & Gas, Technology, Telecommunications, and Utilities groups, 
respectively. Therefore, these results are also to be interpreted with caution.  
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Table 27: Datastream-calculated Indices: Summary  
Datastream Group 
VNS 
model 
Volume-
augmented 
model 
Model with 
one set of 
structural 
breaks 
Model with 
two sets of 
structural 
breaks 
Evidence 
of bubbles 
Some 
evidence 
of bubbles 
Basic Materials       X     
Consumer Goods     X X  
Consumer Services     X X  
Financials     X X  
Health Care        X 
Industrials   X     X 
Oil & Gas    X     
Technology     X   
Telecommunications     X   
Utilities   X       X 
 
Note: X’s denote the most fitting model and its result 
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6.2.3. Results based on the K-NI 
 
Noting the issues with the length of data of SET’s Industry Group indices available, the 
difficulty managing 27 SET’s Sectoral indices, and limitations of using Datastream-
calculated indices, the K-NI series are computed as elaborated in the previous section.  
 
First of all, in order to further check for consistency with the official SET’s industry group 
indices, the results based on only the replicating observations of the K-NI have been 
estimated. However, as they cover a limited number of observations, the estimates are also 
less reliable, similar to what was found with the SET’s industry group indices. They also 
differ significantly from results based on the full K-NI series, which reinforces the 
unfavourable effect of having small sample size. Therefore, the results on based on just the 
first 49 observations of the K-NI are reported in Appendix 2.    
 
The following analyses, thus, focus on the full K-NI series. The results with the VNS 
showed some evidence of bubbles in only the Consumer Products industry group in Table 
28, while the results with the volume-augmented in Table 29 picked up evidence in 
Technology, and Services, and some evidence in Agro & Food, in addition. The next model 
extension is to include one set of a structural break in July 1997 and the results were shown 
in Table 30. New evidence of some bubble-like behaviour was found in the Property & 
Construction industry group. 
 
Finally, Table 31 presents the results of the model with two sets of dummy variables with 
the K-NI series. The robustness checks against all simpler models including the model with 
one set of dummy variables indicated that all industry groups performed best with this model 
with two structural breaks at September 1996 and August 1998, except for Technology 
industry group, which was better than most models, but the original volume-augmented. 
Also, the results for Technology industry group yielded higher standard deviations in the 
bubbles will be in the surviving state than the collapsing state. As for detection of bubbles, 
the conclusion is drawn based on the number of restriction tests rejected, given the model 
with two structural breaks that has been established as the most fitting specification. There 
was an evidence of bubble-like behaviour in Consumer Products, Property & Construction, 
and Technology industry groups. Some evidence of bubbles was also found in Agro & Food, 
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Financials, Industrials, and Services industry groups. In other words, Resources is the only 
industry group that does not contain evidence of a bubble in the Thai stock market, which 
contradicts with the evidence from the SET’s Sectoral indices discussed earlier that found 
some evidence of bubbles in Mining sector under the Resources industry groups. It is to be 
noted that including structural breaks not only improve the performance of the model, but 
also picked up additional evidence in three industry groups – Financials, Industrials, and 
Property & Construction – that were not detected by either the VNS or the volume-
augmented models.  
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Table 28: The K-NI: VNS model 
 
Agro & Food 
Industry 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0098*** 0.9977*** 1.0132*** 1.0057*** 1.0077*** 1.0072*** 1.0122*** 0.9934*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0094 -0.0145 -0.0268 -0.0549** 0.0080 -0.0501** -0.0031 -0.0161*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0170*** 0.9975*** 1.0117*** 1.0216*** 1.0135*** 1.0273*** 0.9850*** 1.0607*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0555 -0.1125 -0.0036 0.0199 -0.0226 0.0057 -0.0053 0.0912 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  0.6823* 1.2344*** 0.8152*** 1.3189** 1.6105*** 0.9272** 1.9181*** 0.2035 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  0.1592 -1.8298* -1.5688*** -1.8840* -1.0118** -1.4972** -1.8225** 1.2130*** 
𝜎𝑠  0.0478*** 0.0446*** 0.0572*** 0.0570*** 0.0837*** 0.0580*** 0.0606*** 0.0687*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1161*** 0.1218*** 0.1843*** 0.1251*** 0.2044*** 0.1361*** 0.1426*** 0.3460*** 
Log-Likelihood 361.2944 383.3613 224.6584 319.3996 231.4582 263.5970 338.2726 234.7421 
AIC -2.5235 -2.6812 -1.5476 -2.2243 -1.5961 -1.8257 -2.3591 -1.6254 
SBIC -2.5807 -2.7383 -1.6047 -2.2814 -1.6533 -1.8828 -2.4162 -1.6827 
HQIC -2.4819 -2.6395 -1.5059 -2.1826 -1.5545 -1.7840 -2.3174 -1.5836 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.1314 0.0001 0.0045 0.5021 0.0207 1.3378 0.5134 1.2519 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  1.8562 3.2669* 0.0107 0.0000 0.4291 0.0000 0.0190 0.0000 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  2.3183 2.0902 0.0000 0.0000 0.5923 0.0000 0.0025 0.0000 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.0000 4.7059** 13.5026*** 1.4351 17.0915*** 3.1649* 8.5412*** 0.0000 
Volatility regimes 3.6117 12.8147** 14.7805*** 11.4530** 8.9619* 7.4831 9.8557** 23.8725*** 
Mixture of normals 2.7413 11.6372*** 14.5404*** 9.4207** 8.6606** 7.4818* 9.7262** 20.9833*** 
Fads 3.1379 9.0964** 14.6903*** 5.9044 8.9288** 4.0165 9.3628** 17.2299*** 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Sep 1989 
No. of observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 279 
 
Note: Results from the VNS model. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 29: The K-NI: Volume-augmented model 
 
Agro & Food 
Industry 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0105*** 0.9979*** 1.0132*** 1.0220*** 1.0060*** 1.0078*** 1.0105*** 1.0927*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0061 -0.0108 -0.0292 0.0382 0.0066 -0.0524** -0.0008 0.0669 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0177** -0.0059 0.0137 0.0128 0.0057 -0.0170 0.0243*** 0.1992 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0157*** 0.9972*** 1.0119*** 1.0015*** 1.0205*** 1.0273*** 0.9734*** 0.9925*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0329 -0.1197* -0.0020 -0.0308** -0.0216 0.0029 -0.0147 -0.0167*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  0.7823** 1.2199*** 0.8427*** -1.2352*** 1.7474*** 0.9224** 2.3226*** -0.1551 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  0.0113 -1.7164* -1.5324*** 0.5806 -1.0767** -1.6416** -1.8150*** -1.2750*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.6311** -0.1684 -0.2999 0.5104 -0.2235 0.0080 -0.6782* -0.4026* 
𝜎𝑠  0.0468*** 0.0441*** 0.0572*** 0.1386*** 0.0848*** 0.0564*** 0.0610*** 0.3285*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1149*** 0.1211*** 0.1844*** 0.0595*** 0.2082*** 0.1335*** 0.1568*** 0.0686*** 
Log-Likelihood 366.4002 384.4292 226.8595 322.3473 232.0534 264.5318 344.8655 237.6609 
AIC -2.5457 -2.6745 -1.5490 -2.2311 -1.5861 -1.8181 -2.3919 -1.6320 
SBIC -2.6171 -2.7459 -1.6204 -2.3025 -1.6575 -1.8895 -2.4633 -1.7037 
HQIC -2.4936 -2.6224 -1.4969 -2.1790 -1.5340 -1.7660 -2.3398 -1.5798 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.0753 0.0010 0.0033 0.4511 0.1105 1.3204 0.6150 2.5097 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.8789 3.6441* 0.0034 4.9593** 0.3600 0.0000 0.0998 10.2180*** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  1.0726 2.5503 0.0000 1.5753 0.4708 0.0000 0.0772 0.6616 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.0000 4.1446** 14.3221*** 0.0000 8.0637*** 3.9772** 9.7171*** 15.8768*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  8.5126*** 0.9323 2.0470 0.0000 0.3738 0.0000 3.4109* 4.5748** 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  4.4085** 0.0000 2.1186 0.2117 0.2040 0.0000 7.8955*** 3.1040* 
Volatility regimes 13.8232** 14.9507** 19.1829*** 17.3484*** 10.1523 9.3528 23.0414*** 29.7101*** 
Mixture of normals 12.9528** 13.7732** 18.9428*** 15.3160*** 9.8510* 9.3515* 22.9118*** 26.8210*** 
Fads 13.3494** 11.2324** 19.0927*** 11.7998** 10.1192* 5.8863 22.5484*** 23.0675*** 
VNS 10.2115*** 2.1360 4.4024 5.8953* 1.1904 1.8697 13.1856*** 5.8376* 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Sep 1989 
No. of observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 279 
 
Note: Results from the volume-augmented model. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table 30: The K-NI: Model with one set of intercept dummy variables at July 1997 
 
Agro & Food 
Industry 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0166*** 0.9599*** 1.0135*** 0.9899*** 0.9751*** 1.0288*** 0.9908*** 1.1393*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0121 -0.0312* -0.0364* -0.0248 0.0356* -0.0651*** -0.0115 0.0375 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0107 -0.0045 0.0161 -0.0077 0.0048 -0.0039 0.0199** 0.1961 
𝛽𝑠𝑓 -0.0084 0.0438*** 0.0030 0.0154 0.0597** -0.0291 0.0260** -0.0845 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.9718*** 1.0086*** 1.0186*** 1.0147*** 1.0494*** 1.0257*** 1.0034*** 0.9935*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0136** -0.0689* 0.0049 0.0069 -0.0330 0.0090 0.0127 -0.0173** 
𝛽𝑐𝑓 0.0505*** -0.0146 -0.0193 0.0061 -0.0669 0.0003 0.0061 -0.0019 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.3511** -0.1606 0.0225 1.4017** 1.0859 0.5553 1.4399** -0.1677 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -0.8683 -1.5579* -2.2045*** -0.5916 -1.2344* -1.3766** -1.9442*** -1.2789*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  2.2134** -0.1102 -0.3449 -1.2182** -0.2173 -0.1289 -0.7112** -0.3937* 
𝛽𝑞𝑓 -0.4570 1.1461*** 1.3868*** -0.6134 0.3167 0.5403 0.8965 0.0370 
𝜎𝑠  0.0820*** 0.0314*** 0.0504*** 0.0557*** 0.0716*** 0.0572*** 0.0562*** 0.3264*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.0255*** 0.0983*** 0.1746*** 0.1219*** 0.1674*** 0.1357*** 0.1351*** 0.0684*** 
Log-Likelihood 371.6198 396.2510 237.0399 324.6572 237.7032 267.1305 349.2452 237.9574 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  2.6720 3.9856** 0.0221 0.4646 2.2002 0.0093 0.1129 2.5992 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.0000 3.0843* 0.0000 0.0000 1.7850 0.0000 0.0000 5.4235** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  0.0000 0.6864 0.0000 0.0000 3.9343** 0.0000 0.0000 0.2504 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.8763 4.2082** 20.4735*** 0.6122 21.3781*** 1.0923 11.6919*** 11.6189*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  0.0000 0.4431 2.0621 6.1420** 0.3353 0.3414 4.4572** 4.4878** 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  19.5517*** 0.0000 2.6842 0.0000 0.0867 0.0000 5.5252** 3.1927* 
Volatility regimes 24.2625*** 38.5943*** 39.5436*** 21.9682*** 21.4518** 14.5502 31.8008*** 30.3031*** 
Mixture of normals 23.3920*** 37.4168*** 39.3035*** 19.9358** 21.1505*** 14.5490* 31.6713*** 27.4140*** 
Fads 23.7886*** 34.8760*** 39.4534*** 16.4196** 21.4187*** 11.0837 31.3079*** 23.6605*** 
VNS 20.6508*** 25.7796*** 24.7631*** 10.5152* 12.4899** 7.0672 21.9451*** 6.4306 
Volume-augmented 10.4393** 23.6436*** 20.3607*** 4.6387 11.2995** 5.1974 8.7594** 0.5930 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Sep 1989 
No. of observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 279 
Note: Results from the model with one set of intercept dummy variables. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 31: The K-NI: Model with two sets of intercept dummy variables at September 1996 and August 1998 
 
Agro & Food 
Industry 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0019*** 0.9614*** 1.0091*** 1.0011*** 0.9919*** 1.0317*** 0.9912*** 1.1777*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏   -0.0022 -0.0249* -0.0449*** -0.0546** 0.0113 -0.0291 -0.0130 0.0208 
𝛽𝑠𝑣   0.0124* -0.0035 0.0116 -0.0064 0.0044 -0.0160 0.0158** 0.2517* 
𝛽𝑠𝑙  -0.0614*** -0.0439* -0.2045*** -0.0651*** -0.0877 -0.0951*** -0.0701*** -0.0814 
𝛽𝑠𝑓  0.0781*** 0.0855*** 0.2124*** 0.0805*** 0.1167** 0.0717** 0.0990*** -0.0141 
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0241*** 1.0141*** 1.0757*** 1.0057*** 1.1188*** 1.0184*** 1.0262*** 0.9997*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.0185 -0.1192** -0.1753* -0.0004 -0.0312 0.0219 -0.0896 -0.0164** 
𝛽𝑐𝑙 0.1738* -0.0825** -0.1314 -0.0302 -0.1711 0.0820 -0.1604 -0.0734*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑓 -0.2159** 0.0811** 0.2107 0.0443 0.0975 -0.0598 0.1558 0.0675*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜   0.6287 -0.2390 0.4055 1.4014* 1.9175*** 0.6182 1.2279** -0.3596 
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -0.5699 -1.4513 -2.1693*** -1.8059** -1.1074** -0.7639 -0.9161 -0.9572** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣   -0.4869** -0.0993 -0.1864 -1.1140** -0.3550 0.2056 -0.7962** -0.3005 
𝛽𝑞𝑙  1.0177* 0.1073 1.5317* -0.1462 -1.5101* 0.3082 -0.0677 -0.0658 
𝛽𝑞𝑓  0.2276 1.3389** -0.0205 -0.2243 1.7456** 0.3349 0.9890 -0.1478 
𝜎𝑠  0.0495*** 0.0315*** 0.0582*** 0.0496*** 0.0816*** 0.0658*** 0.0548*** 0.3454*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.1156*** 0.0950*** 0.1803*** 0.1149*** 0.2067*** 0.1490*** 0.1385*** 0.0705*** 
Log-Likelihood 382.5044 410.0386 261.7234 335.0707 247.4343 271.5291 361.6977 242.1755 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.6223 4.0226** 2.6651 0.0197 1.2393 0.0814 0.5190 2.1397 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  0.1448 7.2466*** 4.3440** 0.0003 0.6238 0.0000 1.9865 5.1307** 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.1032 3.6670* 2.1259 0.0000 0.8841 0.0000 1.3567 0.0766 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  1.0362 2.8947* 17.7272*** 10.3834*** 7.0896*** 0.0763 1.7181 5.9532** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  4.9417** 0.3191 0.7838 3.8235* 10.8208*** 0.0000 5.9708** 2.6786 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  3.4526* 0.0000 2.0595 0.0000 4.9049** 0.0000 3.9829** 2.8682* 
Volatility regimes 46.0316*** 66.1694*** 88.9105*** 42.7951*** 40.9141*** 23.3474** 56.7059*** 38.7393*** 
Mixture of normals 45.1612*** 64.9919*** 88.6704*** 40.7628*** 40.6128*** 23.3461** 56.5763*** 35.8501*** 
Fads 45.5578*** 62.4511*** 88.8203*** 37.2465*** 40.8810*** 19.8808** 56.2129*** 32.0967*** 
VNS 42.4199*** 53.3547*** 74.1300*** 31.3421*** 31.9522*** 15.8643** 46.8501*** 14.8668* 
Volume-augmented 32.2084*** 51.2187*** 69.7276*** 25.4657*** 30.7618*** 13.9946** 33.6645*** 9.0291 
One intercept DV 12.3845*** 11.8127*** 30.7343*** 15.2897*** 12.6683*** 6.9997* 13.1408*** 7.6567* 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Sep 1989 
No. of observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 279 
Note: Results from the model with two sets of intercept dummy variables. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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6.3. Conclusions 
 
This chapter investigates the more disaggregated price indices in the Thai stock market, in 
order to find out which groups of businesses displayed bubble-like behaviour during the 
period studied by using the SET’s industry group indices and sectoral indices, the 
Datastream-calculated indices, and the author’s calculated K-NI series with the VNS 
model, the volume-augmented model, and – when applicable – the extended models with 
one or two sets structural breaks for the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  
The evidence based on the SET’s official industry group indices hinted signs of a bubble 
in at least five out the eight industry groups. However, these results are to be interpreted 
with caution, as the number of observations available was very small. On the other hand, 
the results based on the SET’s official sectoral indices showed strong evidence of bubbles 
in the Banking, Industrial Materials & Machinery, and Information & Communication 
Technology sectors, as well as, some weaker evidence of bubbles in nine other sectors. 
That it, at least 12 out of 27 sectors in the Thai stock markets displayed some level of 
bubble-like behaviour. Interestingly, when the most fitting specification is considered, it 
appeared that the inclusion of structural breaks helped capture additional variation in the 
returns of 20 sectors – six of which with only one break in July 1997 and 14 other sectors 
with two breaks at September 1996 and August 1998. Meanwhile, three sectors including 
the Information & Communication Technology worked best with the basic VNS model, 
meaning both the abnormal volume included in timing the burst of the bubble, and the 
structural breaks were not significant.  
Similar, results were found using the Datastream-calculated indices. The model with two 
structural breaks was most appropriate for six groups, while another group was most 
compatible with only one break. Regarding the bubble detection, several groups were 
found to contain bubbles, consistent with those obtained from the SET’s official series. 
However, there was a major difference for the technology-related groups where the bubble 
was not detected with the Datastream-calculated indices. This is possibly due to the 
inclusion of only a few stock in the index, and they reported zero dividend yields during 
some periods of the series, thus, affecting the consistencies of fundamental values and 
bubble terms calculated.    
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Finally, the author’s calculated K-NI was investigated. The results suggested strong 
evidence of bubbles in three industry groups, namely, Consumer Products, Property & 
Construction, and Technology, while there was some weaker evidence in five other 
industry groups. Again, the importance of structural breaks was noted. All industry groups 
were most consistent with the model allowing for two structural breaks, except for the 
Technology industry group. In fact, the Technology’s estimates of standard deviations 
were unexpectedly larger in the bubble surviving regime than when they collapse, which 
implied more volatility when the bubbles continue to grow than when they finally burst. 
This is probably related to the uncertainty of the impacts to be brought about by an 
introduction of new innovations and differences of opinions by investors. Specifically, 
new products or services are regularly discovered by technology companies. Initially, 
commercial success and financial benefits these inventions could bring are not precisely 
known. Investors may have differing views, which potentially leads to higher volatility as 
a bubble is formed and continues to grow. The bubble could burst if the eventual 
realisation of how useful the innovation is does not justify the prior valuation. Moreover, 
as investors learn this information, their opinions converge and volatility would reduce. In 
other words, these could help explain why the standard deviation in the bubble-collapsing 
regime turns out to be lower than that in the bubble-surviving regime. The K-NI’s 
Resources was the only one that did not contain a bubble-like behaviour. However, it is to 
be noted that the Mining sector which was a part of the Resources industry group was 
found to have some evidence of bubble presence. Therefore, on the whole, it could 
probably be summarised that the results were suggesting at least some evidence of bubbles 
in practically all industry groups with some inconsistencies between different sets of data 
and models utilised.  
The next chapter will examine the linkages between industry groups and the transmission 
of bubbles from one industry group to another by extending the VNS and the volume-
augmented models with bubble terms from other industry groups or the market-wide SET 
index as a proxy. 
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Chapter 7: Contagion in the Thai Market 
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter broadens the investigation of speculative bubbles in the Thai stock market 
conducted in the previous chapters. Firstly, it extends the standard regime-switching models 
to explore the contagion effects between the disaggregated groups within the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand. This is simply done by adding the relative bubble terms of other 
industry groups into both the two return equations and the probability function. Precisely, 
this will allow an examination of effects to return of an industry group coming from bubbles 
existed in other industry groups, as well as, the impact of such bubbles on the probability of 
the next-period return being realised in a bubble-surviving regime. However, it will not 
explain whether a bubble in one industry group will trigger a bubble in another industry 
group. Note that the term contagion, like a bubble, does not seem to have a universally 
agreed definition. Nonetheless, some of the empirical finance literature consider it as a 
significant increase of linkages between markets after a country is hit by a shock (Forbes 
and Rigobon, 2002) or the excessive co-movements that cannot be explained by 
fundamental factors (Bekaert et al., 2014). Such descriptions are different from what the 
models adopted in the chapter will pick up. Also, following the approach of Anderson et al. 
(2010), the terms contagion, transmission, spillover are used interchangeably here. In 
addition, to overcome the limitations faced with other datasets, this chapter will consider 
the K-NI series, which will include eight industry groups: Agro & Food (AGRO), Consumer 
Products (CONSUMP), Financials (FINCIAL), Industrials (INDUS), Property & 
Construction (PROPCON), Resources (RESOURC), Services (SERVICE), and Technology 
(TECH). 
 
Besides, to supplement the results based on the bubble contagion models, the second part of 
this chapter also analyses the possible relationships between pairs of industry groups by 
utilising the bivariate Granger Causality tests based on both the returns and relative bubble 
sizes. They will offer evidence of whether a return of or a bubble in an industry group 
precedes that of another industry group.  More particularly, while the test on returns would 
suggest whether the return in one industry group tends to follow that of another industry 
group, the test on bubbles might give some indication as to whether a bubble in one industry 
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group may trigger a bubble in another industry group. In addition, as compared the structural 
models used in the first section, the standard Granger Causality tests are set up with the 
vector autoregressive (VAR) specifications – which do not include a regime-switching 
feature. Nonetheless, they do allow for impacts of lagged variables to be considered as well. 
 
The next section presents empirical evidence based on the contagion models discussed in 
Chapter 4: Model A, Model M, and Model J. As the Model J is nested with the more 
complete Model A, the comparison between results obtained from the two models are 
analysed next. The following section then discusses the evidence from the Granger 
Causality tests, and the last section concludes the chapter. 
 
7.2. Empirical Evidence 
 
This section discusses evidence from all three bubble contagion models discussed in the 
previous chapter, namely, Model A, Model M, and Model J. This section will also consider 
results from Granger Causality tests on industry groups’ returns and relative bubble terms. 
 
The data utilised in this chapter is prepared in the same fashion as in the previous chapters. 
It covers the period starting from September 1988 or October 1988 until December 2012. 
The result tables will report the estimated coefficients from the regression, maximised log-
likelihood statistics, results from block exogeneity tests, and robustness checks against more 
parsimonious specifications including the basic speculative bubble models without 
transmission of bubbles and the simplified model types P, R, and V where trading volume 
terms are left out.   
 
7.2.1. Model including Data from All Industry Groups (Model A) 
  
Evidence from the model including data from all industry groups (Model A), as formalised 
in equations (44) to (47), is presented in Table 32. Average returns (𝛽𝑠𝑜
𝑖  and  𝛽𝑐𝑜
𝑖 ) and 
standard deviations ( 𝜎𝑠
𝑖  and  𝜎𝑐
𝑖)   are statistically significant in all industry groups. 
Specifically, the two regimes appear to be different as implied by the regime-switching 
speculative bubble model and the standard deviation in the surviving regime is smaller than 
that in the collapsing regime. For example, the parameters 𝛽𝑠𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑁  and 𝛽𝑐𝑜
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑁 for the 
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Property & Construction industry group are 1.0689 and 1.0030, respectively. They can be 
interpreted as the average net returns when there are no bubbles or abnormal trading volume 
in any of the other industry groups and are 6.89% and 0.30% in the surviving and collapsing 
regimes, respectively. Nonetheless, the average probability of bubble surviving parameters 
are not statistically significant for most industry groups, except for Industrials,  Property & 
Construction, and Technology – where the 𝛽𝑞𝑜 actually turns out to be negative. The precise 
probability can be calculated using the cumulative normal distribution function, for instance, 
the average bubble-surviving probability for the Property & Construction industry group 
when there are no bubbles or abnormal trading volume in all industry groups is 98.59%.   
 
The speculative bubble model also postulates that the bubbles should hurt returns when they 
do finally burst.  However, in several cases, 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗  <  𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗  although 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗 ’s are largely 
statistically insignificant. The impact of abnormal trading volume on returns in the surviving 
regime captured by 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗 is typically statistically significant. Nevertheless, the signs of the 
parameters tend to be mixed, though the theory predicts positive parameters as investors 
should be compensated for the additional risks. Consider, for example, the Property & 
Construction industry groups where 𝛽𝑠𝑏
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑁 , 𝛽𝑐𝑏
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑁  and  𝛽𝑠𝑣
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑁  are -0.2652, 
0.0191, and 0.1272, respectively, the parameters suggest that the existence of a bubble 
would reduce the expected returns in the surviving regime, but may increase returns when 
the bubble collapses although the estimate is not statistically significant. Precisely, when 
the relative bubble term is 0.5 or the bubble size is 50% of the actual price and there is no 
abnormal trading volume, the expected returns will change from 6.89% to -6.37% and 
7.85% in the surviving and collapsing regimes, respectively. These results are indeed quite 
puzzling. The model assumes that, though 𝛽𝑠𝑏  could be positive or negative, it should be 
larger than 𝛽𝑐𝑏, as investors would be punished when a bubble collapses. This problem is 
also found in many other industry groups such as Agro &Food, Financials, Industrials, 
Resources, and Services. It is likely due to the issue with maximum likelihood estimation, 
especially with a large number of parameters to be estimated. In fact, Anderson et al. (2010) 
presented a similar evidence in about half of the sectors in the S&P500 too. Nonetheless, 
the investors are compensated for additional risk when their holdings in the Property & 
Construction industry group observes abnormal trading volume. In this case, the expected 
return with trading volume in only the industry group increases by 50% and there is no 
bubble in any industry groups will be 13.25%. 
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Table 32: Model A, September 1989 – December 2012 (279 observations) 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Parameters Agro & Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
Constant 
𝛽𝑠𝑜 1.0987*** 1.0514*** 1.2832*** 1.0742*** 1.0689*** 1.0735*** 1.0022*** 1.3674*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜 1.0044*** 0.9896*** 1.0115*** 0.9981*** 1.0030*** 1.0054*** 1.0001*** 0.9749*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  0.1786 1.6169 1.8264 2.4750* 2.1941** 1.3467 4.6581 -1.6249** 
𝜎𝑠  0.0064*** 0.0046*** 0.0038*** 0.0205*** 0.0201*** 0.0305*** 0.0177*** 0.0020*** 
𝜎𝑐  0.0673*** 0.0678*** 0.1211*** 0.0796*** 0.1114*** 0.0999*** 0.0753*** 0.0923*** 
Agro & Food 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.1848*** -0.1682*** 0.2599*** -0.0324 -0.1213*** -0.1650*** -0.0424** -0.4001*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.1010*** -0.0953*** 0.2312*** 0.0473** -0.0474** 0.0747* 0.0948*** -0.1757*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏 0.0088 0.0023 -0.0132 0.0216 0.0293 -0.0428* 0.0061 0.0307 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -2.3020 -0.1202 -1.6281 0.5164 -1.1672 -1.4253 1.1400 -0.9573 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  1.4327** -0.7317 -1.1130 -0.2968 -0.8097 -2.6242 3.5222 0.0299 
Consumer 
Products 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.4546*** 0.4534*** 0.2644*** 0.3466*** 0.3237*** 0.6304*** 0.1917*** -0.3925*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  -0.1091*** -0.0399*** 0.0775*** -0.0723*** 0.0192 0.1063*** -0.1144*** -0.0014** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏 -0.0399 -0.0906*** -0.0836* -0.0556* -0.1353*** 0.0000 -0.0339 -0.1466*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -0.4386 -1.3892 -1.2487 -1.0429 -1.5432 -0.7335 0.8317 0.2717 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  0.5185 -1.2815 -0.9505 0.1478 -0.4129 -2.2406** -8.9467 0.2412 
Financials 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.3907*** -0.1155*** -0.4252*** -0.3110*** -0.2619*** -0.1968*** -0.1614*** -0.4908*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  -0.1188*** -0.0098* -0.0748*** -0.0727*** -0.1185*** -0.0295* -0.0673*** 0.0735*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏 0.0147 0.0009 -0.0743* 0.0148 -0.0230 -0.0472 -0.0021 0.0324 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -1.7066 -1.0130 -1.1952 -1.2530 -1.3674 -3.3413 -13.9377 -0.0451 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -0.7669 -1.0124 -0.7998 -0.6970 -1.0510*** 1.1378 -0.5931 -0.0982 
Industrials 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0461*** -0.0613*** 0.2769*** -0.0985*** -0.1558*** -0.1244*** -0.0004 -0.0077 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  -0.0528*** 0.0922*** -0.0248*** -0.1592*** -0.0862*** -0.1543*** -0.0826*** 0.3937*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏 -0.0291*** 0.0010 0.0063 -0.0086 -0.0070 0.0246 -0.0173 -0.0064 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -3.2178 -1.2524 -1.2911 -1.6241 -1.0153 1.4339 -1.1303 -2.4458 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  0.0354 -0.5352 -0.7871 -0.3239 -1.2900** -3.8535*** 0.0111 -0.9571** 
Property & 
Construction 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.1546*** -0.1993*** -0.2476*** -0.0029 -0.2652*** -0.1958*** -0.0049 -0.2088*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  -0.0065** 0.0086 0.0146* 0.0992*** 0.1272*** -0.0151 0.0185 0.2597*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏 -0.0118 -0.0001 0.0140 0.0317* 0.0191 0.0057 -0.0005 -0.0169 
𝛽𝑞𝑏  -4.0399*** -0.8065 -1.8897 -3.0663*** -1.3015** -5.3895** -11.3204 3.2544*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -1.9090** -0.3683 -0.8280 -1.7504*** -1.2925 -3.2569 -22.8919 0.4006 
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Table 32 (continued) 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variables 
Parameters Agro & Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
Resources 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.1847*** -0.1025*** -0.2984*** -0.1628*** -0.2725*** -0.0895*** -0.1351*** -0.2222*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0790*** 0.0364*** 0.0184*** 0.0542*** 0.0676*** 0.0665*** 0.0387*** -0.1955*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏 0.0034 -0.0086 -0.0203 -0.0206 -0.0131 -0.0274 0.0011 0.0177 
𝛽𝑞𝑏 -1.0978*** -2.1092* -1.3658 -1.7617 -1.2118 -3.8582* -0.5558 -0.2680 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -4.2623*** -1.9200* 0.3094 -0.7054 0.0900 0.3601 -0.5473 -0.0035 
Services 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0459*** -0.0222*** -0.1819*** -0.0419 -0.0226 -0.0063 -0.0463*** 0.7660*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0033 -0.0016 -0.0539*** -0.0694*** -0.1571*** -0.0324 -0.0227** -0.0174*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏 0.0050 0.0189 0.0687** 0.0043 0.0330 0.0203 0.0186 0.0318 
𝛽𝑞𝑏 0.1301 -1.5447 -1.2394 -1.3872 -1.6785** -0.7469 -12.3864 0.8483 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -1.6371 -0.3464 -0.8687*** -1.1334 -1.5549*** -4.2216* 0.8570 1.5116*** 
Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑏  0.0651*** 0.1756*** 0.1873*** 0.1123*** 0.2935*** 0.1762*** 0.1038*** 0.5208*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣  -0.0005 0.0516*** -0.1194*** -0.0575*** -0.0865*** -0.1989*** -0.0397*** -0.0208*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏 -0.0055 -0.0146** -0.0155 -0.0225** -0.0218* -0.0126 -0.0226** -0.0271** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏 -0.3542*** -3.0833** -2.0748** -1.1807 -1.8851** -2.2425 -8.3648 -3.0799*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -3.5042*** -1.3083 -0.6998 -0.7009* -0.8624 -2.8869*** -8.4801 -0.2415 
Log-Likelihood 415.1926 402.9800 248.2893 349.0687 254.6115 290.3846 385.3936 313.6687 
Block Exogeneity Tests         
Agro & Food 72.9320*** 17.5187*** 18.7061*** 3.6680 5.2475 5.5648 21.0432*** 254.2627*** 
Consumer Products 33.9604*** 10.0049* 17.4550*** 4.3375 13.4040** 3.8528 2.7848 134.8473*** 
Financials 68.9821*** 10.1642* 12.7034** 1.1347 10.5120* 5.3516 0.8926 259.3127*** 
Industrials 28.9540*** 9.7431* 4.9525 16.7355*** 9.1000 6.3511 8.4790 117.9626*** 
Property & Construction 36.0358*** 15.8184*** 51.7263*** 5.5404 13.6857** 3.1787 3.8349 153.3607*** 
Resources 43.2803*** 6.5610 5.1514 12.5594** 2.6017 8.9403 8.5208 137.6160*** 
Services 7.6133 0.7574 0.7932 5.8186 2.4082 0.9569 6.2182 144.6844*** 
Technology 49.0578*** 8.3403 15.0904*** 3.3184 18.3908*** 2.3977 25.4814*** 120.1936*** 
Robustness Checks         
Volatility regimes 115.1684*** 54.3308* 64.9356** 73.5811*** 58.2054** 64.1225** 107.1538*** 181.7257*** 
Mixtures of normals 114.3249*** 53.2097* 64.6697*** 71.6114*** 57.9085** 64.1213*** 107.0357*** 178.8365*** 
Fads     114.6461*** 51.2050 64.8646*** 68.1712*** 58.1729** 60.6726** 106.7559*** 175.0831*** 
VNS     111.5105*** 41.8612 50.4839* 62.4039*** 49.3166* 56.8876** 97.2340*** 157.8532*** 
Volume-augmented  101.5108*** 39.7789 46.1140* 56.5366** 48.0764* 55.0621** 84.1782*** 153.0974*** 
Note: Results based on the Model A [equations (44) to (47)] ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Consider again the probability equation, not only the average probability of a bubble 
surviving in the next period that seems to be statistically insignificant, but also the impact 
of relative bubble size and abnormal trading volume shown by 𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗
𝑖  and 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗
𝑖  as well. But, 
they usually have the expected negative signs. Specifically, the 𝛽𝑞𝑏
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑁 and 𝛽𝑞𝑣
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑁are 
-1.3015 and -1.2925, respectively. They mean the expected surviving probability with 
relative bubble term of 0.5 would drop to just 54.34%, while the expected surviving 
probability with an abnormal trading volume of 50% may drop to 54.79% but the estimate 
is statistically insignificant. The effects from bubbles and trading volume in other industry 
groups can be interpreted in a similar manner. 
 
Robustness checks compare Model A to the basic speculative bubble models without 
transmission channels from other industry groups. It is predominantly better, as the test is 
rejected, except for Consumer Products industry group where the Model A captures the 
additional variability of returns than the volatility-regimes and mixtures-of-normals models 
but not the fads, the VNS, or the volume-augmented models.   
 
The main result for this section is the block exogeneity tests where linkages between 
industry groups can be detected. This is summarised in Table 33. The transmission goes from 
the bubbles from the industry group shown in the columns (independent variable) to the 
next-period gross return of industry group listed in the rows (dependent variable). 
 
Firstly, the shaded diagonal shows the effect of the bubble in a particular industry group on 
its next-period return. The tests cannot be rejected in Resources and Services industry 
groups. This is consistent with the previous chapter where it picked up some weak evidence 
of bubbles in both industry groups.  
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Table 33: Block Exogeneity Test for Model A 
Model 
A 
Independent Variables 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
 
Agro & 
Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
Agro & 
Food 
*** *** *** *** *** ***  *** 
Consumer 
Products 
*** * * * ***    
Financials *** *** **  ***   *** 
Industrials    ***  **   
Property & 
Construction 
 ** *  **   *** 
Resources         
Services ***       *** 
Technology *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Other key findings from this table are that the Resources industry group is not subject to 
bubble contagion from any other industry groups, though its bubbles will influence returns 
in Agro & Food, Industrials, and Technology industry groups. In fact, Technology industry 
groups appear to be sensitive to bubbles from all industry groups. This can be interpreted as 
when there are bubbles in any industry group, investors will later reallocate their holdings 
to Technology and push up returns, which is quite accurate. Meanwhile, bubbles form 
Technology stocks will spread to other industry groups, except for Consumer Products, 
Industrials and Resources. Another industry group with very limited linkages with others is 
Services. It is only affected by Agro & Food and Technology industry groups and passes on 
bubbles to Technology industry group only.  
 
The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis in Thailand was believed to be partially caused by a real 
estate boom in the early 1990s and a banking crisis. Bubbles in Property & Construction 
industry group were revealed to be moving on to Agro & Food, Consumer Products, 
Financials, and Technology, while its returns receive impacts of bubbles from the same list 
of industry groups, except Agro & Food. Whereas, the Financials industry group, which 
include Banking and Finance & Securities sectors, is linked with Agro & Food, Consumer 
Products, Property & Construction, and Technology industry groups. 
 
Finally, Table 34 details the Model A and the simplified models where abnormal volume 
terms are dropped. Robustness checks compare the full model to model types A-P, A-R and 
A-V 
 
The tests against Model A-V are rejected in six out of eight industry groups, while the tests 
against Model A-R are not rejected in five industry groups. Moreover, there is one industry 
group which fails to reject tests against both Model A-R and A-P. That leaves two industry 
groups where the full Model A is simultaneously better than all three simpler model types. 
This suggests that the impact of bubble contagion captured by the abnormal trading volume 
in Model A seems to be coming through the return equation rather than the probability 
equation. In other words, when bubbles from other industry groups are contagious, they will 
influence return, rather than affecting the likelihood of whether the bubble in the industry 
group will collapse in the next period.  
.   
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Table 34: Comparison of Model A 
  Agro & Food Consumer Products 
  Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0987*** 0.9969*** 1.0188*** 0.9648*** 1.0514*** 1.0642*** 1.0107*** 1.0219*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏 
AGR -0.1848*** -0.7292*** -0.0476*** 0.1286*** -0.1682*** -0.0880*** -0.0283*** 0.0276* 
CON 0.4546*** 0.3149*** 0.1230*** 0.1612*** 0.4534*** 0.4381*** 0.1210*** 0.0861** 
FIN -0.3907*** 0.3722*** 0.1330*** -0.1698*** -0.1155*** -0.1211*** 0.0597*** 0.0604** 
IND 0.0461*** -0.2856*** -0.2277*** -0.0633*** -0.0613*** -0.0632*** -0.0413*** -0.1185*** 
PRO 0.1546*** -0.0515*** -0.0679*** -0.0477*** -0.1993*** -0.2071*** -0.0590*** -0.0388*** 
RES -0.1847*** -0.3648*** -0.0470*** 0.1258*** -0.1025*** -0.1045*** -0.0602*** 0.0039 
SER -0.0459*** 0.1798*** -0.0330*** -0.1010*** -0.0222*** -0.0196 -0.0217*** -0.0230* 
TEC 0.0651*** 0.3315*** 0.0414*** -0.0076*** 0.1756*** 0.1652*** 0.0054*** 0.0231*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣 
AGR 0.1010***  0.0383***  -0.0953***  0.0417***  
CON -0.1091***  0.0119***  -0.0399***  -0.0182***  
FIN -0.1188***  -0.0281***  -0.0098*  -0.0245***  
IND -0.0528***  0.0288***  0.0922***  -0.0002  
PRO -0.0065**  0.0310***  0.0086  -0.0476***  
RES 0.0790***  0.0043***  0.0364***  0.0127***  
SER 0.0033  -0.1024***  -0.0016  -0.0072***  
TEC -0.0005  -0.0116***  0.0516***  0.0041***  
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0044*** 1.0035*** 1.0017*** 1.0116*** 0.9896*** 0.9872*** 0.9914*** 0.9873*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏 
AGR 0.0088 0.0057 -0.0038 0.0007 0.0023 0.0063 0.0079 0.0028 
CON -0.0399 -0.0559** -0.0409 -0.0409 -0.0906*** -0.0984*** -0.0951*** -0.1057*** 
FIN 0.0147 -0.0020 -0.0102 -0.0142 0.0009 0.0068 -0.0001 0.0025 
IND -0.0291*** -0.0144 -0.0144 -0.0224** 0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0052 
PRO -0.0118 -0.0063 0.0073 -0.0023 -0.0001 -0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0075 
RES 0.0034 -0.0007 0.0015 -0.0070 -0.0086 -0.0065 -0.0083 -0.0082 
SER 0.0050 0.0119 0.0054 0.0202 0.0189 0.0152 0.0185 0.0252 
TEC -0.0055 -0.0109 -0.0187** -0.0070 -0.0146** -0.0151** -0.0114 -0.0127 
 
Note: Results based on the Model A and Model A-P, A-R, and A-V as discussed in p. 93. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 34 (continued) 
  Agro & Food Consumer Products 
  Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  0.1786 -2.2885 2.4223*** 3.7969*** 1.6169 2.5496 2.1062*** 4.6817*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏 
AGR -2.3020 -3.5619 -0.4807 -3.8547** -0.1202 -4.3165 -0.7173 -6.1121** 
CON -0.4386 -2.5572 -1.4041 -1.3323 -1.3892 -0.7523 -1.2945 -11.5531** 
FIN -1.7066 1.8865 -1.4451 -3.2888* -1.0130 -4.4857 -1.3979* 5.4288** 
IND -3.2178 -3.3676 -2.1531** -1.4375 -1.2524 -0.6072 -1.8095** -11.5500*** 
PRO -4.0399*** -3.6726 -1.4102** -1.7762* -0.8065 -2.8722 -0.8898* 2.6464** 
RES -1.0978*** -2.1087 -2.3836*** -3.4830** -2.1092* -6.2850*** -1.3513** -11.4979*** 
SER 0.1301 -2.1380 -0.6374 -1.8499 -1.5447 0.9096 -1.1678 3.5606** 
TEC -0.3542*** -0.3650 -1.2778*** -1.3892*** -3.0833** -7.2576** -1.1796*** 1.9640** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣 
AGR 1.4327** 1.6037   -0.7317 -5.6724**   
CON 0.5185 -2.5237   -1.2815 -1.0238   
FIN -0.7669 -2.1633   -1.0124 -2.9972   
IND 0.0354 0.6512   -0.5352 -0.3143   
PRO -1.9090** 1.9022   -0.3683 2.0480   
RES -4.2623*** -6.0878**   -1.9200* -1.9576*   
SER -1.6371 -2.2862   -0.3464 -1.4479   
TEC -3.5042*** -3.6918*   -1.3083 -7.8244***   
Log-Likelihood        415.1926       405.6990       417.9935       377.3401       402.9800    391.5178       428.1151      416.1784  
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 34 (continued) 
  Agro & Food Consumer Products 
  Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V 
Block Exogeneity Tests         
Agro & Food 72.9320*** 112.8324*** 38.1354*** 109.4456*** 17.5187*** 11.0712** 15.8740*** 10.7569** 
Consumer Products 33.9604*** 97.1856*** 45.6276*** 8.1071** 10.0049* 15.6927*** 5.4624 9.9881** 
Financials 68.9821*** 112.9123*** 59.3164*** 16.3020*** 10.1642* 8.5315* 6.9417 4.7571 
Industrials 28.9540*** 116.7294*** 115.3164*** 11.8000*** 9.7431* 1.5704 67.0272*** 3.0949 
Property & Construction 36.0358*** 112.8567*** 7.6750 19.7580*** 15.8184*** 17.2277*** 72.6733*** 9.6351** 
Resources 43.2803*** 112.9098*** 3.2426 4.7712 6.5610 66.4410*** 59.3588*** 24.3825*** 
Services 7.6133 97.0137*** 28.1004*** 0.0468 0.7574 14.8152*** 24.9475*** 7.8241** 
Technology 49.0578*** 114.7093*** 53.7470*** 5.9637 8.3403 67.0137*** 29.9457*** 12.2421*** 
Robustness Checks         
Volatility regimes 115.1684*** 96.1812*** 120.7702*** 39.4633** 54.3308* 31.4063 104.6010*** 80.7276*** 
Mixtures of normals 114.3249*** 95.3377*** 119.9266*** 38.6198** 53.2097* 30.2852 103.4799*** 79.6065*** 
Fads     114.6461*** 95.6589*** 120.2479*** 38.9411** 51.2050 28.2805 101.4752*** 77.6018*** 
VNS     111.5105*** 92.5233*** 117.1123*** 35.8054** 41.8612 18.9367 92.1314*** 68.2580*** 
Volume-augmented  101.5108*** 82.5236*** 107.1126*** 25.8057 39.7789 16.8545 90.0491*** 66.1757*** 
Model A-P 18.9872**    22.9245***    
Model A-R 0.0000    0.0000    
Model A-V 75.7051*** 56.7179*** 81.3069***  0.0000 0.0000 23.8734***  
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 34 (continued) 
 
Financials Industrials 
Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.2832*** 0.9412*** 0.9967*** 1.0048*** 1.0742*** 0.8805*** 1.0080*** 0.9947*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏 
AGR 0.2599*** -0.0016 0.0457*** -0.0059 -0.0324 0.1827*** 0.1214*** 0.0143 
CON 0.2644*** 0.0844*** 0.0199*** 0.0637 0.3466*** -0.2240*** 0.0294*** 0.3757*** 
FIN -0.4252*** 0.3060*** 0.0245*** -0.0376 -0.3110*** 0.1417*** -0.1076*** 0.0698*** 
IND 0.2769*** -0.0069 -0.0785*** -0.0075 -0.0985*** -0.1324*** -0.2915*** -0.0748*** 
PRO -0.2476*** 0.1606*** -0.0535*** 0.0285 -0.0029 -0.2637*** -0.1591*** -0.2796*** 
RES -0.2984*** -0.0624*** 0.0909*** -0.0142 -0.1628*** 0.2346*** 0.1496*** 0.0003 
SER -0.1819*** 0.0177*** 0.0638*** -0.0366 -0.0419 -0.2815*** -0.1494*** -0.1127*** 
TEC 0.1873*** -0.0220*** -0.0252*** -0.0148 0.1123*** -0.0636*** 0.0312*** 0.0493*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣 
AGR 0.2312***  -0.0071***  0.0473**  -0.0429***  
CON 0.0775***  0.0008**  -0.0723***  0.0429***  
FIN -0.0748***  -0.0591***  -0.0727***  -0.0276***  
IND -0.0248***  0.0579***  -0.1592***  0.0216***  
PRO 0.0146*  0.0425***  0.0992***  0.0673***  
RES 0.0184***  0.0718***  0.0542***  0.0303***  
SER -0.0539***  -0.0223***  -0.0694***  -0.1369***  
TEC -0.1194***  0.0217***  -0.0575***  -0.0450***  
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0115*** 1.0321*** 1.0208*** 1.0335*** 0.9981*** 1.0045*** 1.0044*** 1.0054*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏 
AGR -0.0132 0.0046 0.0024 -0.0035 0.0216 0.0190 0.0132 0.0150 
CON -0.0836* -0.0922* -0.1156** -0.1471* -0.0556* -0.0455 -0.0464 -0.0502 
FIN -0.0743* -0.0841** -0.0833** -0.1389* 0.0148 0.0012 -0.0063 -0.0084 
IND 0.0063 -0.0005 0.0030 -0.0033 -0.0086 -0.0109 -0.0069 -0.0083 
PRO 0.0140 0.0041 0.0080 -0.0040 0.0317* 0.0286* 0.0292* 0.0274* 
RES -0.0203 -0.0338* -0.0293 -0.0460 -0.0206 -0.0189 -0.0192 -0.0222* 
SER 0.0687** 0.0826*** 0.0829*** 0.1499** 0.0043 0.0136 0.0186 0.0277 
TEC -0.0155 0.0039 -0.0038 0.0483 -0.0225** -0.0155* -0.0174* -0.0154* 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 34 (continued) 
  Financials Industrials 
  Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  1.8264 1.1937 2.3846*** -0.6341 2.4750* 1.7727 2.4975*** 1.7092** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏 
AGR -1.6281 -1.6702 -1.3437 -0.4181 0.5164 -1.3749 -1.7016 -1.4134 
CON -1.2487 -1.6576 -1.0823 -3.2117 -1.0429 -1.4174 -1.3028 -3.2823 
FIN -1.1952 -1.9603 -1.0031 1.1187 -1.2530 -1.1717 -2.1238** -1.6054 
IND -1.2911 -2.9381 -1.1657 -1.5986* -1.6241 -1.6456 -0.9870 -2.2327* 
PRO -1.8897 -0.4835 -1.7301** -0.7940 -3.0663*** -1.9300 -0.5064 -2.8039** 
RES -1.3658 -1.6619* -2.0119*** -0.6311 -1.7617 -2.1229** -1.4586** -2.6983** 
SER -1.2394 -1.5092 -1.5644 0.5731 -1.3872 -1.7472 -1.8055* 2.1829* 
TEC -2.0748** -0.7076 -1.1910*** 3.3336*** -1.1807 -0.8462 -1.5692*** -0.1680 
𝛽𝑞𝑣 
AGR -1.1130 0.1102   -0.2968 -0.7982   
CON -0.9505 -0.1295   0.1478 -0.5586   
FIN -0.7998 -0.6236   -0.6970 0.0676   
IND -0.7871 0.0094   -0.3239 0.2933   
PRO -0.8280 -0.3168   -1.7504*** -0.4649   
RES 0.3094 -1.0921   -0.7054 -0.4153   
SER -0.8687*** 0.3792   -1.1334 -0.4724   
TEC -0.6998 -1.6928*   -0.7009* -0.0987   
Log-Likelihood        248.2893       218.9430       260.6031       252.8735       349.0687    342.1866       378.9970      332.3855  
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 34 (continued) 
  Financials Industrials 
  Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V 
Block Exogeneity Tests         
Agro & Food 18.7061*** 0.6923 19.3102*** 0.4367 3.6680 7.2759 41.2954*** 2.5078 
Consumer Products 17.4550*** 14.7459*** 32.3384*** 5.7683 4.3375 10.7713** 4.5980 28.0676*** 
Financials 12.7034** 4.6693 20.3303*** 5.7989 1.1347 32.4066*** 68.6604*** 4.6712 
Industrials 4.9525 6.3597 70.2641*** 3.9659 16.7355*** 36.6860*** 84.6700*** 17.4384*** 
Property & Construction 51.7263*** 29.7565*** 66.1089*** 3.5542 5.5404 79.8489*** 65.9483*** 7.2706* 
Resources 5.1514 102.3320*** 40.4674*** 2.1432 12.5594** 16.2748*** 21.7355*** 9.6396** 
Services 0.7932 0.5212 37.3950*** 6.5774* 5.8186 35.3935*** 19.2447*** 20.5146*** 
Technology 15.0904*** 34.3972*** 67.4655*** 5.4896 3.3184 10.2157** 16.8362*** 21.8907*** 
Robustness Checks         
Volatility regimes 64.9356** 6.2430 89.5632*** 74.1040*** 73.5811*** 59.8170*** 133.4378*** 40.2149** 
Mixtures of normals 64.6697*** 5.9771 89.2973*** 73.8381*** 71.6114*** 57.8472*** 131.4681*** 38.2451** 
Fads     64.8646*** 6.1719 89.4922*** 74.0330*** 68.1712*** 54.4070*** 128.0279*** 34.8049* 
VNS     50.4839* 0.0000 75.1116*** 59.6523*** 62.4039*** 48.6397** 122.2606*** 29.0377 
Volume-augmented  46.1140* 0.0000 70.7416*** 55.2824*** 56.5366** 42.7724** 116.3933*** 23.1703 
Model A-P 58.6926***    13.7642*    
Model A-R 0.0000    0.0000    
Model A-V 0.0000 0.0000 15.4592*  33.3662*** 19.6021** 93.2230***  
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 34 (continued) 
 
Property & Construction Resources 
Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0689*** 0.9292*** 0.9443*** 1.0343*** 1.0735*** 1.1242*** 0.9898*** 1.0623*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏 
AGR -0.1213*** -0.1238*** -0.1272*** 0.1186*** -0.1650*** -0.0334*** 0.1682*** 0.0849*** 
CON 0.3237*** 0.2808*** -0.0539*** -0.1336*** 0.6304*** 0.1413*** -0.1527*** 0.1567*** 
FIN -0.2619*** -0.2427*** -0.0819*** -0.4192*** -0.1968*** -0.5113*** 0.0873*** -0.2342*** 
IND -0.1558*** -0.0810*** -0.2607*** 0.1099*** -0.1244*** 0.0849*** -0.2834*** 0.3487*** 
PRO -0.2652*** -0.5083*** -0.1532*** -0.1411*** -0.1958*** 0.0850*** -0.0412*** 0.3651*** 
RES -0.2725*** 0.1853*** 0.2470*** 0.0951*** -0.0895*** -0.0363*** 0.1070*** -0.0442*** 
SER -0.0226 -0.0831*** 0.0219*** 0.1207*** -0.0063 -0.0306*** -0.1214*** -0.0797*** 
TEC 0.2935*** 0.0668*** -0.0534*** 0.0399* 0.1762*** -0.0817*** 0.1579*** 0.0772*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣 
AGR -0.0474**  -0.0072***  0.0747*  -0.1868***  
CON 0.0192  0.0121***  0.1063***  0.1029***  
FIN -0.1185***  0.0575***  -0.0295*  -0.1189***  
IND -0.0862***  0.0276***  -0.1543***  0.1382***  
PRO 0.1272***  0.0175***  -0.0151  0.0533***  
RES 0.0676***  0.0114***  0.0665***  0.0683***  
SER -0.1571***  -0.1572***  -0.0324  -0.0627***  
TEC -0.0865***  -0.0229***  -0.1989***  -0.0543***  
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0030*** 1.0149*** 1.0087*** 1.0073*** 1.0054*** 1.0129*** 1.0137*** 1.0134*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏 
AGR 0.0293 0.0172 0.0090 0.0135 -0.0428* -0.0436** -0.0494** -0.0454** 
CON -0.1353*** -0.1291*** -0.1347*** -0.1160** 0.0000 0.0348 0.0197 0.0333 
FIN -0.0230 -0.0464 -0.0405 -0.0282 -0.0472 -0.0301 -0.0498 -0.0357 
IND -0.0070 -0.0038 -0.0031 -0.0100 0.0246 0.0155 0.0240 0.0165 
PRO 0.0191 0.0165 0.0016 0.0095 0.0057 -0.0048 -0.0031 -0.0029 
RES -0.0131 -0.0227 -0.0222 -0.0207 -0.0274 -0.0110 -0.0232 -0.0127 
SER 0.0330 0.0545** 0.0677** 0.0481 0.0203 0.0136 0.0289 0.0165 
TEC -0.0218* -0.0119 -0.0123 -0.0133 -0.0126 -0.0063 -0.0101 -0.0079 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 34 (continued) 
  Property & Construction Resources 
  Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  2.1941** 1.3897 2.5854*** 1.6091* 1.3467 1.6219 2.1100*** 1.3452 
𝛽𝑞𝑏 
AGR -1.1672 -0.9232 -0.8681 -1.4234 -1.4253 -1.2743 -1.8882 -0.9756 
CON -1.5432 -1.8168 -1.6056 2.1697 -0.7335 -1.4793 -1.8360 -3.6339 
FIN -1.3674 -2.8114 -1.5654* -2.9338** -3.3413 -1.3918 -1.4442 -0.5994 
IND -1.0153 -1.7206 -1.3943** -0.9135 1.4339 -1.6512 -1.4522 -0.6307 
PRO -1.3015** -1.1481 -0.9358 -0.5811 -5.3895** -0.8792 -0.7726 -3.0854** 
RES -1.2118 -0.1625 -2.3339*** -0.6169 -3.8582* -2.1848** -1.2180* -3.0799** 
SER -1.6785** -2.8660 -1.4788 -1.0711 -0.7469 -1.2221 -1.3179 1.1344 
TEC -1.8851** -1.9756** -1.3803*** -1.9876* -2.2425 -1.3755** -1.1604*** -0.7426 
𝛽𝑞𝑣 
AGR -0.8097 -1.0006   -2.6242 -0.4665   
CON -0.4129 -0.4367   -2.2406** -1.1587*   
FIN -1.0510*** 0.2631   1.1378 -0.1992   
IND -1.2900** 0.2121   -3.8535*** 0.1771   
PRO -1.2925 -0.5715   -3.2569 0.0418   
RES 0.0900 -0.7939   0.3601 -0.1511   
SER -1.5549*** -0.7027   -4.2216* -0.6629   
TEC -0.8624 -0.3953   -2.8869*** -0.1579   
Log-Likelihood        254.6115       248.3794       285.9656       237.2151       290.3846    280.4672       309.2243      279.4777  
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 34 (continued) 
  Property & Construction Resources 
  Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V 
Block Exogeneity Tests         
Agro & Food 5.2475 117.4417*** 26.4357*** 35.1048*** 5.5648 47.8770*** 54.9832*** 67.3763*** 
Consumer Products 13.4040** 44.0330*** 28.8016*** 10.2477** 3.8528 25.0583*** 67.0287*** 67.0681*** 
Financials 10.5120* 103.2577*** 55.1179*** 20.7170*** 5.3516 17.2778*** 91.9421*** 63.9130*** 
Industrials 9.1000 32.1672*** 3.6795 17.6444*** 6.3511 4.9044 7.4298 67.1053*** 
Property & Construction 13.6857** 7.1119 55.3221*** 34.5982*** 3.1787 46.7495*** 68.3160*** 53.8454*** 
Resources 2.6017 21.9905*** 53.9021*** 20.7215*** 8.9403 4.5555 69.8393*** 42.7788*** 
Services 2.4082 5.1852 39.3857*** 38.0017*** 0.9569 8.1696* 21.8164*** 66.4716*** 
Technology 18.3908*** 37.3376*** 46.0298*** 21.4293*** 2.3977 11.5842** 12.5051** 41.2611*** 
Robustness Checks         
Volatility regimes 58.2054** 45.7412* 120.9136*** 23.4127 64.1225** 44.2877* 101.8020*** 42.3087** 
Mixtures of normals 57.9085** 45.4443* 120.6167*** 23.1158 64.1213*** 44.2864* 101.8007*** 42.3075** 
Fads     58.1729** 45.7087* 120.8811*** 23.3802 60.6726** 40.8377 98.3520*** 38.8587** 
VNS     49.3166* 36.8524 112.0247*** 14.5239 56.8876** 37.0528 94.5671*** 35.0738** 
Volume-augmented  48.0764* 35.6122 110.7846*** 13.2837 55.0621** 35.2272 92.7416*** 33.2483** 
Model A-P 12.4642    19.8349**    
Model A-R 0.0000    0.0000    
Model A-V 34.7927*** 22.3285*** 97.5009***  21.8138*** 1.9790 59.4933***  
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 34 (continued) 
 
Services Technology 
Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0022*** 1.0160*** 1.0383*** 1.0073*** 1.3674*** 0.9794*** 0.6034*** 0.9742*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏 
AGR -0.0424** 0.1024*** -0.0550*** 0.2949*** -0.4001*** 0.0221 0.5993** 0.0384* 
CON 0.1917*** -0.2026*** 0.0999*** 0.0958*** -0.3925*** -0.1208*** -0.1492 -0.1288*** 
FIN -0.1614*** -0.0226** -0.1571*** -0.6342*** -0.4908*** 0.0123 0.5431*** 0.0435 
IND -0.0004 -0.0103 -0.0273*** 0.1163*** -0.0077 -0.0079 0.7328*** -0.0125 
PRO -0.0049 0.0871*** 0.2661*** 0.1041*** -0.2088*** -0.0035 -1.0100*** -0.0064 
RES -0.1351*** -0.0744*** -0.1613*** 0.2215*** -0.2222*** 0.0147 -0.0016 0.0133 
SER -0.0463*** 0.0296* -0.1519*** -0.1156*** 0.7660*** 0.0204 1.7133*** 0.0110 
TEC 0.1038*** -0.0380** 0.0307*** 0.0745*** 0.5208*** -0.0285*** 1.2502*** -0.0270*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣 
AGR 0.0948***  0.0678***  -0.1757***  0.0860***  
CON -0.1144***  0.0071***  -0.0014**  0.3018***  
FIN -0.0673***  -0.1050***  0.0735***  -0.0638  
IND -0.0826***  -0.0650***  0.3937***  -0.0117  
PRO 0.0185  -0.0527***  0.2597***  0.2610  
RES 0.0387***  0.0906***  -0.1955***  0.1507***  
SER -0.0227**  -0.0929***  -0.0174***  0.0036  
TEC -0.0397***  -0.0064***  -0.0208***  -1.0211***  
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0001*** 1.0011*** 1.0042*** 1.0051*** 0.9749*** 1.7882*** 0.9905*** 1.5891*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏 
AGR 0.0061 -0.0080 0.0041 -0.0045 0.0307 0.0522 0.0176 0.1609*** 
CON -0.0339 -0.0282 -0.0416 -0.0520* -0.1466*** -0.5248* -0.1903*** -0.0038 
FIN -0.0021 -0.0089 -0.0094 -0.0250 0.0324 -0.5386** -0.0364 -0.8861*** 
IND -0.0173 -0.0122 -0.0204* -0.0128 -0.0064 0.6545* -0.0019 -0.1800*** 
PRO -0.0005 -0.0028 -0.0063 -0.0011 -0.0169 -0.5017** -0.0015 -0.2003*** 
RES 0.0011 0.0009 -0.0064 -0.0070 0.0177 -0.9912*** 0.0099 -0.3549*** 
SER 0.0186 0.0256 0.0350* 0.0414** 0.0318 0.5463** 0.0493** 0.5940*** 
TEC -0.0226** -0.0220*** -0.0167** -0.0201** -0.0271** 0.5667** -0.0292*** 1.0964*** 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 34 (continued) 
  Services Technology 
  Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V 
𝛽𝑞𝑜  4.6581 -0.0063 1.7805** 5.0176*** -1.6249** 4.5075* 1.5893* 1.9396*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏 
AGR 1.1400 -2.0790 0.1340 -3.7902* -0.9573 -0.0890 -2.5011* 0.3595 
CON 0.8317 0.4211 -0.8718 3.5833 0.2717 -0.8679 -1.7116 0.7967 
FIN -13.9377 -1.9799 -1.7558* -2.6757* -0.0451 -1.0861 -1.1858 -1.7084* 
IND -1.1303 0.5504 -0.3851 -2.9064* -2.4458 -2.2069 -0.9206 -0.3483 
PRO -11.3204 -0.2978 -1.0223 -2.3585* 3.2544*** -0.3781 -0.4220 -0.9492 
RES -0.5558 -3.7122** -1.1315 -3.5925** -0.2680 -0.4687 -0.8187 -0.0377 
SER -12.3864 -2.9560 -2.2052** -4.5789** 0.8483 -1.1941 -1.9741 0.4222 
TEC -8.3648 -4.6679* -1.8690*** -3.0355*** -3.0799*** 3.0970* -1.2826*** 1.2768** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣 
AGR 3.5222 -1.0922   0.0299 2.1254   
CON -8.9467 -0.2193   0.2412 0.0377   
FIN -0.5931 -0.4694   -0.0982 -1.0795   
IND 0.0111 -2.2669   -0.9571** -0.0584   
PRO -22.8919 -0.1610   0.4006 -1.9398*   
RES -0.5473 -5.8614**   -0.0035 0.2467   
SER 0.8570 -0.9034   1.5116*** -2.5450*   
TEC -8.4801 -2.4948   -0.2415 0.7640   
Log-Likelihood 385.39 347.72 376.92 351.64 313.67 259.72 265.04 264.23 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 194 
 
Table 34 (continued) 
  Services Technology 
  Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V Model A Model A-P Model A-R Model A-V 
Block Exogeneity Tests         
Agro & Food 21.0432*** 30.9811*** 23.8996*** 5.7462 254.2627*** 10.9121** 3.0568 3.7139 
Consumer Products 2.7848 5.0380 31.5408*** 4.4553 134.8473*** 23.3111*** 24.9225*** 12.0451*** 
Financials 0.8926 27.5751*** 22.2987*** 27.6104*** 259.3127*** 20.9152*** 43.4694*** 37.4986*** 
Industrials 8.4790 22.0552*** 50.8528*** 150.3466*** 117.9626*** 9.9152** 261.1352*** 2.1508 
Property & 
Construction 3.8349 15.1091*** 7.8627* 48.6760*** 153.3607*** 48.9926*** 261.1352*** 1.0126 
Resources 8.5208 25.7714*** 11.2359** 17.0059*** 137.6160*** 26.3288*** 84.3029*** 3.4853 
Services 6.2182 34.5578*** 94.1009*** 22.6958*** 144.6844*** 22.7448*** 217.9403*** 62.5439*** 
Technology 25.4814*** 1.7285 61.0521*** 32.4269*** 120.1936*** 3.4871 232.0001*** 183.0134*** 
Robustness Checks         
Volatility regimes 107.1538*** 31.8087 90.1968*** 39.6429** 181.7257*** 73.8220*** 84.4737*** 82.8529*** 
Mixtures of normals 107.0357*** 31.6906 90.0787*** 39.5248** 178.8365*** 70.9328*** 81.5846*** 79.9637*** 
Fads     106.7559*** 31.4109 89.7989*** 39.2450** 175.0831*** 67.1793*** 77.8311*** 76.2102*** 
VNS     97.2340*** 21.8889 80.2770*** 29.7231* 157.8532*** 49.9495*** 60.6012*** 58.9804*** 
Volume-augmented  84.1782*** 8.8331 67.2212*** 16.6673 153.0974*** 45.1937** 55.8455*** 54.2246*** 
Model A-P 75.3450***    107.9037***    
Model A-R 16.9570**    97.2520***    
Model A-V 67.5109*** 0.0000 50.5539***  98.8728*** 0.0000 1.6209  
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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7.2.2. Model including Market-wide Index’s Data (Model M) 
 
The second approach is to include the basic volume-augmented model bubble and trading 
volume terms of the market index (Model M) [equations (48) to (50)], instead of data from 
all other industry groups. They will serve as proxies for impacts of overall market condition 
on a particular industry group being investigated. Also, this modelling strategy helps reduce 
the number of parameters required to be estimated and thus makes the optimisation more 
efficient. The results are reported in Table 35. Overall, Model M seems to be appropriate, 
as the robustness checks against bubble models without linkages with the market are all 
rejected, except for the Agro & Food industry group that shows Model M be inferior to the 
basic volume-augmented model.   
 
All individual mean returns (𝛽𝑠𝑜
𝑖  and  𝛽𝑐𝑜
𝑖 ) and residual standard deviation (𝜎𝑠
𝑖  and  𝜎𝑐
𝑖) 
estimates are statistically significant and have the plausible signs and magnitudes. Several 
bubble and volume parameters (𝛽𝑠𝑏
𝑖 , 𝛽𝑠𝑣
𝑖 , and 𝛽𝑐𝑏
𝑖 ) in the return equations in both regimes 
are, however, statistically significant and have mixed signs which are not consistent with 
the theory. The probability equations, on the other hand, look to be fitting well with the 
mean probability of the bubble surviving parameters in seven out of eight industry groups 
turning out to be statistically significant. Moreover, most of the estimated 𝛽𝑞𝑏
𝑖  are 
statistically significant and have the expected negative sign, while the parameters 𝛽𝑞𝑣
𝑖 are 
less satisfactorily.  
 
The results on the market index in the probability equation 𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑀
𝑖 and  𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑀
𝑖 )  are very 
interesting. As the market index is a proxy for the conditions in the stock market and the 
general economy, any bubble component on the index could be expected to affect the 
disaggregated industry group. Specifically, as the relative size of a bubble in the market 
increases, the chance that a bubble in an individual industry group will continue growing in 
the next period may drop. The estimated parameters of market-wide index’s bubbles on the 
probability that each industry group will be in the bubble-surviving regime (𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑀
𝑖 ) are all 
negative as expected, except in Industrials, though only four out of eight are statistically 
significant. Some of the estimates’ size are quite large, such as those for Consumer Products 
and Financials.
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Table 35: Model M 
 Agro & Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.0257*** 1.0030*** 1.0312*** 1.0129*** 1.0782*** 0.9774*** 1.0464*** 0.9956*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏    0.0015 0.0291 0.1206*** -0.0515*** 0.0632*** -0.0907*** 0.0361*** -0.0154* 
𝛽𝑠𝑣    0.0146 -0.0037 0.0239** 0.0025 0.0036 -0.0056 0.0238** -0.0030 
𝛽𝑐𝑜   1.0157*** 1.0247*** 1.0222*** 0.9895*** 0.9648*** 1.0457*** 1.0078*** 1.3076*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   -0.0420 -0.0789** -0.0952** 0.0114 -0.0570 0.0080 -0.0069 0.2669 
𝛽𝑞𝑜    1.0453** 2.7739*** 1.9307*** 1.3008* 3.2742*** 1.2905** 2.3795*** 0.6704 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    0.0373 -4.2584** -0.6897 -2.6625** -1.7612*** -2.4608*** -1.5297** 1.1499*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣    -0.5421** 0.1526 0.4342 -0.1739 0.3895 -0.3968 -0.1093 0.6081** 
𝜎𝑠   0.0461*** 0.0340*** 0.0524*** 0.0576*** 0.0768*** 0.0438*** 0.0577*** 0.0676*** 
𝜎𝑐   0.1118*** 0.0903*** 0.1635*** 0.1247*** 0.1868*** 0.1198*** 0.1592*** 0.3340*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑖   -0.0448*** -0.0039 -0.1551*** -0.0182 -0.1563*** 0.0796** -0.0849*** 0.0003 
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑖   -0.0006 -0.0053 -0.0290 -0.0094 0.0008 -0.0580** 0.0012 -0.0130 
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑖   0.0037 -0.0630 0.0571 0.0985 0.1033 -0.0645 -0.0515 -0.5559 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑖  -0.3580 -4.1420*** -3.5307*** 1.8813* -2.8852** -1.2145 -0.2738 -0.6889 
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑖   -0.7073* -1.0847* -0.8714 -1.4592*** -1.0809* -0.7659 -0.7668** -0.6537** 
Log-Likelihood 373.1095 396.0635 240.0840 329.6103 243.9632 269.9758 357.8240 242.0000 
AIC      -2.5579 -2.7219 -1.6077 -2.2472 -1.6355 -1.8213 -2.4487 -1.6272 
SBIC    -2.6651 -2.8290 -1.7149 -2.3544 -1.7426 -1.9284 -2.5559 -1.7348 
HQIC   -2.4798 -2.6438 -1.5296 -2.1691 -1.5573 -1.7432 -2.3706 -1.5489 
Block exogeneity test 12.5553*** 22.8865*** 26.2580*** 14.5616*** 26.1018*** 11.0898*** 25.7700*** 8.9843*** 
Volatility regimes 27.2418*** 38.2193*** 45.6317*** 31.8744*** 33.9718*** 20.2407** 48.9585*** 38.3882*** 
Mixture of normals 26.3713*** 37.0418*** 45.3916*** 29.8421*** 33.6704*** 20.2394** 48.8289*** 35.4990*** 
Fads      19.9245** 34.0312*** 43.2477*** 30.5851*** 32.6248*** 17.9152* 36.8476*** 33.0669*** 
VNS     18.4174** 24.9868*** 27.3640*** 26.2043*** 27.3997*** 17.4149** 36.6272*** 24.9842*** 
Volume-augmented 7.1995 16.7157*** 19.6686*** 10.1268* 24.4590*** 15.3262*** 26.3740*** 20.1418*** 
Model M-P 2.7112 1.5355 3.9753 0.4282 0.1270 7.8372** 8.6441** 3.0360 
Model M-R 10.4790*** 5.5035* 3.0922 17.4712*** 5.0327* 6.1833** 7.4565** 8.3081** 
Model M-V 16.8420*** 7.6356 6.4860 17.8891*** 5.9585 9.7196** 18.8176*** 10.6980** 
Starting observation Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Sep 1989 
No of observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 279 
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Precisely, they can be worked out that, when the market’s relative bubble size is 0.5 or 50% 
of the total price index, while there are no bubble in the industry group, no abnormal trading 
volume in the industry group and in the market, the probability of being in a surviving 
regime would drop by about 23.90% and 41.86% in Consumer Products and Financials 
industry groups, respectively. The effect of market’s abnormal trading volume on the 
probability (𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑀
𝑖 ) is even more convincing.  All of them have the expected negative signs 
and six out of eight are statistically significant. Notable examples include Industrials and 
Technology industry groups. Assuming no bubbles in both the industry group and the 
market and the trading volume in the industry group is normal, the probability of surviving 
would fall by 20.73% and 15.25%, in those two industry groups respectively, when the 
trading volume in the market increases from the normal level by 50%.  
 
The fact that the block exogeneity tests for all industry groups are rejected suggests that the 
contagion from the market index’s bubble and volume terms are clearly important. 
However, it essentially works through the probability equation. This conclusion is drawn 
from the fact that most parameters in the return equations, namely, 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑀
𝑖 , 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑀
𝑖 , and 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑀
𝑖 , 
are also statistically insignificant and have mixed signs, like those with the industry group’s 
bubble and volume parameters, while most of the estimated 𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑀
𝑖 and  𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑀
𝑖  have the 
expected negative signs and are statistically significant. Furthermore, the comparison with 
simplified model type M-P, M-R, and M-V are shown in Table 36. It reveals two industry 
groups where the full Model M is better than all other model types, five industry groups 
where the full Model M performs better than the Model M-R, and Financials is the one 
industry group where the full Model M does not capture additional explained variability 
from all Model M-P, M-R and M-V. The results from the block exogeneity tests with the 
three simplified model types do not change.  
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Table 36: Comparison of Model M 
 Agro & Food Consumer Products 
 Model M Model M-P Model M-R Model M-V Model M Model M-P Model M-R Model M-V 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.0257*** 1.0238*** 1.0249*** 1.0237*** 1.0030*** 1.0036*** 1.0029*** 1.0142*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏    0.0015 0.0029 -0.0028 0.0015 0.0291 0.0192 0.0189 0.0039 
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑖   -0.0448*** -0.0457*** -0.0487*** -0.0398** -0.0039 -0.0068 -0.0018 -0.0513 
𝛽𝑠𝑣    0.0146  0.0029  -0.0037  -0.0043  
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑖   -0.0006  0.0175**  -0.0053  0.0010  
𝛽𝑐𝑜   1.0157*** 1.0232*** 1.0185*** 1.0237*** 1.0247*** 1.0206*** 1.0163*** 1.0064*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   -0.0420 -0.0467 -0.0460 -0.0473 -0.0789** -0.0715** -0.0675** -0.0634** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑖   0.0037 -0.0058 -0.0046 -0.0152 -0.0630 -0.0544 -0.0473 -0.0259 
𝛽𝑞𝑜    1.0453** 0.9133* 0.7106 0.8690** 2.7739*** 2.9396*** 2.5260*** 2.2664*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    0.0373 0.1495 0.1797 0.0767 -4.2584** -5.0719* -5.0384 -4.8676** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑖  -0.3580 -0.2911 -0.1296 -0.3557 -4.1420*** -4.4064*** -4.5536** -4.4740*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣    -0.5421** -0.4790   0.1526 0.1748   
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑖   -0.7073* -0.7911**   -1.0847* -1.1044*   
𝜎𝑠     0.0461*** 0.0457*** 0.0455*** 0.0469*** 0.0340*** 0.0337*** 0.0298*** 0.0270*** 
𝜎𝑐     0.1118*** 0.1085*** 0.1160*** 0.1167*** 0.0903*** 0.0895*** 0.0856*** 0.0839*** 
Log-Likelihood 373.1095 371.7539 367.8700 364.6885 396.0635 395.2958 393.3118 392.2458 
AIC      -2.5579 -2.5625 -2.5348 -2.5263 -2.7219 -2.7307 -2.7165 -2.7232 
SBIC    -2.6651 -2.6554 -2.6276 -2.6049 -2.8290 -2.8235 -2.8094 -2.8018 
HQIC   -2.4798 -2.4948 -2.4671 -2.4691 -2.6438 -2.6630 -2.6488 -2.6659 
Block exogeneity test 12.5553*** 15.1158*** 11.4522*** 6.7881*** 22.8865*** 23.3888*** 18.6975*** 17.7690*** 
Volatility regimes 27.2418*** 24.5306*** 16.7628* 10.3998 38.2193*** 36.6839*** 32.7158*** 30.5837*** 
Mixture of normals 26.3713*** 23.6601*** 15.8924** 9.5293 37.0418*** 35.5063*** 31.5383*** 29.4062*** 
Fads      19.9245** 17.2133** 9.4456 3.0825 34.0312*** 32.4957*** 28.5277*** 26.3956*** 
VNS     18.4174** 15.7062*** 7.9385 1.5754 24.9868*** 23.4513*** 19.4833*** 17.3512*** 
Volume-augmented 7.1995 4.4882 0.0000 0.0000 16.7157*** 15.1803*** 11.2122** 9.0801*** 
Model M-P 2.7112    1.5355    
Model M-R 10.4790***    5.5035*    
Model M-V 16.8420*** 14.1308*** 6.3630**  7.6356 6.1001** 2.1321  
Starting observation Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 
No of observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 
 
Note: Results based on the Model M and Model M-P, M-R, and M-V as discussed in p. 93. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 36 (continued) 
 Financials Industrials 
 Model M Model M-P Model M-R Model M-V Model M Model M-P Model M-R Model M-V 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.0312*** 1.0266*** 1.0303*** 1.0276*** 1.0129*** 1.0127*** 1.0161*** 1.0162*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏    0.1206*** 0.1021*** 0.1236*** 0.1134*** -0.0515*** -0.0512*** -0.0499** -0.0534** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑖   -0.1551*** -0.1258*** -0.1486*** -0.1336*** -0.0182 -0.0168 -0.0282 -0.0280 
𝛽𝑠𝑣    0.0239**  0.0200*  0.0025  -0.0019  
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑖   -0.0290  -0.0169  -0.0094  0.0083  
𝛽𝑐𝑜   1.0222*** 1.0205*** 1.0205*** 1.0196*** 0.9895*** 0.9899*** 0.9908*** 0.9927*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   -0.0952** -0.0988* -0.0984** -0.1003** 0.0114 0.0109 0.0051 0.0062 
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑖   0.0571 0.0628 0.0584 0.0613 0.0985 0.0939 0.0727 0.0685 
𝛽𝑞𝑜    1.9307*** 1.9598*** 1.9745*** 1.9765*** 1.3008* 1.4306* 1.2047** 1.0930** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    -0.6897 -0.7090 -0.7579 -0.7723 -2.6625** -2.8433** -2.0748** -1.9220** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑖  -3.5307*** -3.1888*** -3.7435*** -3.5658*** 1.8813* 1.8061 0.2579 0.2265 
𝛽𝑞𝑣    0.4342 0.1921   -0.1739 -0.1709   
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑖   -0.8714 -0.6709   -1.4592*** -1.4754***   
𝜎𝑠     0.0524*** 0.0570*** 0.0533*** 0.0555*** 0.0576*** 0.0581*** 0.0555*** 0.0541*** 
𝜎𝑐     0.1635*** 0.1718*** 0.1634*** 0.1667*** 0.1247*** 0.1258*** 0.1214*** 0.1192*** 
Log-Likelihood 240.0840 238.0963 238.5379 236.8410 329.6103 329.3962 320.8747 320.6658 
AIC      -1.6077 -1.6078 -1.6110 -1.6131 -2.2472 -2.2600 -2.1991 -2.2119 
SBIC    -1.7149 -1.7007 -1.7038 -1.6917 -2.3544 -2.3528 -2.2920 -2.2905 
HQIC   -1.5296 -1.5401 -1.5433 -1.5559 -2.1691 -2.1923 -2.1314 -2.1546 
Block exogeneity test 26.2580*** 24.5921*** 55.9035*** 52.9243*** 14.5616*** 14.3096*** 2.9502*** 2.5323*** 
Volatility regimes 45.6317*** 41.6564*** 42.5395*** 39.1457*** 31.8744*** 31.4462*** 14.4033 13.9854* 
Mixture of normals 45.3916*** 41.4163*** 42.2995*** 38.9056*** 29.8421*** 29.4139*** 12.3709 11.9530* 
Fads      43.2477*** 39.2724*** 40.1556*** 36.7617*** 30.5851*** 30.1569*** 13.1139 12.6960** 
VNS     27.3640*** 23.3887*** 24.2719*** 20.8780*** 26.2043*** 25.7761*** 8.7331 8.3152** 
Volume-augmented 19.6686*** 15.6933*** 16.5764*** 13.1826*** 10.1268* 9.6986** 0.0000 0.0000 
Model M-P 3.9753    0.4282    
Model M-R 3.0922    17.4712***    
Model M-V 6.4860 2.5107 3.3938  17.8891*** 17.4608*** 0.4179  
Starting observation Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 
No of observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 36 (continued) 
 Property & Construction Resources 
 Model M Model M-P Model M-R Model M-V Model M Model M-P Model M-R Model M-V 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.0782*** 1.0783*** 1.0788*** 1.0789*** 0.9774*** 0.9847*** 0.9825*** 0.9873*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏    0.0632*** 0.0631*** 0.0648*** 0.0634*** -0.0907*** -0.0810** -0.0861*** -0.0767** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑖   -0.1563*** -0.1559*** -0.1610*** -0.1608*** 0.0796** 0.0687 0.0645 0.0543 
𝛽𝑠𝑣    0.0036  0.0180  -0.0056  -0.0316***  
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑖   0.0008  -0.0149  -0.0580**  0.0062  
𝛽𝑐𝑜   0.9648*** 0.9679*** 0.9543*** 0.9673*** 1.0457*** 1.0467*** 1.0510*** 1.0514*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   -0.0570 -0.0540 -0.0775 -0.0601 0.0080 0.0091 0.0144 0.0157 
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑖   0.1033 0.0967 0.1479 0.1113 -0.0645 -0.0686 -0.0682 -0.0734 
𝛽𝑞𝑜    3.2742*** 3.2152*** 3.6980*** 3.3061*** 1.2905** 1.5601** 1.0270* 1.1223** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    -1.7612*** -1.7373*** -1.9311** -1.7131** -2.4608*** -2.7074** -1.8263*** -1.8139** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑖  -2.8852** -2.8139** -3.4742** -3.1876** -1.2145 -1.3749 -0.7236 -0.8854 
𝛽𝑞𝑣    0.3895 0.3928   -0.3968 -0.2906   
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑖   -1.0809* -1.1140**   -0.7659 -0.5960   
𝜎𝑠     0.0768*** 0.0764*** 0.0815*** 0.0789*** 0.0438*** 0.0506*** 0.0494*** 0.0515*** 
𝜎𝑐     0.1868*** 0.1864*** 0.1878*** 0.1870*** 0.1198*** 0.1220*** 0.1247*** 0.1263*** 
Log-Likelihood 243.9632 243.8997 241.4468 240.9839 269.9758 266.0572 266.8841 265.1160 
AIC      -1.6355 -1.6493 -1.6318 -1.6427 -1.8213 -1.8076 -1.8135 -1.8151 
SBIC    -1.7426 -1.7421 -1.7246 -1.7213 -1.9284 -1.9004 -1.9063 -1.8937 
HQIC   -1.5573 -1.5816 -1.5641 -1.5855 -1.7432 -1.7399 -1.7458 -1.7578 
Block exogeneity test 26.1018*** 29.1540*** 22.4597*** 27.4425*** 11.0898*** 4.4928*** 4.7053*** 3.0380*** 
Volatility regimes 33.9718*** 33.8448*** 28.9391*** 28.0133*** 20.2407** 12.4035 14.0573 10.5211 
Mixture of normals 33.6704*** 33.5435*** 28.6378*** 27.7120*** 20.2394** 12.4022 14.0561* 10.5198 
Fads      32.6248*** 32.4978*** 27.5922*** 26.6664*** 17.9152* 10.0780 11.7319 8.1956 
VNS     27.3997*** 27.2727*** 22.3670*** 21.4412*** 17.4149** 9.5777* 11.2316** 7.6953* 
Volume-augmented 24.4590*** 24.3320*** 19.4263*** 18.5005*** 15.3262*** 7.4890* 9.1429** 5.6066** 
Model M-P 0.1270    7.8372**    
Model M-R 5.0327*    6.1833**    
Model M-V 5.9585 5.8315* 0.9258  9.7196** 1.8824 3.5363  
Starting observation Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 
No of observations 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 280 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 36 (continued) 
 Services Technology 
 Model M Model M-P Model M-R Model M-V Model M Model M-P Model M-R Model M-V 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.0464*** 1.0454*** 1.0460*** 1.0472*** 0.9956*** 0.9969*** 0.9977*** 0.9983*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏    0.0361*** 0.0386*** 0.0308* 0.0344** -0.0154* -0.0146* -0.0144* -0.0141* 
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑖   -0.0849*** -0.0858*** -0.0860*** -0.0846*** 0.0003 -0.0073 -0.0050 -0.0108 
𝛽𝑠𝑣    0.0238**  0.0254***  -0.0030  -0.0043  
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑖   0.0012  0.0015  -0.0130  -0.0088  
𝛽𝑐𝑜   1.0078*** 1.0551*** 1.0168*** 1.0227*** 1.3076*** 1.3006*** 1.2982*** 1.2919*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   -0.0069 0.0170 0.0119 0.0059 0.2669 0.2630 0.2567 0.2519 
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑖   -0.0515 -0.0854 -0.0505 -0.0556 -0.5559 -0.5407 -0.5440 -0.5301 
𝛽𝑞𝑜    2.3795*** 1.9705*** 2.3493*** 2.1933*** 0.6704 0.6912 0.6699 0.6877 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    -1.5297** -1.3099* -1.5370** -1.3448** 1.1499*** 1.1311*** 1.1379*** 1.1273*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑖  -0.2738 0.1269 -1.0833 -0.9002 -0.6889 -0.7110 -0.9415 -0.9666 
𝛽𝑞𝑣    -0.1093 -0.4917   0.6081** 0.5659**   
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑖   -0.7668** -0.8644*   -0.6537** -0.6368**   
𝜎𝑠    0.0577*** 0.0567*** 0.0569*** 0.0583*** 0.0676*** 0.0682*** 0.0667*** 0.0671*** 
𝜎𝑐    0.1592*** 0.1429*** 0.1480*** 0.1515*** 0.3340*** 0.3352*** 0.3299*** 0.3300*** 
Log-Likelihood 357.8240 353.5020 354.0957 348.4152 242.0000 240.4820 237.8459 236.6510 
AIC      -2.4487 -2.4322 -2.4364 -2.4101 -1.6272 -1.6307 -1.6118 -1.6176 
SBIC    -2.5559 -2.5250 -2.5293 -2.4887 -1.7348 -1.7239 -1.7050 -1.6964 
HQIC   -2.3706 -2.3645 -2.3687 -2.3528 -1.5489 -1.5628 -1.5439 -1.5601 
Block exogeneity test 25.7700*** 25.1685*** 21.8715*** 20.2852*** 8.9843*** 8.7461*** 4.4018*** 3.8177*** 
Volatility regimes 48.9585*** 40.3144*** 41.5019*** 30.1409*** 38.3882*** 35.3522*** 30.0801*** 27.6902*** 
Mixture of normals 48.8289*** 40.1848*** 41.3724*** 30.0113*** 35.4990*** 32.4630*** 27.1910*** 24.8010*** 
Fads      36.8476*** 28.2035*** 29.3911*** 18.0300*** 33.0669*** 30.0309*** 24.7588*** 22.3689*** 
VNS     36.6272*** 27.9831*** 29.1707*** 17.8097*** 24.9842*** 21.9482*** 16.6761*** 14.2862*** 
Volume-augmented 26.3740*** 17.7299*** 18.9175*** 7.5564*** 20.1418*** 17.1058*** 11.8338*** 9.4438*** 
Model M-P 8.6441**    3.0360    
Model M-R 7.4565**    8.3081**    
Model M-V 18.8176*** 10.1735*** 11.3610***  10.6980** 7.6620** 2.3899  
Starting observation Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Aug 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 
No of observations 280 280 280 280 279 279 279 279 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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To sum up, while the Model A shows that the effects of bubbles and trading volume from 
all other industry groups work through the return equation, the Model M implies bubbles 
and abnormal trading volume of the entire market influence each industry group through 
probability equation by making them less likely to be in a surviving regime in the next 
period. In other words, a bubble component in the index suggests an increased instability of 
the market as a whole. This would push a return path of the industry group more towards a 
bubble-collapsing state. In contrast, a bubble in a related industry group would directly 
affect the level of performance to be realised by investors.  
 
7.2.3. Model including Data from Two Industry Groups (Model J) 
 
As noted earlier, the contagion model with all industry groups (Model A) is the fullest 
model, but it may be sub-optimal in terms of maximum likelihood estimation as it contains 
45 parameters to be estimated for eight industry groups, which also makes the interpretation 
difficult. This section attempts to deal with this issue by including only the industry groups 
of interest and one additional industry group as the independent variables at a time (Model 
J) [equations (51) to (53)]. This reduces the number of parameters to be estimated from 45 
to just 15. Implicitly, this means the Model J ignores the impacts from all other industry 
groups not included in the particular specification. Still, it is believed to offer some partial 
evidence of contagion between industry groups.  
 
The results of Model J are presented in Table 37. There are 56 specifications in total from 
eight industry groups as the dependent variable, and seven other industry groups take turn 
to act as the additional independent variable. Overall, the average return parameters (𝛽𝑠𝑜
𝑖𝑗
 
and  𝛽𝑐𝑜
𝑖𝑗
)  are statistically significant in all specifications. Almost all of them have the 
financially meaningful magnitude and the two regimes are somewhat different as assumed 
by the theory with the estimates of 𝛽𝑠𝑜
𝑖𝑗
 greater than 𝛽𝑠𝑜
𝑖𝑗
 in about 41% of all the cases. For 
example, the parameters 𝛽𝑠𝑜
𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂,𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆
 and  𝛽𝑠𝑜
𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂,𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆  are estimated to be 1.0157 and 
1.0098 in the case of Agro & Food as dependent variable and Industrials as the additional 
independent variable (AGRO-INDUS). They suggest the average net returns are 1.57% and 
0.98%, respectively.  The standard deviations in both regimes are all statistically significant 
as well. As expected, the standard deviations in the collapsing regime are higher than those 
in the surviving regime, except for the cases of CONSUMP-TECH, TECH-AGRO, TECH-
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INDUS, TECH-PROPCON, TECH-RESOURC, and TECH-SERVICE. In other words, 
there appears to be a problem when estimating regressions with Technology industry group 
as the industry group of interest since if the surviving regime is more volatile than the bubble 
actually collapses.  
 
The results for the bubble parameters from the industry group being studied, 𝛽𝑠𝑏
𝑖𝑗
 and 𝛽𝑐𝑏
𝑖𝑗
, 
and from the additional industry group, 𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗
𝑖𝑗
 and 𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗
𝑖𝑗
 , in the return equations are less well-
fitting. Many of them are statistically insignificant. The influence of the bubble terms on 
returns in the collapsing regime are negative as hypothesised in about 60% of the cases. The 
theory also postulated that 𝛽𝑠𝑏
𝑖𝑗
 should be larger than 𝛽𝑐𝑏
𝑖𝑗
 and that appears to be supported by 
the data in about 50% of all the cases. The effects of abnormal trading volumes on the returns 
are also unconvincing. The estimates for the industry group whose return is being 
investigated are positive in 61% but only statistically significant in about 38% of all the 
cases, while those for the additional industry group are positive in only 39% and statistically 
significant in 13% of the cases.    
 
Consider the probability equation, the average probability of bubble surviving denoted 𝛽𝑞𝑜
𝑖𝑗
 
tend to be positive. Particularly, they are greater than zero, which implies an average 
probability of more than 50% in 84% of the cases, and greater than one (average probability 
of more than 84.13%) in 55% of all the cases. Moreover, they are statistically significant in 
43 cases. Out of the other 13 cases where 𝛽𝑞𝑜
𝑖𝑗
 are statistically insignificantly different from 
zero, there are five cases where Technology industry group as the dependent variable. This 
perhaps points out the uniqueness of the industry group again.  
 
As predicted by the theory, the average probability that a bubble will survive in the next 
period tends to fall as the bubble size increases. This is shown by the estimates of 𝛽𝑞𝑏
𝑖𝑗
 
turning out to be negative in 84% and are statistically significant in 63% of all the cases, 
while the 𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗
𝑖𝑗
 which implies linkages with another industry group are negative in 71% but 
only statistically significant in 32% of all the cases. The effect of the abnormal normal 
trading on the probability is again less convincing. Although the 𝛽𝑞𝑣
𝑖𝑗
 and 𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗
𝑖𝑗
 are negative 
in 84% and 57% of the cases, respectively, they are only statistically significant in 32% and 
20%, respectively.  
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Table 37: Model J 
Dependent Variable: Agro & Food 
Independent 
Variables 
Agro & Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜    1.0097*** 1.0163*** 1.0157*** 1.0061*** 1.0108*** 1.0096*** 1.0024*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏     0.0057 0.0239** 0.0140 -0.0018 0.0030 0.0054 -0.0102 
𝛽𝑠𝑣     0.0180* 0.0201** 0.0189* 0.0135 0.0215** 0.0097 0.0179** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜    1.0153*** 1.0159*** 1.0098*** 1.0152*** 1.0168*** 1.0140*** 1.0064*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏    0.0232 -0.0518* -0.0407 -0.0323 -0.0330 -0.0357 -0.0263 
𝛽𝑞𝑜     0.9568** -0.7217 0.9756 0.7783* 0.8013* 1.1659*** 0.0078 
𝛽𝑞𝑏     0.4331 4.5555 -0.2788 0.0736 -0.0001 0.2861 0.2336 
𝛽𝑞𝑣     -1.0200*** -0.5793 -0.5555 -0.6917** -0.7093** -0.4048 -0.6389** 
𝜎𝑠     0.0463*** 0.0434*** 0.0446*** 0.0460*** 0.0461*** 0.0476*** 0.0458*** 
𝜎𝑐     0.1158*** 0.0884*** 0.1040*** 0.1135*** 0.1145*** 0.1216*** 0.1198*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗    -0.0085 0.0261* -0.0271*** -0.0111 -0.0148** -0.0070 -0.0138*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗    -0.0008 0.0127 0.0038 0.0062 -0.0065 0.0143 0.0040 
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗    -0.0901 -0.0359* -0.0284 -0.0133 -0.0121 0.0052 -0.0039 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗    -1.3993 -2.2560 -0.3070 -0.1064 -0.0426 -1.0150* 1.0132** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗    0.7329** -2.4463 -1.0466 0.1293 0.1791 -0.0800 0.5826* 
Log-Likelihood  369.1420 369.6538 375.0039 366.6018 368.5308 367.6554 375.1558 
AIC       -2.5387 -2.5423 -2.5807 -2.5204 -2.5343 -2.5280 -2.5818 
SBIC     -2.6462 -2.6498 -2.6882 -2.6280 -2.6418 -2.6355 -2.6893 
HQIC    -2.4603 -2.4640 -2.5024 -2.4421 -2.4560 -2.4497 -2.5034 
Volatility regimes  23.0671** 24.0907** 34.7909*** 17.9867* 21.8448** 20.0940** 35.0946*** 
Mixture of normals  22.2235** 23.2472*** 33.9474*** 17.1432* 21.0013** 19.2505** 34.2511*** 
Fads       22.5448** 23.5684*** 34.2686*** 17.4644* 21.3226** 19.5718** 34.5724*** 
VNS      19.4092*** 20.4328*** 31.1330*** 14.3288** 18.1869** 16.4361** 31.4367*** 
Volume-augmented  9.4095* 10.4331* 21.1333*** 4.3291 8.1872 6.4364 21.4370*** 
Model J-P  4.4512 5.3773* 1.0264 5.2645* 5.5847* 7.9246** 8.2546** 
Model J-R  11.9040*** 13.3123*** 15.7713*** 8.5794** 8.8076** 2.5780 0.0000 
Model J-V  14.9771*** 15.0282*** 18.2669*** 11.4815** 10.6504** 10.2860** 4.5310 
Starting observation  Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 
No of observations  279 279 279 279 279 279 279 
 
Note: Results based on the Model J [equations (51) to (53)] ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 37 (continued) 
Dependent Variable: Consumer Products 
Independent 
Variables 
Agro & Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   0.9986***  0.9990*** 0.9988*** 0.9951*** 0.9970*** 0.9983*** 1.0056*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏    -0.0120  0.0091 -0.0086 -0.0187 -0.0058 -0.0035 -0.0506 
𝛽𝑠𝑣    -0.0056  -0.0060 -0.0054 -0.0063 -0.0058 -0.0058 -0.0040 
𝛽𝑐𝑜   1.0010***  0.9864*** 0.9963*** 1.0037*** 1.0074*** 0.9963*** 0.9745*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   -0.1700*  -0.1184** -0.1134 -0.0917 -0.1290* -0.1499* -0.0658*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑜    1.0253**  1.1606*** 1.3047*** 0.6251 1.2489*** 1.3957*** 0.9189* 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    -2.2364  -1.1119 -1.8612* -2.5218** -1.9929* -1.5097 0.7488 
𝛽𝑞𝑣    -0.0582  -0.0352 -0.0770 -0.2300 -0.0889 0.0325 -0.2208 
𝜎𝑠    0.0420***  0.0397*** 0.0432*** 0.0413*** 0.0424*** 0.0420*** 0.0932*** 
𝜎𝑐    0.1145***  0.1060*** 0.1196*** 0.1128*** 0.1167*** 0.1139*** 0.0321*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗   0.0020  0.0066 -0.0118 -0.0070 -0.0162*** -0.0028 -0.0119 
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗   0.0009  0.0037 0.0020 -0.0006 -0.0063 0.0026 0.0198 
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗   0.0586  0.0170 0.0071 -0.0161 -0.0442 0.0335 -0.0218*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗   0.4537  -0.9011 -0.1790 1.2284** 0.1045 -0.5757 -1.6209*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗   -0.1506  -0.5349 -0.2379 -0.0070 -0.3348 -0.8745** -0.0406 
Log-Likelihood 384.2292  385.9260 384.8625 387.3164 391.0015 388.2407 399.4167 
AIC      -2.6468  -2.6590 -2.6513 -2.6689 -2.6954 -2.6756 -2.7557 
SBIC    -2.7543  -2.7665 -2.7589 -2.7765 -2.8029 -2.7831 -2.8632 
HQIC   -2.5685  -2.5807 -2.5730 -2.5906 -2.6170 -2.5972 -2.6774 
Volatility regimes 16.8291  20.2227** 18.0958* 23.0035** 30.3737*** 24.8521*** 47.2041*** 
Mixture of normals 15.7080  19.1017** 16.9747* 21.8824** 29.2527*** 23.7310*** 46.0831*** 
Fads      13.7033  17.0969* 14.9700 19.8777** 27.2479*** 21.7263** 44.0784*** 
VNS     4.3595  7.7531 5.6262 10.5339 17.9041** 12.3825* 34.7345*** 
Volume-augmented 2.2772  5.6709 3.5440 8.4516 15.8219*** 10.3003* 32.6523*** 
Model J-P 1.4944  1.6373 1.0114 2.2118 3.3120 1.2416 2.3701 
Model J-R 0.7298  3.5123 1.5019 1.6684 0.0000 9.3605*** 1.6328 
Model J-V 1.9868  5.5966 2.0865 3.3490 5.7645 10.5340** 4.1111 
Starting observation Sep 1989  Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 
No of observations 279  279 279 279 279 279 279 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 37 (continued) 
Dependent Variable: Financials 
Independent 
Variables 
Agro & Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.0129*** 1.0142***  1.0124*** 1.0215*** 1.0215*** 1.0165*** 0.9973*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏    -0.0325 -0.0492**  -0.0200 -0.0556 -0.0495 -0.0413 -0.0185 
𝛽𝑠𝑣    0.0167 0.0196*  0.0065 0.0177* 0.0284** 0.0145 0.0150* 
𝛽𝑐𝑜   1.0154*** 1.0024***  1.0105*** 1.0091*** 1.0091*** 1.0346*** 1.0118*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.0005 0.0100  0.0028 0.0039 -0.0054 -0.0582 -0.0082 
𝛽𝑞𝑜    1.1195*** 1.0961***  1.0479*** 0.4561 1.6276*** 1.0038*** -1.1976* 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    -0.6130 -0.6620  -1.5972*** -1.7855*** -1.9218*** -1.1189** -0.8689 
𝛽𝑞𝑣    -0.4160 -0.2727  -0.0359 -0.2719 -0.3240 -0.1564 0.1048 
𝜎𝑠    0.0578*** 0.0566***  0.0588*** 0.0528*** 0.0448*** 0.0571*** 0.0561*** 
𝜎𝑐    0.1820*** 0.1819***  0.1932*** 0.1771*** 0.1589*** 0.1854*** 0.1782*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗   0.0125 0.0082  -0.0255** 0.0112 0.0002 0.0209 -0.0138* 
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗   -0.0025 -0.0129*  0.0036 -0.0201* -0.0274*** 0.0016 -0.0058 
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗   0.0044 -0.0569  -0.0123 -0.0016 -0.0129 0.0648 0.0316 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗   -1.7256 -3.0233*  -0.0005 0.6856* -2.7306*** -0.7070 2.3730*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗   -0.1823 0.0387  -0.5358*** -0.1537 0.0804 -0.4163 -0.1315 
Log-Likelihood 227.7673 229.9807  232.8103 228.4165 233.3333 229.4615 243.2113 
AIC      -1.5252 -1.5411  -1.5614 -1.5299 -1.5651 -1.5374 -1.6359 
SBIC    -1.6327 -1.6486  -1.6689 -1.6374 -1.6726 -1.6449 -1.7435 
HQIC   -1.4469 -1.4628  -1.4830 -1.4516 -1.4868 -1.4590 -1.5576 
Volatility regimes 23.8917** 28.3185***  33.9777*** 25.1900*** 35.0235*** 27.2801*** 54.7796*** 
Mixture of normals 23.6257*** 28.0526***  33.7118*** 24.9241*** 34.7576*** 27.0142*** 54.5137*** 
Fads      23.8206*** 28.2475***  33.9067*** 25.1189*** 34.9525*** 27.2091*** 54.7086*** 
VNS     9.4400 13.8668*  19.5260*** 10.7383 20.5719*** 12.8284* 40.3280*** 
Volume-augmented 5.0700 9.4969*  15.1561*** 6.3684 16.2019*** 8.4585 35.9580*** 
Model J-P 2.3409 6.1129**  0.7540 4.3070 11.9790*** 2.2636 3.2828 
Model J-R 0.7930 1.3290  10.4723*** 3.0190 0.9605 3.7388 0.2494 
Model J-V 4.1807 7.6451  13.2527** 7.0243 11.3216** 6.7231 3.3067 
Starting observation Sep 1989 Sep 1989  Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 
No of observations 279 279  279 279 279 279 279 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 37 (continued) 
Dependent Variable: Industrials 
Independent 
Variables 
Agro & Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.0083*** 0.9998*** 0.9985***  0.9970*** 1.0028*** 1.0017*** 0.9953*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏    -0.0652** -0.0258** -0.0299**  -0.0245* -0.0517** -0.0275** -0.0297 
𝛽𝑠𝑣    -0.0183 -0.0063 -0.0047  -0.0160 0.0004 -0.0089 -0.0121 
𝛽𝑐𝑜   1.0134*** 1.0281*** 1.0090***  1.0218*** 1.0132*** 1.0262*** 1.0141*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.0045 0.0211 -0.0008  -0.0018 0.0044 0.0099 0.0005 
𝛽𝑞𝑜    1.0425** 1.8298*** 1.6156**  1.0288* 0.9601** 1.5001*** 1.2835* 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    -1.6861** -0.6176 -0.6005  -0.5391 -1.7362* -0.5591 -1.9948 
𝛽𝑞𝑣    -1.2030** -1.3505** -0.9925  -1.6434 -0.9716** -0.9616 -1.3162** 
𝜎𝑠    0.0507*** 0.0585*** 0.0579***  0.0553*** 0.0401*** 0.0569*** 0.0537*** 
𝜎𝑐    0.1112*** 0.1276*** 0.1267***  0.1151*** 0.1030*** 0.1256*** 0.1136*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗   0.0298** 0.0180 0.0148  -0.0044 -0.0335*** 0.0194 -0.0120* 
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗   -0.0113 -0.0103 -0.0054  0.0035 -0.0224*** -0.0036 0.0017 
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗   -0.0084 0.0007 0.0469  0.0311 -0.0090 0.0309 -0.0029 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗   -0.1174 -2.6389* -1.1694  -0.3869 -0.8382 -0.5906 -0.1248 
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗   -0.4821 -0.1327 -0.3186  0.2895 0.1184 -1.1105** 0.1283 
Log-Likelihood 325.1433 325.1114 325.7236  322.2619 327.4015 327.1896 322.6651 
AIC      -2.2232 -2.2230 -2.2274  -2.2026 -2.2394 -2.2379 -2.2055 
SBIC    -2.3308 -2.3305 -2.3349  -2.3101 -2.3470 -2.3454 -2.3130 
HQIC   -2.1449 -2.1447 -2.1491  -2.1243 -2.1611 -2.1596 -2.1272 
Volatility regimes 25.7305*** 25.6665*** 26.8909***  19.9675** 30.2469*** 29.8230*** 20.7740** 
Mixture of normals 23.7607*** 23.6968*** 24.9212***  17.9978* 28.2771*** 27.8532*** 18.8042** 
Fads      20.3205** 20.2566** 21.4810**  14.5576 24.8369*** 24.4130*** 15.3640 
VNS     14.5532** 14.4893** 15.7137**  8.7903 19.0696*** 18.6458*** 9.5968 
Volume-augmented 8.6859 8.6220 9.8464*  2.9230 13.2023** 12.7784** 3.7294 
Model J-P 2.7930 2.6622 0.5364  0.9511 7.1024** 0.6225 0.4476 
Model J-R 7.0775** 0.0000 4.7909*  3.8844 7.9093** 8.8107** 3.9883 
Model J-V 7.1648 4.4152 8.2334*  4.1438 11.6985** 8.8746* 4.4927 
Starting observation Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989  Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 
No of observations 279 279 279  279 279 279 279 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 37 (continued) 
Dependent Variable: Property & Construction 
Independent 
Variables 
Agro & Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.0045*** 1.0009*** 0.9881*** 1.0050***  1.0116*** 1.0091*** 1.1110*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏    -0.0050 -0.0087 -0.0153 0.0026  0.0308** -0.0029 -0.0118*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣    0.0144 0.0061 0.0005 0.0075  0.0057 0.0008 0.1836*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜   1.0115*** 1.0011*** 1.0333*** 1.0285***  1.0407*** 1.0123*** 1.0042*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   -0.0090 -0.0056 0.0025 0.0023  -0.0328 -0.0091 0.0229* 
𝛽𝑞𝑜    2.7347*** 1.8632*** 1.9154*** 1.9174***  8.0734* 1.7608*** -1.4890*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    -1.1235** -0.7802* -0.8298 -1.0656**  -2.2814** -0.9597* 1.9168*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣    -0.1609 -0.1184 0.0455 -0.0749  0.4080 -0.0194 -0.5896 
𝜎𝑠    0.0753*** 0.0746*** 0.0763*** 0.0850***  0.0846*** 0.0793*** 0.0051*** 
𝜎𝑐    0.1753*** 0.1747*** 0.1831*** 0.2051***  0.1703*** 0.1923*** 0.0971*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗   0.0041 0.0192 0.0741 -0.0110  -0.0793*** 0.0421 0.1673*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗   -0.0082 -0.0093 -0.0002 -0.0040  -0.0091 -0.0037 0.5474*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗   -0.0066 -0.1066 -0.0493 -0.0727  0.0259 -0.0256 -0.0192** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗   -4.2197*** -3.9999** -1.6380* -0.4048  -8.8264 -0.6314 -2.9005*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗   0.2994 0.1228 -0.4640 -0.2419  -0.9955 -0.6434 -0.1764 
Log-Likelihood 238.2307 237.3528 239.5700 232.1676  245.2265 236.0743 261.6985 
AIC      -1.6002 -1.5939 -1.6098 -1.5568  -1.6504 -1.5848 -1.7684 
SBIC    -1.7077 -1.7015 -1.7173 -1.6643  -1.7579 -1.6923 -1.8760 
HQIC   -1.5219 -1.5156 -1.5315 -1.4784  -1.5721 -1.5064 -1.6901 
Volatility regimes 25.4437*** 23.6881** 28.1224*** 13.3176  39.4354*** 21.1311** 72.3795*** 
Mixture of normals 25.1468*** 23.3912*** 27.8255*** 13.0207  39.1385*** 20.8342** 72.0826*** 
Fads      25.4113*** 23.6557*** 28.0899*** 13.2852  39.4030*** 21.0986** 72.3470*** 
VNS     16.5549** 14.7993** 19.2336*** 4.4288  30.5466*** 12.2423* 63.4907*** 
Volume-augmented 15.3148*** 13.5592** 17.9934*** 3.1887  29.3065*** 11.0021* 62.2505*** 
Model J-P 1.5115 1.4238 0.0012 0.3329  0.7125 0.0505 67.8672*** 
Model J-R 0.8679 0.4010 2.8682 0.9860  0.9967 3.8730 49.8871*** 
Model J-V 2.4987 1.7826 3.0372 2.0352  1.7106 4.2998 69.6681*** 
Starting observation Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989  Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 
No of observations 279 279 279 279  279 279 279 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 37 (continued) 
Dependent Variable: Resources 
Independent 
Variables 
Agro & Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.0063*** 1.0042*** 0.9959*** 1.0102*** 1.0092***  1.0073*** 1.0152*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏    -0.0783*** -0.0683*** -0.0912*** -0.0275* -0.0747***  -0.0710*** -0.0703*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣    -0.0004 -0.0047 -0.0320*** -0.0150 -0.0018  -0.0385*** -0.0072 
𝛽𝑐𝑜   1.0180*** 1.0274*** 1.0343*** 1.0176*** 1.0271***  1.0170*** 1.0176*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.0007 0.0013 0.0065 -0.0109 0.0188  0.0080 0.0375 
𝛽𝑞𝑜    1.0193** 0.8827** 0.4022 8.0541** 0.9877**  0.3975 0.5793 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    -2.0332*** -1.9653** -1.1092** -10.4045** -2.0350***  -2.1084*** -2.0458** 
𝛽𝑞𝑣    -0.4127 -0.2780 0.2000 -3.2057* -0.5337  0.0245 -0.2430 
𝜎𝑠    0.0535*** 0.0541*** 0.0461*** 0.0650*** 0.0580***  0.0422*** 0.0617*** 
𝜎𝑐    0.1285*** 0.1299*** 0.1159*** 0.1277*** 0.1324***  0.1143*** 0.1346*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗   -0.0153 -0.0378 0.0693*** 0.0064 0.0132  0.0389*** 0.0116 
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗   -0.0166** -0.0054 0.0035 -0.0112 -0.0043  -0.0227 0.0043 
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗   -0.0343 0.0148 -0.0441** 0.0034 -0.0230  -0.0589** -0.0490 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗   -0.0988 0.4356 -0.6529 -8.2385* 0.2688  0.5804 0.8525* 
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗   0.1982 0.1235 0.4248* -2.0475* 0.9295**  -0.4613 0.4915 
Log-Likelihood 265.9017 263.6028 267.1910 268.8621 267.0869  267.3488 267.2573 
AIC      -1.7986 -1.7821 -1.8078 -1.8198 -1.8071  -1.8090 -1.8083 
SBIC    -1.9061 -1.8896 -1.9153 -1.9273 -1.9146  -1.9165 -1.9158 
HQIC   -1.7203 -1.7038 -1.7295 -1.7415 -1.7288  -1.7306 -1.7300 
Volatility regimes 15.1568 10.5590 17.7354* 21.0775** 17.5271*  18.0510* 17.8679* 
Mixture of normals 15.1555 10.5577 17.7341* 21.0763** 17.5259*  18.0497* 17.8666* 
Fads      11.7068 7.1090 14.2854 17.6276* 14.0771  14.6010 14.4179 
VNS     7.9218 3.3240 10.5005 13.8426* 10.2922  10.8160 10.6330 
Volume-augmented 6.0963 1.4985 8.6750 12.0171** 8.4667  8.9905 8.8075 
Model J-P 4.6897* 1.2692 6.0716** 1.4407 0.4390  7.3808** 0.6242 
Model J-R 1.7503 0.2774 4.6933* 7.0900** 1.8101  1.5875 2.7020 
Model J-V 5.5217 2.3027 7.5947 8.6055* 8.7377*  8.4506* 4.4600 
Starting observation Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989  Sep 1989 Sep 1989 
No of observations 279 279 279 279 279  279 279 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 37 (continued) 
Dependent Variable: Services 
Independent 
Variables 
Agro & Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.0126*** 1.0120*** 1.0164*** 1.0118*** 1.0087*** 1.0106***  1.0171*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏    -0.0019 -0.0035 0.0040 -0.0067 0.0198 0.0137  0.3204*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣    0.0252*** 0.0299*** 0.0299*** 0.0203** 0.0283*** 0.0220**  0.0484*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜   0.9581*** 0.9271*** 1.0033*** 0.9962*** 0.9851*** 0.9732***  1.0004*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   -0.0105 0.0238 0.1321 0.0064 0.0045 -0.0345  -0.0006 
𝛽𝑞𝑜    2.3769*** 2.4064*** 2.2723*** 1.9673*** 2.0509*** 2.2763***  -1.2651** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    -1.7829** -1.5130** -2.0935*** -1.9617*** -1.7639*** -1.2523*  -0.3708 
𝛽𝑞𝑣    -0.6598 -0.7658* -0.3797 -0.3360 -0.5455 -0.7010*  0.2801 
𝜎𝑠    0.0608*** 0.0612*** 0.0598*** 0.0551*** 0.0590*** 0.0608***  0.0127*** 
𝜎𝑐    0.1558*** 0.1538*** 0.1422*** 0.1336*** 0.1534*** 0.1745***  0.0677*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗   0.0125 0.0192 -0.0212 -0.0306*** -0.0212*** -0.0233***  0.1094*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗   0.0006 -0.0067 -0.0038 0.0001 -0.0043 -0.0043  0.0242*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗   -0.0350 -0.2176 -0.1933 -0.0003 -0.0202 0.0211  -0.0214*** 
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗   -0.2178 -0.5809 0.3488 -0.0684 0.2310 -0.0794  -0.5417 
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗   0.0873 0.3371 -0.3267 -0.5310 -0.0872 -0.0004  0.1621 
Log-Likelihood 344.3840 345.5936 346.8427 349.4071 347.9680 348.2696  347.7018 
AIC      -2.3612 -2.3698 -2.3788 -2.3972 -2.3869 -2.3890  -2.3850 
SBIC    -2.4687 -2.4774 -2.4863 -2.5047 -2.4944 -2.4966  -2.4925 
HQIC   -2.2829 -2.2915 -2.3005 -2.3189 -2.3086 -2.3107  -2.3066 
Volatility regimes 25.1345*** 27.5537*** 30.0518*** 35.1807*** 32.3025*** 32.9056***  31.7702*** 
Mixture of normals 25.0164*** 27.4356*** 29.9337*** 35.0626*** 32.1844*** 32.7875***  31.6521*** 
Fads      24.7366*** 27.1559*** 29.6540*** 34.7829*** 31.9046*** 32.5078***  31.3723*** 
VNS     15.2147** 17.6339** 20.1321*** 25.2609*** 22.3827*** 22.9858***  21.8504*** 
Volume-augmented 2.1589 4.5781 7.0763 12.2051** 9.3269* 9.9301*  8.7946 
Model J-P 8.5935** 9.4860*** 11.3549*** 4.9687* 9.0747** 6.2999**  0.0000 
Model J-R 2.1475 3.6045 2.0242 5.9136* 2.8563 3.9980  4.6177* 
Model J-V 13.6858*** 15.5180*** 16.9029*** 14.2622*** 14.4060*** 11.8983**  13.5545*** 
Starting observation Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989  Sep 1989 
No of observations 279 279 279 279 279 279  279 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 37 (continued) 
Dependent Variable: Technology 
Independent 
Variables 
Agro & Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.1085*** 0.9901*** 0.9922*** 1.1038*** 1.0627*** 1.0998*** 1.0834***  
𝛽𝑠𝑏    0.0564 -0.0195*** -0.0163*** 0.0984 0.2049* 0.0804 0.0462  
𝛽𝑠𝑣    0.2197* -0.0043 -0.0051 0.2068* 0.1450 0.1978 0.1824  
𝛽𝑐𝑜   0.9919*** 1.0102*** 1.0700*** 0.9917*** 0.9925*** 0.9925*** 0.9927***  
𝛽𝑐𝑏   -0.0172*** 0.0771 0.1350 -0.0167*** -0.0214*** -0.0168** -0.0168***  
𝛽𝑞𝑜    -0.1067 0.2563 0.6138* -0.6482** -0.4230 -0.1741 -0.2097  
𝛽𝑞𝑏    -1.2938*** 1.3105*** 1.0743*** -1.6088*** -1.6419*** -1.2861*** -1.2751***  
𝛽𝑞𝑣    -0.4159* 0.3641 0.4745** -0.5541** -0.6588** -0.4529** -0.8093***  
𝜎𝑠    0.3254*** 0.0646*** 0.0677*** 0.3304*** 0.3048*** 0.3259*** 0.3161***  
𝜎𝑐    0.0682*** 0.3217*** 0.3436*** 0.0697*** 0.0675*** 0.0682*** 0.0670***  
𝛽𝑠𝑏𝑗   0.0287 -0.0425 0.0174 -0.0799 -0.1772** -0.0275 0.0361  
𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗   -0.0393 -0.0099 -0.0112 -0.0237 0.0378 -0.0263 0.0489  
𝛽𝑐𝑏𝑗   -0.0029 -0.2240 -0.1117 -0.0067 0.0102 0.0000 0.0040  
𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗   -0.0688 -0.9920 -0.7271* 1.3965** 0.8288** 0.0328 0.0193  
𝛽𝑞𝑣𝑗   0.0404 -0.0181 -0.2720 0.4811** 0.4450* 0.1854 0.8444**  
Log-Likelihood 237.8930 242.2538 241.6435 245.8369 245.1723 238.2418 241.5299  
AIC      -1.5978 -1.6291 -1.6247 -1.6547 -1.6500 -1.6003 -1.6239  
SBIC    -1.7053 -1.7366 -1.7322 -1.7623 -1.7575 -1.7078 -1.7314  
HQIC   -1.5195 -1.5507 -1.5464 -1.5764 -1.5717 -1.5220 -1.5456  
Volatility regimes 30.1743*** 38.8960*** 37.6752*** 46.0620*** 44.7328*** 30.8720*** 37.4481***  
Mixture of normals 27.2852*** 36.0068*** 34.7860*** 43.1729*** 41.8437*** 27.9828*** 34.5589***  
Fads      23.5317*** 32.2533*** 31.0326*** 39.4194*** 38.0902*** 24.2293*** 30.8055***  
VNS     6.3018 15.0235** 13.8027* 22.1895*** 20.8604*** 6.9995 13.5756*  
Volume-augmented 1.5461 10.2677* 9.0469 16.3519*** 16.1046*** 2.2437 7.7380  
Model J-P 3.3756 4.3789 4.5198 3.2353 3.1928 3.2382 4.0865  
Model J-R 4.3271 3.8601 5.5552* 0.0000 2.6904 5.0045* 10.5229***  
Model J-V 6.0917 7.6796 9.9282** 12.6683** 9.4417* 6.8973 13.2161**  
Starting observation Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989 Sep 1989  
No of observations 279 279 279 279 279 279 279  
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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The robustness checks against other models reveal that Model J is better than most of the 
simpler specifications, namely the volatility regime, the fads, and the VNS models. 
However, it only improves from the basic volume-augmented models in about 48% of all 
the cases. This test against the volume-augmented models also serves as block exogeneity 
test for Model J. The results are also summarised in Table 38. In general, it shows several 
linkages to and from the Industrials, Services and Technology to other industry groups, 
while the Resources industry group receives very limited influence from others but develops 
bubbles before some of them. Remarkably, the test picks up only a few linkages between 
the Financials industry group with others. Moreover, it discovers only a couple of cases of 
transmission from Property & Construction industry group although it is affected by bubbles 
in all other industry groups except Industrials.  
 
The robustness tests against the Model types P, R, and V – where the volume terms are 
dropped – are only statistically significant in about 32%, 34%, and 48% of all the cases, 
respectively. This is consistent with the majority of the trading-volume parameters being 
statistically insignificant as discussed earlier.   
 
When considering the results for each industry group, there are a number of points to take 
note of. Firstly, the specifications with Agro & Food industry group as the dependent 
variable always yield positive 𝛽𝑠𝑣
𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂,𝑗
, which are statistically significant in five out of seven 
cases, and 𝛽𝑞𝑣
𝐴𝐺𝑅𝑂,𝑗
which are all negative and statistically significant in four cases. Similarly, 
the 𝛽𝑠𝑣
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐼𝐴𝐿,𝑗
 for Financials industry group as the dependent variable are all positive with 
four cases of statistical significance. These suggest the importance of abnormal trading 
volume of Agro & Food and Financials industry groups in determining their own returns. 
In the cases where Agro & Food industry group is included as the additional independent 
industry group, the models are not better than basic volume-augmented models, except for 
a case with Property & Construction. Thus, Agro & Food industry group has a very limited 
linkage to others. 
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Table 38: Block Exogeneity Test for Model J  
Model 
J 
Independent Variables 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
  
Agro & 
Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
Agro & 
Food 
N/A * * ***       *** 
Consumer 
Products 
  N/A       *** * *** 
Financials   * N/A ***   ***   *** 
Industrials     * N/A   ** **   
Property & 
Construction 
*** ** ***   N/A *** * *** 
Resources       **   N/A     
Services       ** * * N/A   
Technology   *   *** ***     N/A 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. This is equivalent to performing the log-likelihood ratio test between Model 
J and the basic Volume-augmented model. 
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The impact from the bubble on Industrials industry group tends to work through the return 
equation, while the influence of the trading volume appears to affect the probability of 
surviving. This is shown by the results that 𝛽𝑠𝑏
𝑖𝑗
 and 𝛽𝑞𝑣
𝑖𝑗
 are always positive, as expected, 
and they are statistically significant in six and four cases, respectively. It is the opposite for 
the Services industry group, where 𝛽𝑠𝑣
𝑖𝑗
 and 𝛽𝑞𝑏
𝑖𝑗
 are very important in many cases, which 
suggest strong effects of trading volume on returns and bubble on the probability instead. 
 
The effect of bubble size on the probability of bubble surviving, 𝛽𝑞𝑏
𝑖𝑗
, when investigating the 
Property & Construction industry group is very crucial. The estimates are negative in almost 
all the cases, except for PROPCON-TECH, and are also statistically significant in almost 
all the cases, except for PROPCON-FINCIAL. Meanwhile, the effect from bubble from 
another industry group, 𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗
𝑖𝑗
,  tend to be quite large and four cases are statistically 
significant. For instance, they are -4.2197, -3.9999, -1.6380, and -2.9005 in the cases of 
PROPCON-AGRO, PROPCON-CONSUMP, PROPCON-FINCIAL, and PROPCON-
TECH, respectively. This means the expected probabilities of a bubble in the Property & 
Construction industry group surviving are heavily affected by the bubble contagious from 
several other industry groups.  
 
Besides, the trading volumes of either the Property & Construction or any additional 
independent variable industry groups, except for Technology, do not seem to be relevant in 
explaining the returns of the industry group. This is reflected by the fact that all the volume-
related parameters (𝛽𝑠𝑣
𝑖𝑗
, 𝛽𝑞𝑣
𝑖𝑗
, 𝛽𝑠𝑣𝑗
𝑖𝑗
and 𝛽𝑞𝑏𝑗
𝑖𝑗
) turned out to be statistically insignificant and the 
tests against the model type P, R, and V where volume terms are left out were also not 
rejected. A similar result is found in the case of Consumer Products industry group as a 
dependent variable. There, out of 28 parameters, only the 𝛽𝑞𝑣
𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑀𝑃,𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐼𝐶𝐸  was found to 
be statistically significant. 
 
The Resources industry group is strongly influenced by the relative bubble terms. When 
investigating the Resources industry group, the 𝛽𝑠𝑏
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶,𝑗
are all statistically significant 
although they are all negative and smaller than 𝛽𝑐𝑏
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶,𝑗
, contradicting the intuition from 
the theory, while the 𝛽𝑞𝑏
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶,𝑗
 are all statistically significant and negative as expected. 
However, it is important to also note that the specifications almost always are not better than 
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simpler fads, VNS, and volume-augmented models, except for the case with Industrials 
industry group. This explains the limited linkage from other industry groups to the 
Resources. When the Resources industry group is the additional independent variable, it 
yields six cases of negative  𝛽𝑠𝑏
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶,𝑗
 , except for Financials, and five of them are 
statistically significant, except for Financials and Technology.  It also correlates with cases 
of all negative 𝛽𝑞𝑏
𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑂𝑈𝑅𝐶,𝑗
and they are all statistically significant, except for Agro & Food 
as a dependent variable.  
 
Finally, the Technology industry group is the most notable in several ways. Investigation of 
the returns in Technology industry group found five cases of negative and statistically 
significant effect of relative bubble on the return in the collapsing regime (𝛽𝑐𝑏
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻,𝑗
), while 
the other two cases of positive 𝛽𝑐𝑏
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻,𝑗
are found to be statistically insignificant. In the 
probability equation, both the 𝛽𝑞𝑏
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻,𝑗
and 𝛽𝑞𝑣
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻,𝑗
 are all statistically significant, though 
they are unexpectedly negative in the cases where Consumer Products and Financials are 
the additional industry group. However, the average probability estimates,  𝛽𝑞𝑜
𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻,𝑗
, are 
mostly statistically insignificant, suggesting the average probability that is no different from 
50%. The magnitudes of the standard deviations in the two regimes, as reported earlier, are 
contradicting the expectations in many cases. The surviving regime was found to be more 
volatile than when the bubble collapses, except for TECH-CONSUMP and TECH-
FINCIAL again.  
 
For the specifications where Technology was included as the second industry group, the 
effects of relative bubble terms from Technology on returns of the particular industry group 
being studied are quite strong. The impact on the state-determining probability equation 
(𝛽𝑞𝑏
𝑖,𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻), are statistically significant in five cases although they only have the expected 
negative signs in CONSUMP-TECH and PROPCON-TECH. The influence on the returns 
when the bubble survives (𝛽𝑠𝑏
𝑖,𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻) are also statistically significant in five cases, though 
they have mixed signs as well.  The parameter, 𝛽𝑐𝑏
𝑖,𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻
, which illustrate the impact of a 
bubble from Technology on returns of another in other industry group, are negative as 
expected, except for Financials. However, only three of them are statistically significant, 
namely, the cases with Consumer Products, Property & Construction, and Services.  
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The contagion from Technology to other industry groups via trading volume is quite limited. 
This is shown by the parameter 𝛽𝑠𝑣
𝑖,𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻
. While they have the expected positive signs in 
almost all the cases, except for Financials, the estimates are only statistically significant in 
two cases of Property & Construction and Services. Moreover, the estimates of 𝛽𝑞𝑣
𝑖,𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐻
, 
which captures the effect of Technology’s trading volume on the probability equations, are 
almost always statistically insignificant and have mixed signs.  
  
7.2.4. Comparison of Results from Model A and Model J 
 
As the Model J is actually nested in the Model A, results from the two models can be 
compared with Log-likelihood Ratio (LR) test to determine whether the Model A offers an 
improvement over the more parsimonious Model J. The results are presented in Table 39.  
 
Overall, the evidence reveals 30 cases of LR test rejection, which suggests the Model A is 
mostly preferred to Model J, while the null hypothesis that Model J is the true model is not 
refuted in four other cases – two in Financials and two others in Property & Construction 
and Services. There are also 22 other cases (approximately 39% of all the cases) which were 
reported as invalid. This refers to a situation where maximised likelihood statistics from the 
Model J is unexpectedly higher than that of the comparable Model A. This is totally 
counterintuitive because the larger model should, at least, have the same likelihood statistics 
at optimal. The problem is believed to be caused by the inefficient estimations of the Model 
A in that it may contain too many parameters to be efficiently estimated.  Even though 
attempts to reiterate the optimisations with multiple sets of randomised starting values were 
included in the MATLAB code, it is extremely difficult to predict in advance the suitable 
magnitudes of 45 different parameters. The issue is observed primarily in cases where 
Financials, Industrials, Property & Construction, Resources, and Technology industry 
groups are the independent variables, and Consumer Products and Services are the 
dependent variables. Therefore, these results are to be interpreted with some caution. 
 217 
 
Table 39: Log-Likelihood Ratio Test – Model A vs. Model J 
Ho: The reduced model (i.e. Model J) is true 
LR 
Test 
Independent Variables 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
 
Agro & 
Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
Agro & 
Food 
N/A 67.6761*** Invalid Invalid Invalid Invalid 35.4763 Invalid 
Consumer 
Products 
61.9269*** N/A Invalid Invalid Invalid Invalid Invalid Invalid 
Financials 374.8506*** 345.9985*** N/A 232.5167*** 52.3901*** 114.1027*** 311.8641*** 140.9148*** 
Industrials 180.0985*** 155.7373*** Invalid N/A Invalid Invalid 116.4080*** Invalid 
Property & 
Construction 
353.9239*** 331.2543*** 17.4386 233.8022*** N/A 90.3162*** 298.6385*** 103.9403*** 
Resources 298.5818*** 278.7544*** Invalid 160.4132*** Invalid N/A 236.0896*** 92.8228*** 
Services 141.6172*** 114.7728*** Invalid Invalid Invalid Invalid N/A Invalid 
Technology 354.5992*** 321.4523*** 13.2917 206.4637*** 18.8784 104.2855*** 287.7274*** N/A 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 40 shows the results from the Model A and Model J, as well as, the LR tests between 
them. Firstly, the evidence is somewhat alike. On the whole, they offer the same conclusions 
in 28 cases – which is 50% of all the cases – with 15 cases of no contagion detected and 13 
cases of some level of linkages between industry groups.  
 
Secondly, test invalidity occurs in 22 cases, as pointed out previously. However, there are 
nine cases where the two models have the same implication. Precisely, they include four 
cases of some evidence of contagion and five other cases of no evidence at all.  This leaves 
only 13 cases of inconclusive results.  
 
Lastly, the shaded cells in Table 40 indicate a presence of contagion as detected by the 
preferred model or that both models found some evidence of linkages. Table 41 concludes 
the number of cases where each industry group is found to be connected with others. It also 
considers the cases of inconclusive results as possible linkages.  
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Table 40: Comparison between Model A and Model J 
 
Independent 
Variables 
Agro & 
Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
Dependent 
Variables 
Test\Model A J A J A J A J A J A J A J A J 
Agro & Food 
BE  
N/A 
*** * *** * *** *** ***  ***    *** *** 
LR  A Invalid – S Invalid – S Invalid Invalid J Invalid – S 
Consumer 
Products 
BE  ***  
N/A 
*  *  ***   ***  *  *** 
LR  A Invalid Invalid Invalid Invalid Invalid Invalid 
Financials 
BE  ***  *** * 
N/A 
 *** ***   ***   *** *** 
LR  A A A A A A A 
Industrials 
BE       * 
N/A 
  ** **  **   
LR  A A Invalid Invalid – N Invalid – S A Invalid – N 
Property & 
Construction 
BE   *** ** ** * ***   
N/A 
 ***  * *** *** 
LR  A A J A A A A 
Resources 
BE         **   
N/A 
    
LR  A A Invalid – N A Invalid – N A A 
Services 
BE  ***       **  *  * 
N/A 
***  
LR  A A Invalid – N Invalid Invalid Invalid Invalid 
Technology 
BE  ***  *** * ***  *** *** *** *** ***  ***  
N/A 
LR  A A J A J A A 
Note: BE stands for Block Exogeneity Tests, while LR refers to Log-likelihood Ratio Tests where A and J mean either Model A or Model J is preferred, respectively, and Invalid denotes cases 
where the maximised likelihood statistics from Model A were unexpectedly lower than Model J’s, while Invalid – S and Invalid – N are cases where the LR tests are invalid, but the results from 
both models found either some level of linkages (S) or no linkage between the two industry groups (N) at all, respectively. The shaded cells are specifications with contagion detected. ***, **, * 
denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 41: Total Number of Linkages To and From Industry Groups 
Industry Group 
Contagion 
To 
Contagion 
From 
Total 
Linkages 
 
With Possible Additional 
Contagion To 
With Possible Additional 
Contagion From 
Total Possible 
Linkages 
Agro & Food 4 4 8  6 4 10 
Consumer Products 1 4 5  7 4 11 
Financials 4 2 6  4 4 8 
Industrials 1 2 3  2 4 6 
Property & 
Construction 
3 2 5  3 5 8 
Resources 0 2 2  0 5 5 
Services 1 1 2  5 2 7 
Technology 6 3 9  6 5 11 
 
Note: Possible additional contagion refers to cases where the LR test is invalid, and the results from Model A and Model J are inconclusive. 
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As per general view, the Technology industry group is found to be the most interconnected 
with contagion to six other industry group (except Financials) and from three industry 
groups, which can potentially increase to five. Consumer Products, Financials, and Property 
& Construction are also reasonably contagious with several other industry groups, as 
expected, although the result for Consumer Products could change dramatically with the 
cases of test invalidity. On a contrary, the results of the Agro & Food industry group is 
rather surprisingly. The evidence suggests that it is quite heavily linked with other industry 
groups.  
 
Finally, Resources is the most isolated industry group, as it does not seem to pass on effect 
to returns of any other industry groups, though it appears to develop bubbles following a 
few others. Services and Industrials are also found to have quite limited linkages with other 
industry groups, although that may be different with the inconclusive results.  
 
7.2.5. Granger Causality Tests 
 
An alternative methodology for analysing contagion between industry groups is to conduct 
Granger Causality tests. It detects an existence of the independent variable in the past 
preceding the dependent variable and therefore can be used as evidence of spillovers. Both 
the returns and relative bubble terms were investigated. 
 
The results from the pairwise Granger Causality tests using returns from different industry 
groups are reported in Table 42. In general, they are similar to those obtained from the 
Model A discussed above. Resources industry group remains essentially isolated – now with 
no connection to other industry groups although a link to Consumer Products was detected 
– while Technology still is the most interconnected industry group having had its returns 
preceded several industry groups and followed many of them. The results for Services 
industry group show additional links to three other industry groups and from several new 
industry groups.    
 
Fewer cases of directions from Financials and Industrial industry groups were picked up, 
but additional cases of influence on them from other industry groups were also detected. 
Lastly,  
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Property & Construction was found to be more independent from others, but there are still 
flows to and from Financials and to Technology industry groups.  
 
Table 43 presents evidence from the Granger Causality tests on the relative bubble term. 
Overall, the test reveals slightly fewer cases of linkages between bubbles from different 
industry groups than those detected with the Model A, but comparable to the Granger 
Causality tests on returns although the exact pairs are somewhat different. Financials, 
Industrials, Property & Construction, and Technology industry groups remain heavily 
connected with others, as their bubbles form before the existence of a bubble in many other 
industry groups. However, bubbles in these industry groups only follow bubbles in only a 
few others. Meanwhile, Resources and Services industry groups are shown to have limited 
linkages with others, in terms of bubble formation. 
 
In conclusion, the results from Granger Causality tests partially support evidence suggested 
by the speculative bubble models. Precisely, Financial, Industrials, and Technology industry 
groups are found to be strongly linked with several other industry groups in the market, 
although the evidence on the returns and the bubble terms are less clear on the lead-lag 
relationships between them. Resources industry group is predominantly unconnected to 
others in all sets of evidence. Property & Construction and Services industry groups have 
somewhat inconsistent results. The former is unexpectedly shown to be quite cut off from 
other industry groups with the Granger Causality on returns, while the same analysis also 
reveals additional links of Services with other industry groups although other sets of results 
seem to imply it is relatively isolated. 
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Table 42: Granger Causality Test: Returns 
Ho: The independent variable does not Granger-cause the dependent variable 
Returns Independent Variables 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
 
Agro & 
Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
Agro & 
Food N/A 3.2495* 0.5553 0.4496 0.0353 1.6846 1.0621 5.3724*** 
Consumer 
Products 5.8171*** N/A 0.2261 0.0516 1.9113 0.8617 0.2389 5.4961*** 
Financials 2.8638* 2.7405* N/A 2.9218* 4.7280** 2.4585 6.8082*** 2.9122* 
Industrials 10.9360*** 9.4524*** 0.0488 N/A 1.7089 0.8016 4.7033** 1.1342 
Property & 
Construction 1.6723 2.4224 3.9286** 1.6540 N/A 1.2126 4.4632** 2.2176 
Resources 0.3646 3.7404* 0.3276 1.0314 0.6128 N/A 0.3656 0.9496 
Services 0.8266 4.3660** 5.4512*** 4.6178** 0.0987 2.0805 N/A 5.4674*** 
Technology 6.6457*** 5.3542*** 5.9705*** 0.0885 7.4298*** 0.4757 5.8736*** N/A 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table 43: Granger Causality Test: Relative Bubble Terms 
Ho: The independent variable does not Granger-cause the dependent variable 
Bubbles Independent Variables 
D
ep
en
d
en
t 
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s 
 
Agro & 
Food 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
Agro & 
Food N/A 5.5251*** 6.8009*** 8.2156*** 9.4919*** 2.2141 5.1967** 9.8415*** 
Consumer 
Products 8.4421*** N/A 4.5324*** 4.4578** 8.1480*** 2.3358 0.4391 6.5735*** 
Financials 1.7802 4.6295** N/A 0.8814 2.1928 0.2451 1.2898 0.2358 
Industrials 2.7535* 2.5919 5.8541*** N/A 4.3671** 2.1134 2.1970 4.2712** 
Property & 
Construction 4.0859** 8.0386*** 1.5177 5.3416*** N/A 1.5627 1.0479 3.1127* 
Resources 0.5257 1.0582 5.1846** 0.1129 0.2280 N/A 4.8513** 0.2522 
Services 0.8352 0.0219 10.4853*** 1.1729 5.2175*** 0.5636 N/A 6.3534*** 
Technology 1.3044 1.3730 3.2692* 3.2928* 2.0183 6.8936*** 1.7605 N/A 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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7.3. Conclusions 
 
The previous chapter tested the existence of speculative bubbles in various sectors or 
industry groups in the Thai stock market and found most of them with at least some evidence 
of bubbles. This chapter sets out to investigate the contagion or the transmission of bubbles 
between them. The analysis includes both variants of speculative bubble models and the 
Granger-Causality tests.   
Specifically, the channels for the effects coming other industry groups or the overall market 
index are built into the basic regime-switching models. The first specification, Model A, 
allows for impacts from all other industry groups. However, the model would include a large 
number of parameters to be estimated. Therefore, a simpler Model J is also adopted to study 
the linkages between two industry groups at a time. Overall, the evidence implies that 
Technology is the most contagious industry group, while Resources is the most isolated. 
This may suggest a distinction between the characteristics of the new-economy, tech-related 
shares and those in the traditional resource-based sectors. Meanwhile, Financials, 
Industrials, and Property & Construction are moderately linked with several other industry 
groups. Moreover, it also reveals that the Agro & Food and Consumer Products are quite 
heavily interconnected with other industry groups, which is somewhat unexpected. 
Unfortunately, the results are rather inconclusive for the Services industry group. 
The chapter also explores an alternative approach to capture impact from outside a particular 
industry group by assuming the market-wide index as a proxy in Model M. The baseline 
specification yields an expected result that all industry groups are affected by the market as 
a whole. However, the three model sub-types, based on different sets of abnormal volume 
term dropped, offer an interesting insight. With the Model A, several industry groups are 
affected by all other industry groups through their return equations, rather than via the 
probability equation, whereas the opposite finding is discovered when Model M is applied. 
In other words, a bubble in the overall market is associated with a bubble in individual 
industry group collapsing in the next period, while the bubbles in other industry groups tend 
to directly affect the next-period return of a particular industry group.  
The last part of the chapter examined the linkages between industry groups with the Granger 
Causality tests. In general, the evidence is fairly in support of the conclusion found in the 
previous section. Specifically, the results based on returns of the different pair of industry 
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groups reveal that the return of the Consumer Products precedes return of six other industry 
groups. This is reasonable as the performance of this industry group relies on purchasing 
power of consumers, and a strong demand for consumption could support profits in other 
industry groups as well. In contrast, the performance of financial intermediaries typically 
lags behind the economy. For example, after the economy slows down, non-performing 
loans at commercial banks would begin to rise. This is supported by the evidence that return 
of the Financials industry group follows six others. As for the results based on the bubble 
terms, the evidence indicates that bubbles in Financials and Technology industry groups 
precede most of the others, which would be in line with the popular opinion.     
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
This study was set out to examine the existence and the transmission of bubbles in the Thai 
stock market from its foundation in April 1975 until December 2012. It has applied several 
variants of regime-switching bubble models to detect bubble-like behaviour, as well as, the 
linkages between bubbles in different industry groups in the Thai market.  
 
The first empirical chapter investigated a bubble in the aggregate market index. The results 
from the volume-augmented regime-switching bubble model suggested some evidence of a 
bubble in the SET index. The chapter also presented various robustness checks, as well as, 
extensions to the base model. Particularly, some of the specifications allowed for structural 
breaks in the Thai stock returns. Thailand replaced the fixed exchange rate regime for a 
managed float system in July 1997. Indeed, the model including one intercept dummy 
variable as a proxy for the break starting from July 1997 was proved to better at capturing 
return variability than the standard model. However, when the breakpoint was set to be 
determined by the model, it was revealed to be in at the end of June 1990 which overlapped 
with the period when the Thai government introduced financial liberalisation policies. More 
interestingly, the model with two endogenous breaks was able to illustrate the important 
effect of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis by pointing out September 1996 and August 1998 
as the most appropriate structural breaks. The analysis of implied probabilities statistics 
from the regime-switching models was also shown to be mostly consistent with the actual 
performance of the index, which supports the methodology choice.   
 
The second empirical chapter analysed the disaggregated indices. Series from different 
datasets were investigated, and the general conclusion was that there was at least some 
evidence in various segments in the Thai stock market. The first set was the official SET’s 
industry group. However, the complete data suitable for the volume-augmented regime-
switching bubble models was only available from December 2007. Once allowed for an 
initial burn-in period for fundamental value computations, it only contained 49 observations, 
which was arguably too short to produce convincing evidence. The disaggregated SET’s 
sectoral indices were considered next. The eight industry groups can be sub-divided into 27 
sectors. The majority of the sectoral indices are most fitting with the model with two 
structural breaks on September 1996 and August 1998. Financials, Industrials, and 
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Technology are three industry groups which had one of their sectors (Banking, Industrial 
Materials & Machinery, and Information & Communication Technology, respectively) 
detected with strong evidence of bubble presence. Some evidence were also found in many 
other sectors from every industry groups. Then, the Datastream-calculated indices were 
investigated. Similarly, more than half of the indices were found to work best with the model 
with two intercept dummy variables. The results showed strong evidence of bubbles in 
Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, and Financials stocks, while some evidence were 
also detected in Health Care, Industrials, and Utilities. However, these outcomes are to be 
interpreted with caution, as there was an issue with dividend yields reported as zero for 
extended periods in some of the indices. The classification of stocks by Datastream was also 
inconsistent with the official SET’s indices. 
 
All the different datasets had certain limitations, for instance, availability of the industry 
group indices, tractability working with 27 sectoral indices, and reliability of the 
Datastream-calculated indices. As a result, a new set of indices, called the K-NI, was 
proposed by the author. It was constructed by imitating the computations of the SET’s 
industry group and sectoral indices but only grouped into eight industry groups and extended 
as far back as 1988. All the K-NI industry groups were best suited to the model with two 
structural breaks, except for the Technology industry group where it was no better than the 
basic volume-augmented model. The results showed at least some level of evidence in every 
industry groups, except the Resources. 
 
Comparing the evidence from these first two chapters on the aggregate market index and 
the disaggregated indices, they were consistent with Jung and Shiller (2005) who put 
forward that aggregation would average out impacts from individual constituent stocks or 
indices and make evidence of bubbles less apparent.   
 
Transmission of bubbles between industry groups within the Thai stock market was studied 
in the third empirical chapter. The standard regime-switching models were extended in three 
key settings. The first was to include impacts of all other industry groups, called the Model 
A. Model M was the second specification, and it allowed for influence from the market 
index on individual industry groups. Lastly, the pairwise contagion between each two 
industry groups was assessed with Model J. Moreover, as the Model J is nested within the 
full Model A,their results can be compared with log-likelihood ratio tests. The main findings 
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were that Technology appeared to be most heavily linked with other industry groups, while 
some evidence of contagion were found in other popular industry groups, namely, 
Financials, Industrials, and Property & Construction, as well. Surprisingly, evidence of 
bubble transmission was also detected in Agro & Food and Consumer Products. The results 
for Services was ambiguous, which leaves Resources to be the only industry group that is 
relatively separated from others.  
 
In addition, as the number of parameters to be estimated in the complete bubble contagion 
models was quite large, the more parsimonious models where the volume terms were 
removed in certain ways were also taken into considerations. It revealed an interesting 
feature of the different influence of other industry groups and the main market to a particular 
industry group. Precisely, the impact of bubbles in other related industry groups was 
primarily observed in the returns, while the bubble in the market as a whole appeared to 
chiefly affect the probability of the industry group’s bubble collapsing in the next period.  
 
The insights gained from analysing stock market bubbles could have several important 
implications. The understanding of asset price evolution and bubble behaviour can help 
improve the functioning of the financial markets. The cost of a bursting bubble is massive. 
Several authors had offered recommendations to policy makers and regulators. For instance, 
Scherbina (2013) pushed for the removal of various conditions for bubble formation like 
short sale constraints or perverse incentives and providing better financial education to the 
public to reduce irrationality. Jones (2014) emphasised on the additional role of monitoring 
quantity indicators, such as quality of financial asset issuance and underwriting standards. 
However, given various issues, the ability of the policy makers to recognise ongoing bubble 
is far from perfect. Also, the financial markets are continuously evolving both in terms of 
size and depth. Hence, policy makers should be aware that the next threat to financial 
stability could be different from what encountered in the past. 
 
Future research could take several paths. Firstly, it could focus on developing a surveillance 
framework for bubble detection. Identification of bubbles is a complicated undertaking and 
probably cannot be reduced to a single equation. The introduction of new indicators, as well 
as, comparative studies of different market scenarios, would be valuable. Monitoring efforts 
should also be updated frequently, as price patterns can change in relatively short time. 
Secondly, investors would benefit from having trading rules that can detect different stages 
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of bubble developments and time the eventual collapse, as well as, track flows of funds from 
one sector to another. They should be tested against other investment strategies to validate 
their financial usefulness through both explosive and dormant phases. Particularly, it would 
also be desirable to be able to parameterise the models more parsimoniously. However, it 
should be noted that if all investors assume the same strategies, bubbles may never be 
formed in the first place. Finally, additional works in terms of theoretical literature are still 
needed. For instance, the relationship between actual price and fundamentals could be 
subjected change in investor preference, and this can be modelled with the game theoretical 
approach (Brooks and Katsaris, 2003a). 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Results based on SET’s Industry Group Indices 
 
This appendix discusses the results based on eight industry group indices of the Stock 
Exchange of Thailand. Based on the evidence presented in Table A1-1, there are five main 
panels. The top panel presented the estimated parameters with asterisks denoting different 
levels of statistical significance. The next panel showed the log-likelihood statistics at 
optimum and different information criteria. The coefficient restriction tests and the 
robustness checks against simpler specifications were presented in the next two panels. The 
bottom panel reported the starting observation and the number of observations included in 
the estimation.  
 
Consider the results for Financials industry group, for example, the coefficients 𝛽𝑠𝑜 and 𝛽𝑐𝑜 
are 1.0364 and 0.9579, respectively. This suggests that the average net monthly return in 
the surviving and collapsing regimes for the Financials industry group are 3.64% and a loss 
of 4.21% per month or 53.58% and -40.32% per year, respectively. The estimated 
parameters of the relative bubble term (𝛽𝑠𝑏  and  𝛽𝑐𝑏) are both statistically significant – 
particularly, 𝛽𝑐𝑏  is negative and is smaller than 𝛽𝑠𝑏  as postulated by the theory. The 
parameter 𝛽𝑞𝑜 shows the average probability for the next period to be in a surviving regime. 
It is estimated to be 2.1368 which suggests the cumulative normal distribution probability 
of 98.37%. However, as the bubble grows, this probability drops very quickly, as shown by 
the estimated 𝛽𝑞𝑏  of -2.9979. Unexpectedly, the standard deviations of the Financials 
industry group in the surviving regime, 𝜎𝑠, turns out to be higher than that in the collapsing 
regime, 𝜎𝑐. Results from all other industry groups can be interpreted in a similar manner. 
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Table A1-1: SET’s Industry Group Indices: VNS model 
 
Agro & Food 
Industry 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.0192*** 1.0364*** 1.0649*** 1.0783*** 1.0369*** 1.0469*** 0.9021*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏   -0.0403 -0.1077** -0.0556* -0.1136*** 0.0798*** -0.0323 -0.3039*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑜   1.0365*** 0.9579*** 0.8641*** 0.9560*** 1.0119*** 0.9521*** 1.0702*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.8583*** -0.1345*** -0.0768*** -0.0277 -0.1886*** -0.0703*** 0.0942 
𝛽𝑞𝑜   0.4129 2.1368** 2.0063*** 0.8561* -0.6591 5.7691** -0.4460 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    8.2436* -2.9979 -1.4852** -0.9579 0.7963 -9.0113* 0.4464 
𝜎𝑠   0.0359*** 0.0616*** 0.0754*** 0.0444*** 0.0173*** 0.0506*** 0.0329*** 
𝜎𝑐   0.0003*** 0.0108** 0.0406*** 0.0347*** 0.0676*** 0.0058** 0.0556*** 
Log-Likelihood  107.0412 68.1609 48.7891 66.7613 69.5707 78.4869 70.7060 
AIC  -4.0425 -2.4555 -1.6649 -2.3984 -2.5131 -2.8770 -2.5594 
SBIC  -4.3690 -2.7821 -1.9914 -2.7250 -2.8396 -3.2035 -2.8860 
HQIC  -3.9253 -2.3384 -1.5477 -2.2812 -2.3959 -2.7598 -2.4422 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜   17.0162*** 2.8022* 5.1492** 4.1215** 11.5540*** 7.4223*** 2.3644 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0   0.0000 2.8022* 5.1492** 0.7249 10.1949*** 7.4223*** 0.0000 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.0000 2.8022* 5.1492** 0.0000 13.0815*** 7.4223*** 0.0000 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0   0.0000 2.8022* 5.1492** 10.5349*** 0.0000 7.4223*** 0.0000 
Volatility regimes  37.2999*** 7.8738* 4.2717 15.1239*** 19.5435*** 7.8229* 8.1701* 
Mixture of normals  5.4230 0.0000 2.7286 15.1239*** 19.2023*** 0.0000 5.2808 
Fads  37.0077*** 2.8022 4.0564 10.5349** 17.7449*** 7.4223* 5.9522 
Starting observation Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 
No. of observations 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
 
Note: Results from the VNS model [equations (13) to (17)]. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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The evidence appears to suggest that VNS model is explaining the return behaviour of 
certain industry groups reasonably well. For example, the model worked quite well with 
Industrials, Services, Financials, and, slightly less so with Resources, Property & 
Construction and Consumer Products. However, the standard deviations in almost all of 
these industry groups – except for Resources – in the surviving regime is higher than in the 
collapsing regime, which is counterintuitive. Moreover, results from Industrials, Services 
and Financials are hardly more informative when compared to simpler models like volatility 
regimes, mixtures of normal, or fads models. Astonishingly, the results suggest only a weak 
evidence of bubbles in the Technology index. Note also that there is no result available for 
Agro & Food industry group from the model estimation as the maximum likelihood statistics 
failed to converge, which is probably due to lack of data. 
  
The results with the volume-augmented model are shown in Table A1-2. The model now 
includes two new parameters. The coefficients 𝛽𝑠𝑣  and 𝛽𝑞𝑣 indicate the impact of abnormal 
trading volume in the return function when the bubble survives and the probability of the 
bubble continues to grow in the next period, and they are expected to be positive and 
negative, respectively. Overall, it suggests bubble-like behaviour in Financials and 
Technology industries. Weaker evidence is also found in Industrials, Resources and 
Services.  
 
However, the results seem to imply that there were no bubbles in Property & Construction 
and Consumer Products industries. Moreover, the estimation still did not return any results 
for Agro & Food industry group.  
 
There are still issues with estimated standard deviations. The specification offers an 
improvement over the VNS model. Precisely, the restriction tests are statistically significant 
in four out of seven industry groups and comparisons with simpler models showing stronger 
evidence in favour of the volume-augmented model, except for Industrials.  
 243 
 
Table A1-2: SET’s Industry Group Indices: Volume-augmented model 
 
Agro & Food 
Industry 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜   1.0172*** 1.0207*** 1.0667*** 1.0661*** 1.0357*** 1.0232*** 0.9822*** 
𝛽𝑠𝑏   -0.0152 -0.0421 -0.1038*** -0.2662*** 0.0770*** 0.0019 -0.1371** 
𝛽𝑠𝑣   -0.0135 -0.0028 -0.0798** -0.0154 -0.0023 -0.0370 -0.0268 
𝛽𝑐𝑜   1.0365*** 1.1041*** 1.0101*** 1.0384*** 1.0122*** 1.1079*** 1.0653*** 
𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.8583*** -0.0856*** -0.0053 -0.0331 -0.1927*** -0.0351 0.1262* 
𝛽𝑞𝑜   0.4075 2.5805** 1.7694* 1.1711 -0.6566 0.5577 119.3708 
𝛽𝑞𝑏    8.7579* -3.2415 -3.2920* -3.9531 0.7712 4.9228 -187.7880 
𝛽𝑞𝑣   -0.6254 -2.2143** -1.1287 -3.0648 0.4923 -2.9858 -117.3053 
𝜎𝑠   0.0354*** 0.0586*** 0.0583*** 0.0437*** 0.0181*** 0.0483*** 0.0566*** 
𝜎𝑐   0.0003*** 0.0097*** 0.1139*** 0.0816*** 0.0678*** 0.0175*** 0.0390*** 
Log-Likelihood  108.4365 73.7026 51.1069 66.4105 69.8762 81.9008 74.1539 
AIC  -4.0178 -2.6001 -1.6778 -2.3025 -2.4439 -2.9347 -2.6185 
SBIC  -4.4260 -3.0083 -2.0860 -2.7106 -2.8521 -3.3429 -3.0267 
HQIC  -3.8713 -2.4536 -1.5314 -2.1560 -2.2974 -2.7882 -2.4720 
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜   31.4317*** 10.2454*** 4.3646** 0.8890 4.6508** 5.4790** 3.4555* 
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0   0.0000 10.2454*** 0.0233 0.6344 8.8323*** 2.2142 0.0000 
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏   0.0000 10.2454*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.1002 1.3577 0.0000 
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0   0.0000 10.2454*** 9.4061*** 0.0327 0.0000 0.0000 36.4396*** 
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0   1.6032 10.2454*** 1.0239 3.5895* 0.0000 9.9044*** 9.1597*** 
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Volatility regimes  40.0905*** 18.9572*** 8.9073 14.4223** 20.1546*** 14.6507** 15.0659** 
Mixture of normals  8.2136 7.5929 7.3642 14.4223** 19.8134*** 0.0000 12.1766** 
Fads  39.7983*** 13.8857** 8.6920 9.8333* 18.3560*** 14.2500** 12.8480** 
VNS  2.7906 11.0835*** 4.6356* 0.0000 0.6111 6.8278** 6.8958** 
Starting observation Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 
No. of observations 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
 
Note: Results from the volume-augmented model [equations (22) to (24)]. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Overall, there is some evidence of bubble-like behaviour in many industry groups, namely 
Financials, Industrials, Property & Construction, Resources, Services, and Technology from 
either the VNS or the volume-augmented models. This leaves only Consumer Products, 
which neither models seems to be fitting well and the Agro & Food industry group which 
no results were obtained from estimations. However, these sets of results are to be 
interpreted with great caution. The availability of data was extremely limited. The validity 
of these results is compromised as this can potentially lead to estimation inefficiency, 
meaning the distribution of the estimator is wider than it would have been with a larger 
sample. Results from several industry groups did not always capture more variability of 
returns than simpler specifications, or they yield standard deviations in the surviving regime 
that are larger than those in the collapsing regime, which is rather counterintuitive. 
Moreover, the appropriate breaks for the models with dummy variables as analysed in the 
previous chapter are before the start of this industry group dataset by the SET. Therefore, 
those extensions are not applicable here. 
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Appendix 2: Results based on the K-NI (Replicating observations only) 
 
In order to evaluate the results with the K-NI, only the observations that are comparable to 
the available SET’s Industry Group indices were used in the estimations. The results from 
the VNS and the volume-augmented models are presented in Table A2-1 and Table A2-2. 
As a conclusion, based on the most fitting specification for each industry group, the results 
with the last 49 observations of the K-NI revealed evidence of bubbles in Agro & Food, and 
Services industry groups, and some evidence in Industrials, Property & Construction, and 
Resources industry groups. However, due to the limited number of observations, the results 
for three industry groups, namely, Consumer Products, Financials, and Technology, did not 
converge. These results are mostly identical to those obtained with SET’s original industry 
group indices. Specifically, both sets of data showed at least some evidence of bubbles in 
Industrials, Property & Construction, Resources, and Services industry groups. 
Unfortunately, the results for four other industry groups were not available either with the 
SET’s industry group indices or the K-NI and, thus, cannot be directly compared. 
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Table A2-1: The K-NI (Replicating observations only): VNS model 
 
Agro & Food 
Industry 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0472***   1.0302*** 1.0701*** 1.0703*** 1.0517***  
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0871**   -0.0012 -0.1826*** -0.2006*** -0.0054  
𝛽𝑐𝑜  0.9118***   1.0643*** 1.0308*** 0.9741*** 0.9900***  
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -0.2530***   0.2151 0.1298*** 0.0195 -0.2468***  
𝛽𝑞𝑜  3.2245***   0.4096 2.4140*** 0.6424 1.3544*  
𝛽𝑞𝑏   -6.3543*   0.6487 -3.4652* -1.2036 0.9184  
𝜎𝑠  0.0474***   0.0501*** 0.0748*** 0.0518*** 0.0546***  
𝜎𝑐  0.0025**   0.1427*** 0.0015** 0.0660*** 0.0015**  
Log-Likelihood 80.7130   54.4305 62.7641 63.6666 73.2989  
AIC -2.9679   -1.8951 -2.2353 -2.2721 -2.6653  
SBIC -3.2944   -2.2217 -2.5618 -2.5986 -2.9918  
HQIC -2.8507   -1.7779 -2.1181 -2.1549 -2.5481  
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  12.4026***   0.3397 12.9095*** 3.7280* 7.1379***  
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  12.4026***   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 7.1379***  
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  12.4026***   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 7.1379***  
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  12.4026***   0.0000 12.9095*** 50.6510*** 0.0000  
Volatility regimes 14.3843***   2.7416 17.9569*** 7.8446* 7.3595  
Mixture of normals 12.8240***   2.7205 17.9569*** 7.4919* 0.0000  
Fads 11.5527***   2.3111 12.9095*** 6.3657* 7.1379*  
Starting observation Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 
No. of observations 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
 
Note: Results from the VNS model [equations (13) to (17)]. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
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Table A2-2: The K-NI (Replicating observations only): Volume-augmented model 
 
Agro & Food 
Industry 
Consumer 
Products 
Financials Industrials 
Property & 
Construction 
Resources Services Technology 
𝛽𝑠𝑜  1.0398***   1.0295*** 1.0678*** 1.0179*** 1.0307***  
𝛽𝑠𝑏  -0.0958**   -0.0345*** -0.1919*** 0.1249*** 0.0049  
𝛽𝑠𝑣  0.0272   -0.0508*** -0.0082 -0.0162 -0.0544  
𝛽𝑐𝑜  1.0633   1.0561*** 1.0344*** 1.0502*** 1.0959***  
𝛽𝑐𝑏  -1.0040   0.0750* 0.1381*** -0.2424*** -0.0628  
𝛽𝑞𝑜  2.9636***   0.1149 2.4935*** -0.5284 1.2316  
𝛽𝑞𝑏  0.8107   -0.6871 -3.4443 0.1153 -0.4135  
𝛽𝑞𝑣  -1.2346   -0.0611 -1.5010* 0.8014 -2.4189  
𝜎𝑠  0.0541***   0.0179*** 0.0747*** 0.0163*** 0.0527***  
𝜎𝑐  0.0000   0.1138*** 0.0090*** 0.0723*** 0.0506***  
Log-Likelihood 95.2424   58.2268 61.8184 69.1869 70.8985  
AIC -3.4793   -1.9684 -2.1150 -2.4158 -2.4857  
SBIC -3.8874   -2.3766 -2.5232 -2.8240 -2.8938  
HQIC -3.3328   -1.8220 -1.9686 -2.2693 -2.3392  
(𝑅1) 𝛽𝑠𝑜 ≠ 𝛽𝑐𝑜  38.2649***   5.5443** 10.4205*** 6.1793** 0.7484  
(𝑅2) 𝛽𝑐𝑏 < 0  38.2649***   0.0000 0.0000 8.0448*** 0.5549  
(𝑅3) 𝛽𝑠𝑏 > 𝛽𝑐𝑏  38.2649***   0.0000 0.0000 0.2195 0.5894  
(𝑅4) 𝛽𝑞𝑏 < 0  0.0000   2.3183 10.4205*** 0.0000 41.9608***  
(𝑅5) 𝛽𝑞𝑣 < 0  38.2649***   7.4728*** 10.4205*** 0.0000 2.1086  
(𝑅6) 𝛽𝑠𝑣 > 0  41.4615***   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000  
Volatility regimes 43.4432***   10.3343 16.0656** 18.8853*** 2.5588  
Mixture of normals 41.8829***   10.3131* 16.0656*** 18.5326*** 0.0000  
Fads 40.6116***   9.9037* 11.0183* 17.4064*** 2.3372  
VNS 29.0589***   7.5926** 0.0000 11.0407*** 0.0000  
Starting observation Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 Nov 2008 
No. of observations 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 
 
Note: Results from the volume-augmented model [equations (22) to (24)]. ***, **, * denote statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
 248 
 
 
